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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a carefully focused philosophical 
examination of the ethical arguments about the use of In 
Vitro Fertilization with Embryo Transfer {IVF/ET) and 
artificial insemination to assist infertile couples to bear 
their own genetic children. The dissertation sets the scene 
of its argument with a statement of its biological 
presuppositions and a review of the well known arguments 
about the morality of IVF/ET. It then examines Thomas 
Aquinas' teaching on natural law ethical theory, since some 
opponents of IVF/ET appeal to this theory to defend their 
position. Then the dissertation provides a detailed 
philosophical explanation and critique of an important 
document opposing IVF/ET. The author explains and critiques 
the best well known philosophical work against IVF/ET, 
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on 
the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of 
the Day by Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith {CDF, 
1987). CDF claims that unity of husband and wife, and 
proreation are essentially linked to conjugal act. That is, 
the proper nature of conjugal act is to unite husband and 
wife and to procreate children. But CDF did not show how the 
two aspects of the conjugal act that CDF considers necessary 
ri 
(unitive meaning and procreative meaning), are necessarily 
present together in conjugal act, when very often, they 
occur separately. This position of CDF is based on a kind of 
natural law (deontological) moral argument which views 
!VF/ET and artificial insemination as unnatural, hence 
immoral. Then, on the basis of a proportionalist or 
consequentialist interpretation of Thomas Aquinas' natural 
law ethical theory, in contrast with the deontological 
interpretation of this ethical theory by CDF, the author 
shows that CDF's deontological ethical argument that !VF/ET 
is unnatural and therefore immoral is fundamentally flawed. 
Instead !VF/ET is shown to be both natural and morally 
justified. Using value assumptions about the two essential 
meanings conjugal act, the unitive meaning (love of spouses) 
and the procreative meaning (value of the child), which CDF 
itself accepts, the dissertation argues on proportionalis or 
consequentialist grounds that, in general, !VF/ET yields 
more goods than harms for those involved, especially in a 
culture like Nigeria. Moreover, a comparison of !VF/ET with 
other competing alternatives shows that, in each case, 
IVF/ET yields a better balance of good over evil than the 
other alternatives. 
Therefore opponents of IVF/ET are not justified in 
condemning this technology as immoral either on the basis 
that 'it is fraught with serious risks/harm for the embryo or 
on the basis that it is unnatural. 
viii 
INTRODUCTION 
The new reproductive technologies have opened up yet 
another chapter of general moral concern in a world 
already fraught with many theoretical and practical moral 
issues. While governments, institutions and professional 
bodies were locked in theoretical moral debates about the 
morality of in vitro fertilization with embryo transfer 
(IVF/ET) and artificial insemination, individuals and 
groups of individuals were already engaged in the actual 
use of this technology to assist infertile couples to 
bear their own genetic children, some long before the 
debates even began. Presumably these individuals and 
groups knew or supposed the moral answer to the issue 
being debated was positive. Whatever rule of conduct 
these individuals have used for the judgment of their 
action, it is the goal of this dissertation to make a 
carefully focused philosophical examination about whether 
IVF/ET and artificial· insemination can be morally 
justified, and under what grounds. The work will then 
provide a consequentialist or proportionalist 
phi~osophical framework for a moral justification of 
IVF/ET. The author hopes that the findings of this work 
1 
will be a genuine contribution to philosophical 
scholarship and that it will provoke more scholarly 
discussion about the morality of IVF/ET without an 
unexamined religious partisanship. 
2 
The dissertation contains Five Chapters. Chapter One 
will provide both the biological presuppositions or 
setting of the issue of IVF/ET and artificial 
insemination as well as a general review of the moral 
arguments for and against these procedures. Chapter Two 
will give a general sketch of the available ethical 
theories that can be used to establish a philosophical 
background for the morality of IVF/ET. It will take an 
in-depth look at Thomas Aquinas' account of natural law 
ethical theory for a proper understanding of arguments 
which many def enders and opponents have employed in the 
arguments on IVF/ET. In Chapter Three, the author will 
provide a more focused and detailed ethical philosophical 
foundation for both the critique and the defense of the 
morality of IVF/ET; it will then explain the position of 
Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) 
arguments, and show that CDF's moral interpretation of 
natural law ethical theory is deontological and that its 
fundamental argument against IVF/ET is flawed. On the 
basis of the account in Chapter Three, Chapter Four will 
make a consequentialist examination of the risks/harms 
and benefits of IVF/ET, and will show that in general, 
3 
the benefits of IVF/ET will yield more goods than evil 
for all involved, especially for some cultures like 
Nigeria where human procreation is for most people the 
primary reason for marriage. A consequentialist or 
proportionalist comparison of IVF/ET with other competing 
alternatives will be the focus of Chapter Five. It will 
be shown that in each instance, IVF/ET provides a greater 
balance of good over evil than its competing alternatives 
{adoption, surgical reconstruction of the oviduct and 
other surgical procedures, acceptance of infertility 
together with the development of other avenues towards 
leading a worthwhile fulfilling life, and polygamy). The 
dissertation will end with a general conclusion that 
CDF's basic deontological argument against IVF/ET as 
unnatural and therefore immoral not only does not hold, 
but that IVF/ET is in fact morally justified. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF ISSUES 
4 
This philosophical work is primarily focused on ethical 
issues. But it has at the same time, biological and 
technological foundations which determine to a great extent 
the content and range of ethical issues to be examined in 
the dissertation. Even though many of the biological facts 
of the processes of human reproduction are well known, the 
central position of these facts in this project calls for a 
brief descriptive account of them. In this way the reader 
will be well prepared for the variety and complexity of the 
arguments which the reproductive technology of in vitro 
fertilization with embryo transfer (IVF/ET) raises. 
The biological presuppositions 
As this work will show later, human infertility which 
occurs in a number of forms has been the most important 
motivating factor in the development of the technologies 
being discussed here. For the major goal of this 
reproductive technology has been the successful treatment of 
infertility. When this goal has been achieved, it is hoped 
that the attendant negative impact of infertility in the 
lives of childless couples will also disappear. For the 
moment, the focus will be on the causes of infertility, in 
order to then understand the various reproductive 
technologies developed to overcome it, especially IVF/ET. 
But it is worth noting that the most general ethical 
justification for the development and use of reproductive 
technologies has already been identified. It is a 
consequentialist or proportionalist justification; namely, 
that the cost and other burdens of developing and using 
reproductive technologies are outweighed by the benefits of 
fertility and of lessening or if possible eliminating the 
harms of infertility for the people involved. This 
utilitarian or proportionalist defense is necessary because 
no better alternative exists for those affected than this. 
It will be necessary to return to examine this ethical 
position in detail later in chapters three and following. 
5 
Why are some of the couples who want children unable to 
have them? To appreciate the effects of reproductive 
technologies, one must first study the human reproductive 
systems. We need sufficient facts about the human 
reproductive system to answer the questions people have 
regarding IVF/ET. 
The major human reproductive organs are: (a) For the 
Male: the testes; the penis; the tubes; and the glands 
namely, the epididymis, the vas deferens, and the 
ejaculatory ducts; (b} For the Female: the ovaries; the 
fal+opian tubes or oviducts; the uterus; the cervix and the 
vagina (Alpern 1992:16-17}. But while all the above organs 
are important, each in its specific mode, we need to pay 
particular attention only to the testes and the penis with 
regard to the male and the ovaries and the uterus in regard 
to the female. 
The male reproductive system: 
6 
This section does not pretend to give an exhaustive 
account of the structures and functions of the male 
reproductive system. It focuses on what is of relevance to 
this work in a summary fashion. 
The testes: The testes are essential organs of the male 
reproductive system because the sperm, the male contributor 
to conception, develop there. The testes originally develop 
within the abdominal cavity and then descend and are 
suspended below the abdomen in the scrotum during the last 
month or two of fetal development (Creager 1983:731). 
However, it sometimes happens that the testes fail to 
descend into the scrotum. When such an abnormality occurs, 
then a man will be sterile (Swanson 1974:60). This is one 
cause of sterility in the male. 
The reason for the special location of the testes in 
the scrotum, separated from the main body cavity of the 
abdomen, is that normal body temperature seems too high for 
the sperm. "The normal temperature of the testes in the 
scr9tum is 2 [degrees] C lower than the internal body 
temperature - the ideal temperature for developing sperm" 
(Creager 1983:732). But the sperm's equal need for 
7 
protection from excessive cold is marked by the fact that 
the muscle of the scrotum in which the testes are suspended 
contracts during cold weather toward the abdominal cavity in 
order to allow "the testes to absorb heat from the rest of 
the body so that the sperm cells do not become chilled" 
(Creager 1983:732). The testes not only produce sperm but 
also the male hormone known as "testosterone", a hormone 
that is essential both "for the development and maintenance 
of the male secondary characteristics throughout the 
reproductive life of a male" (Creager 1983:407). 
The penis: This organ is appropriately structured in 
addition to its other roles to "deposit sperm into the 
reproductive tract of the female during sexual intercourse. 
During sexual arousal the penis enlarges and stiff ens and 
erection is produced" (Creager 1983:734). But the stiffness 
and erection that are necessary requirements for the penis 
to deposit sperm into the reproductive tract of the female 
are not always accomplished. "Sometimes the man's penis does 
not become and remain stiff enough to penetrate the vagina; 
in this case he is said to be 'impotent'" (Swanson 1974:91). 
This is another cause of infertility in the male. 
The female reproductive organs 
The ovaries: The ovaries are reproductive organs that are 
located on either side of the uterus and.are responsible for 
producing the ovum, the female contribution to conception. 
They also produce the female sex hormones, estrogen and 
progesterone, which are highly necessary in human 
reproduction, affecting the development of the ovum in the 
ovary as well as preparing the uterus to receive the 
conceptus if conception takes place. 
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The ovaries of a woman of child bearing age, 
approximately 12 to 47, release one mature ovum once in 
approximately every 30 days. Ordinarily fertilization of the 
ovum takes place in the oviduct by sperm that have made 
their way from the vagina to the oviduct. Some sperm are not 
efficient in making their way from the vagina to the 
oviduct, which can be another cause of a couple's 
infertility. Although it is normal that only one egg is 
released (ovulation) by the ovaries in each cycle, it 
sometimes happens that more than one ovum is released and 
this brings about the possibility for multiple, fraternal 
birth (Freiberg 1987:76). 
Serious illness and various other circumstances can 
prevent a woman once fertile from ovulating. Obviously the 
absence of any ovum makes conception impossible for her 
(Freiberg 1987:76-77}. 
It is important to note that at birth a human female's 
ovaries already contain all the ova the female will need for 
reproduction for the fertile days of her child-bearing age, 
(12 - 47) . At birth a female has "about 2 million primary 
oocytes ... and by puberty about 400,000 remain, 200,000 in 
each ovary" (Creager 1983:738). This is unlike the male 
whose testes continuously produce sperm from puberty, "at 
the rate of several million every few days" (Freiberg 
1987:78). The production of sperm continues throughout life 
even though the production of testosterone, a hormone that 
is responsible for the production of sperm in the testes, 
may decrease in amount as the male progresses in age, 
9 
(Creager 1983:730 - 731). Thus a normal male at any age can 
produce sperm to fertilize an ovum and a normal female will 
produce a fertile ovum once each cycle over her whole child-
bearing time. 
The uterus: The uterus is a muscular organ of the 
female reproductive system in which the conceptus implants 
and develops after the ovum has been fertilized by the sperm 
in the oviduct. The fertilization of an ovum by a sperm 
occurs within 24 hours after ovulation and 4 to 6 hours or 
even in as little time as 30 minutes after sexual 
intercourse depending on how rapidly the sperm moves to the 
ovum (Browder 1991:149; Creager 1983:748; Swanson 1974:116). 
As we saw above, the penis deposits several million 
sperm in the female reproductive tract during sexual 
intercourse. Various intricate developments involving 
biochemical and biophysical changes take place as the sperm 
move to meet the ovum and penetrate it for fertilization. 
The initial changes which sperm undergo before they c~n 
fertilize an ovum is called "capacitation" and "this 
10 
normally takes place in the female genital tract" {Bernstein 
and Siegel 1991:622), or it can "occur either in the uterus, 
the oviduct or both" {Browder 1991:132). The exact mechanism 
of capacitation however, remains poorly understood. {Browder 
1991:132; Davajan 1991:624). 
The fertilization of the ovum by the sperm immediately 
commences a complicated process which must take place for 
the formation of "all of the cells, tissues, organs and 
systems of the human body" {Creager, 1983:80). For this 
further growth to proceed normally, the new organism must 
come to be stationed at an appropriate place in the female 
reproductive organ; that is in the wall of the uterus. 
Defects in the structure or chemistry of the oviducts and 
uterus can make this implantation of the conceptus 
impossible or so inefficient that the conceptus cannot 
develop properly. Thus, some forms of infertility involve 
inability to conceive; other forms involve inability of the 
conceptus to properly implant and develop in the uterus. 
Creager, (1983:759) gives us a description of the 
developmental processes of human life leading from 
fertilization to implantation: 
After fertilization occurs in the uterine tube, the 
fertilized ovum, or zygote, undergoes several mitotic 
divisions known as cleavage . ... a single cell becomes 
two; each of the two divide, making four; each of the 
four divides, making eight cells; and so on, until a 
solid ball of cells, the morula, is formed. About three 
days after fertilization the morula arrives in the 
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uterine cavity, where its cells undergo a rearrangement 
to form a hollow ball, the blastocyst. 
During the second week the blastocyst undergoes 
further changes before it implants in the wall of the 
uterus. The cells of the inner cell mass continue to 
divide by mitosis, and two cavities - the gut cavity 
and the amniotic cavity - form. Between these two 
cavities is the embryonic disc, from which the 
developing embryo will form .... 
Toward the end of the second week of development, 
the blastocyst enzymatically digests its way into the 
decidua basalis, the deepest layer of the endometrium, 
and is covered by other uterine tissue called the 
decidua capsularis. This is the process called 
implantation. 
Not all the cells of the fertilized egg which have 
developed into the blastocyst stage of early human 
development will make up the actual human being who will 
eventually be born. It is noteworthy that it is specifically 
"only the cells of the embryonic disc" which develop into 
the actual human being that is born. The rest of the cells 
form external materials, such as "the placenta or membranes 
that surround the embryo" (Creager 1983:81). 
Therefore, a couple desiring to conceive and bear a 
child of their own in the normal way, must have functional 
reproductive systems. For as Mbiti has written: "Sexual 
organs are the gates of life" (1969:146). We turn now to 
consider in more detail what might go wrong with the male or 
female reproductive system to cause infertility and 
childlessness for a couple. 
12 
Infertility 
Definition: By the standard, technical definition, 
infertility is "the inability of a couple to conceive after 
1 year of sexual intercourse without using any type of 
contraception" (Mishell and Davajan 1991:557). By this 
standard, about 15 percent of couples (Freiberg 1987:438), 
are infertile. Mishell and Davajan distinguish between two 
categories of infertile couples. Those with a low rate of 
conception who are nevertheless able to conceive without any 
medical treatment (but who go longer than a year without 
conceiving) are distinguished from those who cannot conceive 
at all without medical assistance (1991:557). The later 
category is the one that is of interest to this work and the 
terms "infertile" and "infertility" will be used henceforth 
here to refer specifically to this group. However, because 
of the importance of African and especially Nigerian 
cultural traditions to certain parts of this study, it is 
important to point out that "There is no clear distinction 
in much of Africa between barrenness, subfecundity, and 
child death" (John C. Caldwell and Pat Caldwell 1987:417). 
Various kinds of problems account for the infertility 
among couples. Some of these problems are specific to the 
males, others are specific to the females. In about 20 
per~ent of cases of infertility, both partners have problems 
that need to be addressed (Freiberg 1987:438). These include 
"couples who have failed to achieve pregnancy despite 
13 
evaluations that uncover no obvious reasons for their 
infertility or to those who remain infertile despite 
correction of all detectable causes of infertility" (Foad 
Azem et al 1994:1090). This kind of infertility accounts for 
"approximately 10% to 15% of infertile couples" (Foad Azem 
et al 1994:1090). 
Male infertility 
Bernstein and Siegel identify several factors 
responsible for male infertility. There are anatomic factors 
such as congenital anomalies which might interfere with the 
male delivery of semen into the vagina, for example, partial 
or total absence of the vas def erens through which the sperm 
pass to reach the penis and then the vagina. Other 
contributing elements to male infertility that could occur 
include: endocrine problems, such as pituitary tumor or 
testicular failure; genetic factors such as sex chromosome 
abnormalities; inflammatory problems whereby ejaculatory 
ducts can be blocked. Examples of this last category include 
urethritis caused by gonorrhea or external agents such as x-
ray and radiation (Berstein and Siegel 1991:628). 
Female infertility 
Female infertility can be caused by: the inability of 
women to produce ova (anovulation); pelvic factors such as 
tubal blockage;_ abnormalities in the endocrine system such 
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as insufficient cervical mucus, which prevents sperm from 
traveling to the oviducts in good condition for conception; 
and inflammatory diseases such as gonorrhea, chlamydia, 
tuberculosis, and polyps which could have the same effects 
(Mishell and Davajan 1991:562; Freiberg 1987:439). 
Medical technology has been successful in the 
treatment of some of these infertility problems through 
modern surgical techniques such as laser surgery (Freiberg 
1987:439); and some chronic infectious conditions can be 
treated medically and cured, although long-standing 
infections can do permanent damage to the reproductive 
system that can render a woman infertile even after the 
infection is cured. But the major concern of this project is 
infertility of couples which cannot be alleviated by medical 
or surgical techniques. It was 'for infertility of this sort 
that the reproductive technologies, including in vitro 
fertilization with embryo transfer, were developed. This 
essay now turns attention to them. 
The reproductive technologies 
First, a distinction must be made between contraceptive 
and conceptive reproductive technologies. Contraceptive 
reproductive technologies are medical and technological 
int~rventions which are designed to interrupt and prevent 
pregnancy. They include, diaphragms, intra-uterine devices, 
sterilization, abortion, the 'pills', hormone-suppressing 
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drugs, spermicides, and barrier techniques such as cervical 
cap and condom, (Stanworth 1987:10, Mishell 1991:827-835, 
Oakley 1987:40). Periodic abstinence from sexual 
intercourse, following the so-called "natural family 
planning" or the "rhythm" method, is another form of 
contraceptive technique (Mishell 1991:835-836). 
Conceptive technologies are those medical technological 
devices which are "directed to the promotion of pregnancy 
through techniques for overcoming or bypassing infertility" 
(Stanworth 1987:11). They are also called '"artificial 
procreation• or •artificial fertilization'" (Congregation 
For The Doctrine Of The Faith [CDF] 1987:21). These are "the 
different technical procedures directed towards obtaining a 
human conception in a manner other than the sexual union of 
man and woman" (CDF 1987:21). 
According to Fletcher, "The new conceptive technologies 
operate all the way from the germ cell through fertilization 
and gestation and fetal control to delivery and postnatal 
therapy of newborns" (1988:10). By way of specification 
then, the variety of conceptive technologies include 
•artificial insemination• which may or may not require a 
specialized medical intervention, 'in-vitro fertilization•, 
which involves very sophisticated medical surgical and 
labC?ratory procedures" (Stanworth 1987:11). 
Other reproductive technologies include, sex 
selection, whereby the sex of an offspring can be determined 
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or predetermined and chosen, sperm and zygote banking or 
embryo and oocyte cryopreservation, whereby embryos which 
are not transferred in a woman's uterus can be preserved for 
future use {Largey 1978:1439; Paulson 1991:817). Largey, 
however, points out that although an effective technological 
means for sex selection has not been developed, its 
availability in the future will be inevitable. 
This dissertation focuses on the philosophical basis 
for an acceptable ethic of in vitro fertilization with 
embryo transfer {IVF/ET) and artificial insemination. 
Henceforth this work shall simply ref er to all these 
procedures as IVF/ET except where otherwise specified. This 
means that, surrogate gestation and donor sperm and egg, 
will be left out of consideration. In this connection the 
primary position of in vitro fertilization among all 
existing and emerging reproductive technologies at present 
can hardly be overrated; but its factual data needs to be 
addressed. 
IVF/ET has been developed out of need to alleviate 
infertility that is brought about by various kinds of tubal 
diseases and abnormalities which could not be cured by other 
medical or surgical means {Paulson 1991:807). IVF/ET, then, 
"performs the function of the fallopian tube" {Paulson 
1991:807), without which fertilization or conception is 
impossible. IVF/ET proceduce: 
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"begins with drug therapy to produce super-ovulation in 
a woman. Through a procedure called laparoscopy, the 
resulting eggs are removed from the woman's 
reproductive tract and then fertilized. An embryo is 
then implanted in the woman's uterus and, if the 
implantation is successful, carried to term. The 
remaining embryos are stored, either for future 
implantation should the first attempt fail, or for use 
in scientific or medical experiments (George P. Smith 
II 1990:24). 
Artificial insemination (AI), as was already noted, is 
of two kinds; homologous artificial insemination (AIH) and 
heterologous artificial insemination (AID) . The former 
occurs when the semen is obtained from the husband of the 
woman whose ovum is fertilized while the latter occurs when 
the semen is acquired from a donor (see Richard Westley 
1989:84). In both cases, semen is obtained by means of 
masturbation (Frankel 1978:1444; CDF 1987:32). Throughout 
this study, AIH, homologous artificial insemination will be 
the focus unless otherwise indicated. When IVF/ET (AID), is 
mentioned, it will be for the sake of analogy or comparison. 
Specifically then, homologous IVF/ET could be used where 
childlessness is due to a husband's insufficient sperm 
production ("oligospermia") or "low motility" or 
"immobilization of sperm in the cervical mucus" or problems 
with the volume of semen (Davajan 1991:605, 607) necessary 
for the fertilization of his wife's ovum or insufficient 
"viscosity", that is, "incomplete liquefication" (Bernstein 
and siege! 1991:622; Davajan 1991:607) ot the semen for 
proper motility of sperm and fertilization of ovum. 
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Specific and individual reasons abound for the use of 
IVF/ET where the reproductive condition of a wife is the 
cause of childlessness in her marriage. The reasons include: 
"where a wife suffers from abnonnal cervical mucus or 
insufficient amount of essentially nonnal mucus at midcycle" 
(Davajan 1991:603-604). 
The number of women with infertility problems appears 
to be numerous. This author assumes that at worst, what is 
true of the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America1 , could be true of another nation, for example, 
Nigeria, in the specific frequency of infertility due to 
tubal blockage. It is estimated that "in the United Kingdom 
approximately 2 percent of all women suffer from tubal 
occlusion" (Edwards 1974:10). Of this number only about one 
fifth could be helped through an alternative means of "tubal 
reconstruction" (Edwards 1974:10). In the United States of 
America, the estimate is "that 15%- of all married couples" 
are infertile (Blank 1985:14). Of this number it is 
estimated "that between 0.5%- and 1%- of all American women 
can be helped no other way except by IVF (Blank 1985:14; 
LeRoy Walters 1979:26). 
But the question of number of women suffering from 
infertility is not limited to those suffering from tubal 
occ~usion. There are other forms of infertility. They 
. The assumption is made because of lack of accurate statistical record, say for example in Nigeria. 
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includes "endocrine disturbances or antibodies against 
spermatozoa in men and women, and oligospermia in men" 
(Edwards 1974:10). Only a fraction of the men with 
oligospermia could be helped by "artificial insemination 
using pooled ejaculates." (see Smith II 1990:24). There is 
no doubt therefore, that the "most obvious benefit of !VF is 
that it circumvents infertility and allows persons with a 
strong desire to have children to rear a family" (George P. 
Smith II 1990:25; cf. also Westley 1989:85). 
The pioneering work on !VF/ET was done by, among other 
scientists, a British embryologist, R.G.Edwards. He 
describes IVF/ET as the "ability to fertilize human eggs in 
culture, grow them for three to four days in the laboratory 
and then replace them in the mother to grow to full term" 
(Edward and Sharp 1971:87). Or if one prefers, !VF is "the 
fertilization in the test tube, of human egg by human sperm, 
and the subsequent laboratory culture of the young embryo" 
(Kass 1972:23). 
This technology involves considerable technical and 
ethical difficulties which both proponents and opponents of 
the procedure seek to overcome. One of the major technical 
difficulties which this procedure involves is to "obtain 
mature, functional eggs." In order to overcome this 
dif~iculty, "Edwards and his obstetrician colleague, Dr. P. 
C. Steptoe, have devised a surgical method, known as 
laparoscopy, to obtain matured eggs directly from the 
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ovaries prior to ovulation" (Kass 1972:23). More recently, 
the woman's ovaries are now stimulated with drugs to produce 
multiple ova (superovulation) to increase the chance that 
laparoscopy will obtain (several) healthy ova for 
insemination. But it is the ethical problems relating to 
this technology that interest us most here. 
Some challenges to IVF. 
The debate which this work is concerned about, is 
captured by the following: 
The use of new biotechnology in medicine has become an 
everyday experience, but many people still express 
concern about biotechnology. Concerns are evoked 
particularly by the phrases genetic engineering and in 
vitro fertilization(IVF), and these concerns persist 
despite more than a decade of their use in medicine 
(Darryl R. J. Macer 1994:23). 
The promise of IVF/ET to alleviate infertility has been 
challenged on more than one front. For example it has been 
confronted on medical grounds; and so questions have been 
asked: "is infertility really a medical need" (Walters 
1979:26)? Is it is a "disease" or a "desire" to have one's 
own child (Kass 1972; Kass 1974:138-139; Kass 1985:55;), and 
so is a warrant or justification of the roles played by 
medical researchers to satisfy this need? 
Some of these thinkers raise philosophical questions. 
For example Walters, highlights the philosophical concept of 
"the nature of infertility as a disease" on which some 
authors take a position when they turn to IVF/ET as the 
medical answer to the physical problem of infertility. 
Whether or not infertility is a medical need, a disease or 
desire, depends on the meaning one attaches to it. 
Still other opponents have challenged this technology 
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on more specific philosophical grounds - purely metaphysical 
and ethical reasons. For example, some have said that "The 
process of IVF and ET must be judged in itself and cannot 
borrow its definitive moral quality from the totality of 
conjugal life of which it becomes part nor from the conjugal 
acts which may precede or follow it" CDF (1987:29}. More 
precisely CDF believes the procedure is inherently unethical 
because it severs a necessary relationship between marital 
sexual intercourse and human reproduction as well as the 
unity between spouses (cf. CDF 1987:26-29; Smith II 
1990:25} . 2 For CDF "Fertilization achieved outside the 
bodies of the couple remains by this very fact deprived of 
the meanings and the values which are expressed in the 
language of the body and in the union of human persons" 
(1987:28}. 
On other ethical grounds especially harm, the procedure 
is :viewed as immoral. For example, it is claimed that "IVF 
. George P. Smith does not necessarily share CDF's views about the severance between marital sexual 
intercourse and human procreation. But this author believes that Smith correctly interpretes CDF's' 
philosophical thinking about the issue being discussed. 
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and ET involves the destruction of human beings" {CDF 
1987:29; Smith II 1990:26). Or as it is said: "Methods of 
observation or experimentation which damage or impose grave 
and disproportionate risks upon embryos obtained in vitro 
are morally illicit for the same reason" {CDF 1987:18). 
Still further ethical objection are raised against IVF/ET 
because it is used for experimentation on fetuses which 
causes them pain {Smith II 1990:25). 
On the other side the proponents of IVF research hold 
that "the desire to have children must be among the most 
basic of human instincts and denying it can lead to 
considerable psychological and social difficulties" {Edwards 
and Sharp 1971:87; Lappe 1974:143;). For these authors, 
infertility seems to be "clinical defect to be remedied if 
possible by medical attention" {Edwards and Sharp 1971:87). 
It is a kind of unhealthiness to be corrected by available 
appropriate medical means if the patient chooses it. 
Some of the opponents of the IVF/ET who argue that 
infertility is not a disease, propose that a resort to 
IVF/ET to alleviate infertility is not a resort to medicine 
for the cure of a disease, but a resort to medical technique 
to satisfy the desire of an infertile couple for a genetic 
offspring. Thus the procedure does not cure the infertility 
since the woman "remains as infertile as before" {Kass 
1971:1176-77). 
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Kass' argument seems to carry little or no force at all 
when placed side by side with other human ailments which are 
treated by artificial means without permanently curing them. 
For instance "insulin, false teeth, and spectacles" (Edwards 
1974:11) are meant to bring temporal relief to some health 
problems. It is argued that, in these three examples, the 
physician is also treating the desire of a patient "to be 
nondiabetic or to see and eat properly" (Edwards 1974:11), 
just as the physician is using IVF to respond to the desire 
of a childless couple to have their own child. 
At the root of this debate is the issue of the meaning 
of the concept "health" and, more narrowly, the categories 
of human functioning that are to be considered normal, not 
just in the sense of a statistical average, but in the sense 
that they are normative, they are the functions that mature 
humans should have and should keep and should be helped to 
maintain. We will have to explore some fundamental 
philosophical questions about what it is to be a human 
person, to study the ethics of using IVF/ET to assist the 
infertile. 
Furthermore, the benefit-oriented argument for IVF/ET 
has also been challenged by Kass. Against the view that 
IVF/ET is the only method to help many women who are 
infertile due to tubal occlusion, "surgical reconstruction 
of the oviduct" (Kass 1972:26; Kass 1985:56) is suggested as 
an alternative means as a safeguard against potential 
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hazards of the procedures and their unacceptable ethical 
implications. Kass says that this is a preferred therapeutic 
procedure which avoids unnecessary manipulation of 
reproductive method and the risks of the loss of embryos. 
Although Kass thus argues that IVF experiments involve 
great risk of harm of unknown nature, he also adopts at some 
stage the mediating view which is essentially 
consequentialistic in character; namely, that caution should 
be exercised to see that the risks be comparatively as low 
as those found in natural method of human reproduction. In 
this direction, he seems to argue against some authors who 
advocate total prohibition of the technology of IVF/ET 
because of the many unknown risks it embodies for the child 
in the making, as when he says: "But I do not think that the 
risk of harm must be positively excluded ... It would suffice 
if those risks were roughly equivalent to the risks to the 
child from normal procreation" (Kass 1985:55). 
Other alternatives to IVF/ET, have been proposed. For 
example "acceptance of childlessness together with the 
development of other avenues towards leading a worthwhile 
fulfilled life" (Susan Uniacke 1987:243; CDF 1987:34) 3 is 
said to be a better answer than IVF/ET to the problem of 
infertility. As Uniacke has observed, "whether acceptance of 
childlessness is a satisfactory alternative to IVF will have 
. Susan Uniacke does not necessarily endorse this proposal. She simply cites it as one of the proposed 
alternatives to NF /Ef. 
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bearing on what type of problem infertility is and how 
seriously it should be regarded" (1987:243). Uniacke's 
observation is fittingly forceful in the face of the 
question, whether infertility is "really a medical need", "a 
disease" or whether it is simply a desire to have one's own 
Child. II 
Still other alternatives as old as marriage itself in 
some cultures have been in use to combat infertility. For 
example, it must be noted with some emphasis that long 
before IVF/ET, Africans contained infertility by "polygamy" 
(cf. John S. Mbiti 1969; M Angulu Onwuejeogwu 191975; J. F. 
A. Ajayi 1965; Nicholas N. Obi 1987; Elizabeth Isichei 
1995) . But others still have proposed "adoption" (CDF 
1987:34). Also, divorce or separation of spouses is another 
alternative to answering the problem of infertility in 
African cultures. According to some authorities, infertility 
is probably the greatest single cause of divorce "since 
inability to bear children blocks the stream of life" (Mbiti 
1969:145). 
On the other hand, R.G. Edwards, one of the foremost of 
the exponents and innovators of IVF who made the procedure a 
reality of our time, argues in favor of IVF/ET on the basis 
of foreseen benefits of the technology. He notes that 
h~nkind will benefit irmnensely and in various ways from 
the medical breakthrough of IVF/ET: (1) "Some forms of 
infertility (blockage of the oviduct) could pos·sibly be 
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cured; (2) knowledge useful for contraceptive4 technology 
could be gained; and (3) knowledge and methods could be 
obtained leading to the alleviation of genetic disorders and 
even other deformities" {Edwards 1974; Hirschhorn 1974:68-
69) . 
Other thinkers have argued that risk of harm to the 
embryo does not support a strong criticism of the morality 
of IVF. For it is claimed, that the danger the embryo is 
exposed to in terms of risk of deformity {mental or 
physical), or even total destruction, is not different from 
the risk it experiences under ordinary process of human 
conception {Lappe 1972:105; CDF 1987;14). 
In fact it is well known that as much as "50 percent of 
eggs successfully fertilized during unprotected sexual 
intercourse fail to implant ... and are shed soon 
thereafter" {Lappe 1974:144; Kass 1985:107). Some authors 
contend even a higher rate of loss of fertilized eggs based 
on scientific evidence - about 75% loss {cf. Jeffrey Reiman 
1993:174). 
However, this technology of IVF/ET has helped thousands 
of barren married couples to bear their own genetic children 
throughout the world. For example, available report confirm 
. But contraception itself raises some independent ethical questions. 
that "more than 150,000 children have been born worldwide 
through IVF-ET" (Francois Olivennes, et al 1997:284) . 5 
Psychological or social harm 
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There is yet another set of benefits/harms-based 
arguments brought to bear against IVF/ET. This set concerns 
itself with the end product of IVF with regard to the 
identity of the child in the society. It is argued that the 
child of IVF/ET will suffer psychologically about the image 
of himself or herself given the fact that he or she is a 
direct product of artificial means of reproduction (Cynthia 
B. Cohen 1996:20; Smith 1990:25; CDF 1987:32; McCormick 
1978:1462). 
Some other serious objections of demographic kind have 
been brought against IVF/ET. For example, it has been argued 
that the selection of sex through the perfection of IVF/ET 
could cause a major imbalance in the world's population. 
In every instance, arguments of this sort need to be 
developed with both a full evaluation of the feared outcome, 
and evidence of its likelihood, together with a careful 
value-comparison of that set of future events (including the 
benefits of IVF/ET for parents and offspring who benefit 
from the procedure) with the alternative set of future 
. Cf. "Follow-up of a cohort of 422 children aged 6 to 13 years conceived by in vitro fertilization" by 
Francois Olivennes, et al; in: Fertility and Sterility: Official Journal of The American Fertility Society, The 
American Fertility Society, 1209 Montgomery Highway, Birmingham, Alabama, Vol. 67, No. 2,-February 
1997, pp. 284-289. 
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events in which IVF/ET is not practiced. Rarely do critics 
of IVF/ET work out the details of such an argument with any 
care. But those who support IVF/ET on the basis of its 
benefits rarely do so either. Attempts will be made to 
supply that lack in chapters three, four and five; where the 
benefits and harms/risks/burdens of IVF/ET will be treated 
at length. 
Informed consent. 
Medically, "Informed Consent" may be defined as the 
willingness of a patient to accept without force or any form . 
of manipulation, a medical intervention, after sufficient 
explanation has been made of the given medical intervention 
by a health care-giver. Usually the information about the 
medical intervention includes: "its risks, and benefits, as 
well as of alternatives with their risks and benefits" 
(Jansen, Siegler and Winslade 1982:62). 
The sufficiency of informed consent is measured by two 
criteria, namely: "(1) information that is commonly provided 
by competent practitioners in the community or the 
specialty; (2) information that would allow reasonable 
persons to make prudent choices in their own behalf". 
(Jansen, Siegler and Winslade 1982:62). 
Both opponents and proponents of IVF/ET see the 
relevance of informed consent as a criterion of ethical use 
of IVF/ET. Watson stresses the importance of informed 
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consent when he says that "as many people as possible be 
informed about the new ways of human reproduction and their 
potential consequences, both good and bad" (1974:75). Some 
writers however, think that not enough information is 
ordinarily given to the participants of IVF/ET in order to 
elicit their full consent before subjecting them to any 
experimentation. Kass, for example, says that "most of the 
scientific reports on human embryo transfer were strangely 
silent on the nature of the egg donors, on their 
understanding of what was to be done with their eggs, and on 
the manner of obtaining their consent (1985:56). Kass 
rightly believes that this kind of medical experiment should 
be condemned as "cruel and unethical" because it falsely 
generates the participants' hope "by telling the women that 
they themselves, rather than future infertile women, might 
be helped to have a child, in order to secure their 
participation in experiments" (Kass 1972:31; Kass 1985:56). 
Kass' observation seems proper, especially as the heightened 
desire of infertile women to have children may unduly lead 
them to give in to possible uncritical promises of the 
researchers. 
It is quite obvious however, that most of the exponents 
of the technology of artificial human reproduction, fully 
recognize the significance of informed consent. They do 
ordinarily guard against any unwitting exploitation of the 
infertile condition of the couples desperately desiring to 
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have genetic children of their own. Contrary to Kass' 
argument just above, they argue that many infertile couples 
are willing to cooperate with the experimental work on 
fertilization and embryo transfer. They claim that their 
patients are well informed about the procedures. In 
addition, the patients are aware that "the methods might not 
work, their infertility remain uncured, and that other women 
may be the ultimate beneficiaries of the developing methods" 
(Edwards 1974:11). 
Kass also raises an important question about the desire 
to have children in the first place. Do we have children 
primarily for ourselves or for our children? Kass argues 
that "if having children is regarded primarily as the 
satisfaction of parental desires, to attain our own 
fulfillment and happiness" (1985:55), then one cannot 
ethically choose for an unborn child, especially the 
unconceived, "the unknown hazards he must face and 
simultaneously choose to give him life in which to face 
them" (Kass 1985:54). 
If on the other hand "we have children not primarily 
for ourselves but for our children, if procreation means to 
pass on the gift of life to the next generation ... then 
this clear benefit to a child to be, even to a child at 
ris~, as all our children are, could justify the risks taken 
because they are taken in the child's behalf- provided, of 
course, that the risks are not excessive" (Kass 1985:55). 
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Obviously these considerations bear on benefits-based 
. arguments for IVF/ET as well as on the conditions that need 
to be met for proper informed consent by participants in 
IVF/ET. 
The proponents of IVF/ET are also equally concerned as 
their opponents about the psychological and other well 
beings of the product of IVF, as when they note for example 
that: 
If there is no undue risk of deformity additional to 
those in natural conception, and publicity is avoided, 
the children should grow and develop normally and be no 
more misfits than other children born today after some 
form of medical help (Edwards 1974:12). 
But some opponents of the IVF technology appear 
resolute to the demand for absolute safety from risk of 
harm, given the fact that the unconceived is intentionally 
being brought into a possible harmful existence without its 
consent. On this score the objection is expressed that: To 
manipulate a patient into being requires at least the far 
more stringent requirement that to do this we must know that 
every possibility of damage from the procedure itself has 
surely been foreclosed (Ramsey 1972:1349). 
But not all would agree with Ramsey's stipulation for 
the obvious reason that none of us in our present states was 
consulted prior to our conception and birth. With this sort 
of reasoning, Fletcher rejoins that "the absurdity of" any 
objection such as Ramsey's above, i~ appreciated simply by 
remembering that babies produced in the coital-gestational 
or natural way could not have given their consent either 
(1988:95). 
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Still some other advocates of the IVF/ET process argue 
that the demand for consent from the child to be born 
necessarily "leads to total negation - even to denying a 
mother a sleeping pill, a cesarean section or an 
amniocentesis for fear of disturbing the child (Edwards 
1974:14). John A. Robertson argues along these lines when he 
writes that "preventing harm would mean preventing the birth 
of the child ... " (1994:75-76). 
This argument is more forceful given the fact that, 
"every medical treatment from eating aspirin to open-heart 
surgery, carries a risk for each patient, and fetuses are 
not asked before hand about their own conception" (1974:14). 
The arguments of Fletcher and Edwards on the consent 
issue with reference to various deformities a child from 
natural method of conception seem to justify at least 
similar risks of possible deformities that may arise from 
IVF/ET. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it will be 
assumed that in every instance of IVF/ET the parents of the 
emb~o are fully informed of all important medical facts 
about their own condition, the nature of the IVF/ET 
procedure and the possible outcomes of the procedure and 
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their respective likelihood. It also will be assumed that 
the parents consent to the procedure voluntarily and for the 
sake of their own and their future child's benefits. In this 
way, we can focus specifically on the morality of the IVF/ET 
procedure itself, rather than being distracted by the 
important, but distinct issues of informed consent in 
medical decision-making. 
What the technology is likely to lead to. 
Aside from the direct potential benefits and harms of 
IVF/ET itself there is another kind of objection to the use 
of this technology. This objection derives from a fear of 
what the technology of IVF/ET will lead humankind to. At the 
core of this argument are certain negative projections about 
the effects of medical advances involving IVF/ET. 
These projections seek to alert the public of the 
latent dangers of the new reproductive technology and if 
possible ask for a ban on the intervention. In these 
arguments, there is a shift in the direction of the 
arguments against IVF/ET from considering the "uses" of the 
technology to considering its possible "abuses." 
It is feared that IVF/ET technology, even if good in 
itself for the treatment of infertility, nevertheless might 
act as a stepping stone to more dangerous technological 
innovations. For example, there is no guarantee that an 
embryo fertilized in vitro, will "be implanted in the same 
woman from whom the egg was obtained" {Kass 1985:59; 
McCormick 1978:1462; Watson 1974:73), and this obviously 
raises an independent ethical question {McCormick 
1978:1462). 
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There may be "women with uterine abnormalities that 
preclude normal pregnancy" who "may seek surrogate 
gestational mothers" {Kass 1985:60). Similarly, there may be 
women who seek surrogate motherhood because they "don't want 
pregnancy to interfere with " their favorite sports" "enough 
poor women available to fonn a caste of childbearers, 
especially for good pay" {Kass 1985:60; Watson 1974:73). 
Both the proponents and opponents of artificial 
insemination agree that surrogate motherhood, which the 
procedure sometimes employs, can bring conflict of interest 
between the biological mother and the gestational mother, 
about the child. For example, for one reason or another, 
either the surrogate mother or the biological mother could 
be disenchanted with the pregnancy and so seeks an abortion 
{McCormick 1978:1462 ;Edwards 1974:12). But these are 
distinct ethical questions from those at the center of this 
essay. 
It is also feared that the technology will lead to a 
weakening of the marriage bond between husband and wife, or 
eve~ encourage adulterous practices {Ramsey 1970:50; 
McCormick 1978:1462-1463; Westley 1989:85). Some critics 
fear that the technology will lead to two sharply 
distinguished kinds of humans beings. Others fear its 
effects on people's sense of their genealogy or on such 
important social practices as inheritance (Jacobvits 248-
249}. 
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Other extensions of the technology beyond an infertile 
marriage exist. For example, single women such as widows, 
lesbians, homosexuals, could use the technology for their 
own purposes; and others might even use it for personal 
comfort and economic gain. These cases not only exemplify 
the many possible abuses of the reproductive intervention 
they also "raise the fear of directed breeding programs 
under a totalitarian regime" which may culminate in cloning 
(Kass 1985:61; Watson 1974:73; McCormick 1978:1462}. 
Nevertheless, these arguments carry little or no force in 
relation to the ethics of IVF/ET procedures themselves. Some 
commentators in fact argue that pointing to these fears in 
order to call for total ban on the technology is simply 
refusing to look at hard questions of reproductive reality. 
The new reproductive technology is here with us for good, 
they optimistically claim. But in any case there are 
separate ethical questions here to be asked. 
Against such fears that IVF/ET will lead to undesirable 
ends, however, the proponents of the technology debunk the 
fallacy of inevitability inherent in the arguments of their 
opponents. Thus they ask: has "nuclear physics led 
inevitably to the atom bomb, electr~city to the electric 
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chair, air transport to bombers and hijackers, civil 
engineering to the gas chambers" (Edwards 1974:11)? Each of 
these developments depended on numerous choices along the 
way on which moral agents could have judged and chosen 
otherwise. There is nothing inevitable about it. 
Another commentator words the same idea somewhat 
differently; "Should the cure of malaria have been withheld 
- because it has led to overpopulation? Should the 
development of penicillin have been stopped - because it 
kept alive soldiers 'fighting unjust wars" (Beatty 1974:62}? 
Supporters of IVF/ET are claiming here that the 
successful introduction of IVF/ET technology does not 
necessarily mean that it will lead to unwelcome 
consequences. The fact that the technology may be misused, 
by people who make bad judgments or have evil ends in view, 
should not stop us from embarking on the good project that 
the procedure is meant to achieve. 
Yet, at the same time, neither side of this debate 
defends a strong position. All the alternative possible 
futures they are envisioning must be carefully and plausibly 
articulated and evaluated, and then compared - both in terms 
of the benefits and of the harms they involve and in terms 
of their likelihood of occurring - and then those futures 
mus~ be compared with the future likely to occur if IVF/ET 
is not developed. Ouly then will solid arguments about the 
future uses of this technology be available for study. 
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Cloning, another of the new reproductive technologies, 
is another example, and one of the most radical, of what the 
reproductive technology of IVF/ET might lead to. It has 
become a widespread belief among many scientis that not too 
far into the future, human reproduction will be possible by 
cloning. This knowledge has upset some thinkers while 
gladdening the hearts of others. Those who welcome this 
scientific development do so not only on the basis of its 
purported inunediate benefit of helping childless couples to 
have children of their own (Watson 1974:73), but also on the 
general ethical ground that it "provides more good than 
harm" ( Watson 1974:74). 
On a wider scale, cloning of humans would be welcome 
because the technique, it is claimed, would offer one of 
the best avenues yet of unraveling the genetic and 
biochemical origins of certain killer diseases such as 
cancer (Watson 1974:75). The detection of serious recessive 
hereditary defects in the carriers (Glass 1971:28) is 
another of the many promises that have added prominence to 
the development of IVF/ET, and to cloning or other 
reproductive techniques. But at the present time, research 
on cloning is almost completely independent of the 
scientifically established methods of IVF/ET treatment for 
inf~rtility. So supporting IVF/ET treatment will add little 
to the impetus for cloning research. Again, while cloning 
raises many ethical questions, the link of necessity to 
IVF/ET is absent. 
Need for appropriate laboratory research. 
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One other aspect of the benefits-based ethical debate 
about IVF/ET concerns its experimental or research side. The 
basic elements of the procedure are now commonplace, but 
research and reproductive innovations continue on today and 
raise some ethical questions in their own right. Central to 
the arguments on clinical IVF research is the possibility of 
unforeseen risks which this experimentation involves, 
particularly in regard to the human embryo. 
Two kinds of research on human subjects can be 
distinguished. They are: "Laboratory" or "non-therapeutic 
research" and "Clinical" or "Therapeutic research" (Walters 
1977:193). (1) Laboratory (non-therapeutic) IVF research is 
one in which the medical scientists "have no intention of 
transferring any embryo to the uterus of a woman for 
implantation, gestation and eventual birth" (Walters 
1979:23). Commentators say that this type of research is 
purely for experimental purposes designed either for 
perfecting IVF technique or to gain improved knowledge about 
other medical problems involving the human embryo. What is 
most important ethically is that it will not necessarily be 
of any benefit to the embryo that is the subject of the 
research, (Walters 1977:193). 
There are very complex ethical issues about research 
that is not expected to benefit a human research subject 
especially if any risk is involved. For present purposes, 
however, the focus will be on therapeutic IVF research 
because the issues parallel issues in IVF/ET itself. 
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(2) Clinical (therapeutic) IVF research "refers to the 
use of IVF and embryo transfer in an attempt to initiate a 
pregnancy and produce a child" (Walters 1979:23). This is 
therefore therapeutic research, conducted "primarily for the 
benefit of a patient-subject whether by prevention, 
diagnosis, or treatment" (Walters 1977:193). 
Kass contends that the technology has not been 
subjected to serious questioning about the possible risks of 
harm to the conceptus, even before any clinical application 
of the technology to assist an infertile patient. For 
instance, Kass argues that very limited research had been 
carried out on animals. But even if sufficient and 
successful research have been carried out on animals, he 
argues, there still remains the probability that animal 
"experiments could neither rule out nor establish the risk 
of mental retardation for children resulting from 
experiments in humans" (Kass 1985:53). For there are 
differences between animal species. What works well in a 
pri~te or monkey might not work equally well in humans. 
Kass claims that laboratory testing of animal embryos does 
not give enough information about normality and that the 
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information it does reveal is too crude to assure safety for 
human embryos (Kass:53}. Kass claims that the success so far 
achieved on animals without deformities lacks "systematic 
investigation" of various questions about serious or less 
serious abnormalities which could arise at birth or later 
after birth. 
Kass points out a number of harms that the human embryo 
could suffer in IVF/ET experimentations. (1) Not only does 
"laboratory testing of human embryo" prior to their transfer 
not provide enough information about normality, it is 
possible that testing in and of itself can damage the 
embryos. (2} Not only do genetic tests on the embryos have 
the possibility of damaging it; but "there are few genetic 
tests ... available for the doing" (3) Kass also notes that 
damage could be done to the embryo in the very process of 
transferring it into its mother's uterus (Kass 1985:52-53; 
Westley 1989:89}. 
Still some other authors point out that "using IVF as a 
means to produce embryos for experiments or as sources of 
tissues and organs subjects the· embryos to pain" (Smith II 
1990:25}. Smith argues that this objection to IVF on the 
basis of the pain it will inflict on the embryos "would have 
considerable merit where experiments were conducted on 
sub~tantially developed fetuses" (1990:25}. On this issue, 
Smith points out that other writers contend that "conducting 
such scientific interventions with embryos in the first 
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several weeks of their development, such embryos probably do 
not experience pain, owing to the absence of a critical 
nervous system" (Smith 1990:25; Robertson 1988). 
On the other hand, it is argued that medical progress 
is virtually impossible without experimentations that 
involves both human beings and animals (Edwards and Graber 
1988:180). The implication of this claim is that the 
potential benefits of medical progress outweigh the 
potential harms to embryos, that will accompany the 
necessary research. Crucial to this claim, but rarely 
spelled out carefully by the disputants, are views about the 
moral status of the embryo itself. These will be discussed 
shortly. 
In practice, the discussion of these issues takes place 
in relation to accepted ethical guidelines about biomedical 
research. For any experimentation involving human subjects 
to be morally justified, that experiment must fall within 
the following established ethical norms: 
The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful 
results for the good of society, unprocurable by other 
methods or means of study, and not random and 
unnecessary in nature. [Nuremberg Code, 1947,RULE 2] . 
... It is essential that the result of laboratory 
experiments be applied to human beings to further 
scientific knowledge and to help suffering humanity ... 
In the field of scientific research a fundamental 
distinction must be recognized between clinical 
·research in which the aim is essentially therapeutic 
for a patient and clinical research the aim of which is 
purely scientific and without therapeutic value to the 
person subjected to the research. [Declaration of 
Helsinki,1964]. 
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This review shall determine ... whether the risks 
to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the 
benefit to the subject and the importance of the 
knowledge to be gained as to warrant a decision to 
allow the subject to accept those risks. [Protection of 
human subjects, DREW, May 30, 1974.] (Walters 
1977:194). 
As Walters explains, the important and recurrent themes 
of these ethical guidelines are "risk-benefit and informed 
consent." Consequently, IVF research has been approached 
from the perspective of the "need" of individuals concerned. 
The risk-benefit or need question and the consent issues, 
however, would be without any real import, if there were not 
many infertile women who may benefit from the IVF research 
directly, and by extension society; or if there are other 
ways of relieving the infertility problem without recourse 
to research involving human embryos or as noted above, if 
the desire to have one's own biological child, were not 
considered a medical need (Walters 1979:25-26). 
Based on the risk-benefit and need evaluations, it is 
now a common view, as has been noted that IVF research may 
be justified on the basis that "re-implantation of cleaving 
embryos into the uterus is the only method to help many 
patients who are infertile through tubal occlusion" (Edwards 
1974"10). There is no doubt about the successes of applying 
IVF/ET on humans. As already noted, the number of successful 
live·births speaks for the merits of this technology. From 
July 1978, when the first IVF baby was born, to present the 
technology has helped many infertile couples to reproduce as 
many as over 150,000 children throughout the world (see 
Francois Olivennes et al 1997:284). But according to the 
Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society the 
success rate for artificial insemination is not as certain 
as that of IVF/ET only "because lack of reliable data" 
(1986: 34S) . 
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To this kind of data Kass responds that the basis of 
the claim of success is that "the experience to date has 
been so encouraging with no ... reports of severe 
abnormalities" (Kass 1985:53). This encouraging experience 
notwithstanding, however, Kass still wants to suggest that 
the success is only partial, because (1) The number of 
children so far produced by in vitro and embryo transfer 
method is relatively "small" {although it is much larger in 
1997 than it was in 1985 when Kass first wrote) and (2) the 
time within which the technology has produced some children 
is too short to make any conclusive statement on the issue 
and therefore the ethical, risk-benefit question should 
still be considered open (Kass 1985:53) 
Thus the ethical argument about the justifiability of 
IVF/ET research rages on. It has been summarized here for 
the sake of completeness, but it will not be an independent 
topic of importance for the rest of this dissertation. 
Obviously, however, many of the positions to be examined 
later in the dissertation would also have important 
implications for the ethical debate about IVF/ET research. 
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Presuppositions: the status of the embryo. 
As was noted above, fertilization is the fusion of 
sperm and ovum in the female genital tract .. When this union 
of sperm and egg occurs outside the female reproductive 
tract, that is "within a glass" it is referred to as "in 
vitro fertilization" (Mastroianni 1978: 1448; Caplan: 
1990:100). But regardless of its location, in a petri dish 
or working its way down the mother's fallopian tube towards 
her womb, the embryo is a living member of the human 
species; and the moral implications of this fact will be 
crucial for any ethical argument regarding it in connection 
with IVF/ET. So its moral status needs attention at this 
point before a detailed philosophical work of this 
dissertation begins. 
The ethical issues involved in this topic are numerous 
and varied. It raises above all a fundamental question that 
is often worded as "when does human life begin?" But 
presumably what this question is trying to determine is the 
moral status that should be accorded to the embryo at its 
nascent stage. Some opponents of IVF technology claim that 
the full moral reality of human life begins at conception, 
"from the time the ovum is fertilized" (CDF 1987:14; Kass 
1985:104-104; Ramsey 1972:1347; Smith II 1990:22). 
Accordingly, they hold that IVF, in and of itself; is 
immoral because of the loss and risks of loss of human 
embryonic life which this technology sometimes involves. 
Ramsey words the idea as follows: 
45 
Persons who believe that an individual human life 
begins with conception, or after the time of 
segmentation, or at implantation, or with the 
morphologically human fetus, or with heartbeat or ECG 
readings, or self-movement (or any time before birth) 
must regard experiments in vitro fertilization and 
artificial implantation as ab initio inherently 
immoral, because the physician must be willing to 
discard mishaps at any point in that span of time which 
do not come to the standard of an acceptable human 
being (1972:1347). 
Thus, regardless of the stage of development of the 
embryo, the fact of its humanity, which recognizable from 
fertilization on, "ought to elicit our feelings of woe and 
respect" (Kass 1985:105). Since the embryo is a human being 
from fertilization, it is also "a person" from that moment 
of fertilization; that is, it is to be accorded the same 
moral status in our moral reflections as a fully functioning 
adult human being. "From that same moment his right as a 
person must be recognized" (CDF 1987:14). 
Other commentators do not accept the idea that the 
embryo is a human being with full moral status. Some argue 
and challenge, on biological grounds, the view that morally 
significant human life begins at fertilization. For example, 
Edwards contends that fertilization of the ovum is simply 
incidental to the beginning of morally significant life 
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because various processes which are essential to the 
development of human life begin not at fertilization but 
long before ovulation. He concludes that "the potentiality 
for life must therefore reside in the unfertilized egg and 
all of its precursors" (1974:13). The process of the 
development of a human being up to fertilization and beyond 
it is progressively sequential, and the moment of 
fertilization is not exempt from this process as an 
especially privileged stage of human development. In the 
light of this therefore, there is an opposition to "the 
tendency to define absolutes such as giving full human 
rights to a fertilized egg" (Edwards 1974:14). 
One of the major concerns of the pro-fetal-moral-status 
commentators is the deliberate creation and wastage of human 
life which !VF/ET processes appear to involve. Thus, arguing 
from a biological fact, Kass, points out that the embryo is 
alive and has stages of development which may guarantee its 
viability. Given this fact, the remaining human embryo after 
in vitro fertilization, rather than being respected and 
protected because of its humanity, is now being used for 
experimentation, and then discarded (1985:57-58). That is, 
some embryos are subjected to risks of serious harm and even 
death. This is morally inconsistent, Kass believes, with the 
embryo's moral status. 
Other commentators explicitly assign neither "respect" 
nor "protection" to the embryo because on their view, it is 
not a "person". In this connection, the issue of, when the 
biologically human fetus becomes a person is given another 
view. Three different criteria have been suggested as 
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essential in assigning personhood to a being. They are: (1) 
"life" (2) "soul" and (3) "reason" (Fletcher 1988:135-136). 
Discounting elements 1 and 2, Fletcher appraises rational 
intelligence as the essential criterion without which the 
human embryo cannot qualify as a person. In this connection 
he says: 
Humans without some minimum of intelligence or 
mental capacity are not persons, no matter how many of 
their organs are active, no matter how spontaneous 
their living process are. If the cerebrum is gone, due 
to disease or accident, and only the midbrain or 
brainstem is keeping 'autonomic' functions going, they 
are only objects, not subjects - they are its, not 
thous. Just because hearts, lungs, and the neurologic 
and vascular systems persist we cannot say a person 
exists. Noncerebral organisms are not personal. 
Something like a score of 20 on the Binet scale of I.Q. 
would be roughly but realistically a minimum or base 
line for personal status. Obviously a fetus cannot meet 
this test, no matter what its stage of growth (Fletcher 
1988: 137) . 
It will not be possible to fully resolve this issue of 
the status of the embryo in this essay. Instead, each of the 
views discussed will have its corresponding answer to this 
question. 
Walters identifies another approach closely related to 
this issue, on the "naturalness" of !VF/ET: "namely whether 
the acts of !VF with ET themselves violate a natural order 
48 
or structure for human procreation" (1979:25). In response 
to this question some commentators have attacked IVF/ET as 
an artificialization, "rationalization and 
depersonalization" as well as a "dehumanization of the 
natural process of procreation, it is a degradation and an 
assault to parenthood and family life, all in an attempt to 
"manufacture ... wanted, willed and flawless babies" (Kass 
1985:71-73; 1974:48-50). For Kass therefore, the natural 
process of procreation is morally superior to in vitro 
fertilization and embryo transfer precisely because it is 
"natural" and embodies the mysterious (Kass 1985:72). Kass' 
claim may incline some people at least intuitively to 
sympathize with his position. However, his position is 
dismissed as question begging by Callahan because it fails 
to provide an acceptable rationale argument about what it is 
to be human - "an essential human nature" (Callahan 
1971:98) . 6 Callahan also points out that an act can remain 
personal to be human act and can be depersonalized without 
leading to dehumanization (Callahan 1971:99-100). 
In addition to Callahan's challenge to Kass, one might 
point out that Kass' claim that IVF/ET is an artificialized 
and rationalized attempt to manufacture wanted babies 
appears not to take into consideration the fact that 
children are not like property that one could simply ~ 
. This response is to Kass' 1971 writing on IVF/ET, not to that of 1985. 
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own. Instead children are indispensable human values that 
are needed not just wanted for the continuation of future 
human generations. Kass therefore should not ignores the 
difference some philosophers make between "want" and "need". 
One thinker for instance writes: 
There is a difference between wants and needs .... The 
difference between them can, perhaps, best be put like 
this. Anything can (logically) be wanted for its own 
sake; but nothing can (logically) be needed for its own 
sake. To the question "what do you want that for?" it 
is possible to reply "I don't want it for anything. I 
just want it." But to the question "what do you need 
that for" it would never make sense to reply "I don't 
need it for anything. I just need it" (Duane Willard, 
1987:50). 
In opposition to the above views on the unnaturalness of 
!VF/ET, some other commentators think that it is not 
necessarily the case that the new technological method of 
manipulating human reproduction, is dehumanizing and 
depersonalizing. Nor would they think it is "inherently" 
inferior to natural means of human procreation. Instead they 
claim that the artificial or the technological may sometimes 
be superior to the natural. For example, sometimes medicine 
"'interferes' with nature's business; it 'manipulates' 
natural forces and tries to save our lives when natur~ left 
alone would finish us off with disease or deformity. In fact 
mortality is a natural process - so is pernicious anemia" 
(Fletcher 1988:34-35). 
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Against the views that IVF is an assault on natural 
parenthood and family, Edwards sees no reason why IVF should 
be condemned as unnatural and therefore immoral, if one 
bears in mind the aim of the technology which, is the 
transference of an embryo at its early stage of development 
into the womb of its mother, in an attempt to avoid 
incurable infertility which in turn can be seen as something 
unnatural in an important sense. 
Responsibility for decision-making and the how. 
So far, it is clear that both the natural and 
artificial means of human reproduction involves some risk of 
harm or deformity to the child to be, some important 
questions remain to be asked. Some of those questions are: 
Is the decision to reproduce children the sole 
responsibility of married couples? Is it an issue to be 
regulated by law and society? 
Many thinkers have pointed out that "right" is a 
complex concept to define philosophically. For example, some 
authors say: "No simple definition of the form "a right is a 
... can adequately explain this complex concept" (David T. 
Ozar 1986:4); because "the concept of a right is a 'simple 
undefinable, unanalyzable primitive"' (Joel Feinberg 
1980:149). The difficulty in exercising one's rights to make 
decision to reproduce becomes very obvious in the ethical 
issues which arise from IVF/ET method of reproduction. 
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In cases of using IVF/ET to alleviate infertility the 
difficulty of assigning rights arises because more than one 
party is involved in the decision of couples to have 
children who may be harmed by this decision. 
Some of the advocates of IVF/ET believe that "the law 
should not be used to decide the value or hinder the 
progress of work on curing infertility. This should 
especially be so where it concerns husband and wife (Edwards 
1974:16); nor should it be used to challenge the right of 
couples to have children of their own, "provided there is no 
conflict with accepted restriction on marriage, such as 
incest (Edwards:1974;16). Nor should any law be used to 
restrict couples with serious recessive genetic diseases 
from having children of their own (Lappe 1974:145). If this 
law is generally enforced then it simply will conflict with 
the right and interests of the infertile couple and 
therefore their desire to have a genetic child of their own. 
More importantly it will scare doctors as third parties away 
from helping infertile couples to have children (Edwards 
1974:16). 
On the other hand, those who believe that use of IVF/ET 
technology is profoundly immoral have proposed that laws be 
enacted to prevent it. For example CDF says: 
"the new technological possibilities which have opened 
up in the field of biomedicine require the intervention 
of the political authorities and of the legislator, 
since the uncontrolled application of such techniques 
could lead to unforeseeable and damaging consequences 
for civil society (1987:35). 
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Still another aspect of this topic arises from the fact 
that more legal rights are now being given to fetuses which 
allow them "to bring actions while still in utero for the 
death of the father or where parents or agents acting for 
stillborn fetuses receiving fetal injuries while in utero, 
were actions against those causing the injuries (Edwards 
1974:12). This parttern certainly complicates the moral 
issue of the right of couples and their unborn or 
unconceived fetuses. Walters gives a short list of 
pregnancies which in some form, jeopardizes with the future 
life of the unborn in varying ways and which upon careful 
reflection could attract the use of law to protect the right 
of the unborn to a normal healthy life: 
The wife in an infertile marriage takes hormones 
treatments in an effort to become pregnant . 
• An infertile couple requests the use of artificial 
insemination with the husband's sperm in the hope of 
having a child. 
A couple in which the wife is over 40 decides to 
conceive an additional child, knowing that the risk 
of chromosome abnormalities increases with the 
advancing natural age. 
A couple in which both members carry a recessive 
genetic trait for a serious disease decides 
nonetheless to conceive a child . 
. A couple living in abje_ct poverty with inadequate 
food and housing decides ·to have a child (LeRoy 
1979:29). 
Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a good reason 
to identify an advocate at law for every embryo, since in 
the ordinary case both parents and health care providers 
have the well-being of the child conceived through !VF/ET 
technology well in mind. In any case this issue is not the 
focus of this study. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, in order to 
focus specifically on the morality of !VF/ET technology 
itself, it will be assumed that the proper responsibility 
for decision-making about the use of this technology rests 
with the husband and wife together with the physician or 
medical team who would provide it. It will also be assumed 
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that no regulation of this procedure by law - except insofar 
as laws already ensure the safety of ordinary medical 
treatment, protect contracts between parents and doctors 
etc., should be considered until the issues under 
consideration in this dissertation have been resolved, 
namely the morality of the !VF/ET procedure itself. 
A philosophical analysis 
Finally, although the ethical considerations of !VF/ET 
has been argued for or against from many theological 
perspectives especially "of marriage, parenthood, and the 
family" (McCormick 1978:1458), it is nevertheless as a 
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philosophical issue that ethical implications of !VF/ET will 
be discussed here. In the light of this, this essay will now 
turn a brief attention to the main philosophical theories of 
ethical reasoning which underlie and accentuate the various 
positions in the debate about this specific technically 
assisted means of human reproduction. 
CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF RELATED ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
Introduction 
From the dawn of philosophy to the pre~ent, Plato, 
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Jeremy 
Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, stand out among other 
philosophers as some of the most gifted intellectuals the 
history has ever known in ethical philosophy. The question 
about the foundation of moral actions was central in their 
individual philosophies, and succeeded in dividing "them 
into sects and schools carrying on a vigorous warfare 
against one another" (Oskar Piest, 1957:3). This work will 
therefore be inadequate without an examination of some of 
the ethical principles of human actions which def enders and 
opponents of IVF/ET have variously employed in their 
writings on the issue. Three distinctive ethical theories 
can be identified as resonating through the review of the 
literature above. They are: (1) the natural law ethical 
theory, (2) consequentialism/utilitarianism or 
proportionalism (3) deontologism. Other ethical approaches, 
some of which are variations of the above three, will also 
be reviewed briefly. 
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In this chapter, the author will first sketch out the 
basic tenets of the ethical approaches. Then he will see how 
they have been applied in the arguments about IVF/ET. Their 
individual relevance to this project will determine the 
extent which any of the theories will be made use of. 
The natural law ethical principle 
What is Natural Law? An investigation into natural 
law ethical theory would imply first an inquiry into the 
philosophical meaning of the term, "nature". Thus rather 
than ask what is natural law?, our question should first be, 
what is "nature". This step of inquiry is taken because some· 
authors have pointed out that a great deal of the 
ambiguities one finds in the theory of "natural law" is due 
to the failure among authors to clearly delineate the 
meaning of the term "nature", from which natural law ethics 
takes it origin (Punzo 1983:22; Vacek 1992: 330}. 
Nature in its most general sense can be seen on the one 
hand as the totality of the universe. On the other hand it 
can also "refer to the laws and principles of structure by 
which the behavior of things may be explained" (Paul Edwards 
1976:454}. In the first of these two senses, everything in 
the universe whether animate or inanimate, including the 
law~ which keep them in existence is subsumed under the term 
nature. This implies that particular things in the universe 
not only are aspects of nature as a whole, but also have 
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their individual laws by which they operate and remain in 
existence. It is "nature" in the second sense that concerns 
us more here. But nature in the first sense will will also 
be relevant. "Nature" as the term is used in natural law 
theory "refers to the intrinsic principles of human growth 
including our biological, psychological, intellectual and 
religious dimensions" (Edward Vacek 1989:330). 
In an attempt to illuminate the meaning of the term 
"nature", the "natural" is contrasted further with the 
"supernatural", which is a belief in an other worldly 
reality, (Philip Goetz 1991:400). Belief in an other worldly 
reality, has come about from experiences of miraculous 
events which happened and "which it is claimed the power and 
laws of nature could not bring about" (Paul Edwards 
1967:454). It is also contrasted with the "artificial" 
literally that which is "made by (human) art." That is, 
insofar as the characteristics and principles of functioning 
of anything are the product of human purposes and human 
creation, it belongs to a third category in addition to the 
natural and the supernatural. The things which affect human 
life therefore include the artificial, the natural and the 
supernatural. 
Aristotle on nature. 
A more complicated meaning of "nature" seems to have 
been expounded by Aristotle. "Nature", Aristotle says, has 
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many senses. In order to grasp the philosophical sense of 
this term, Aristotle also contrasts it with what is 
"artificial". The natural is that which embodies within 
itself an innate principle by which it has the ability to 
move itself or keep itself at rest. The artificial on the 
other hand is that which lacks an innate power by which to 
move itself or put itself at rest. For example, artificial 
things cannot reproduce themselves (Aristotle, phy. 192a 12-
27) . In every natural thing that exists then, there is an 
underlying principle or power called its "nature" which 
determines the process of and brings it to its maturity, and 
thus affects everything else it does and everything that 
happens to it. "We also speak of a thing's nature as being 
exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is 
attained" (Aristotle phy. 193b14). 
This sense of nature could be seen as teleological; that is, 
the end towards which a thing is aimed as its goal. 
Aristotle, gives other accounts of the term "nature". 
First nature is conceived as "the immediate material 
substance of things which have in themselves a principle of 
motion or change. The second conception of nature is that 
nature is "the shape or form which is specified in the 
definition of the thing" According to some authors (W.D. 
Ross 1923), the latter account is held by Aristotle as a 
more accurate account of what nature is, than the former 
materialistic account or conception of nature. 
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Ross said that Aristotle takes this position because he 
thought that a thing can only be known as this or that thing 
if it has a form by which it can be defined. And this can 
only be so if the thing in question is actually in existence 
not in potency. This is to say that no one knows the nature 
of a thing as it is in potentiality but only as it is 
actually. "The form indeed is •nature' rather than the 
matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is 
when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists 
potentially" (Aristotle, phy.193b7-8). 
Aristotle raises two other noteworthy notions, "means" 
and "end" as objects of knowledge in relation to the nature 
of a thing. He notes analogically that what "means" is to an 
end, is what "matter" is to "form. 11 ·What is of special 
importance here is that "means" is not separated from the 
end towards which this means is aimed at. Ross points out 
that, nature as form of a thing is the end towards which its 
development moves; while nature as matter is the means by 
which this end is to be realized (1923:71). 
From this, one can draw the general conclusion that 
everything which has an end necessarily has a means towards 
that end and without which that end cannot be realized. In 
this sense one can conceive "nature" as final and formal 
cause, or nature as an end on the one hand; on the other 
hand one can also see "nature as means (Aristotle 194a27-28; 
1044a35) . 
.i .. 
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Ross explains why Aristotle gives the foregoing highly 
abstract account of "nature." According to Ross, Aristotle's 
aim is to distinguish physics, the science of the study of 
nature as matter and form, from the study of nature as pure 
form or as matter alone (1923:71). In the interpretation of 
Ross, God, the intelligences and the rational element in 
human soul are pure forms of nature which are the objects of 
metaphysics (1923:71), not physics for Aristotle. 
Aristotle's idea of God as pure form will culminate in 
his idea of God as the first mover, eternal unmovable 
substance (Aristotle 1073a25-30). Some authors have noted 
that "Aristotle's Unmoved Mover stands to nature as its 
final or teleological cause, inspiring nature to imitate the 
divine activity as far as its various constituents are able" 
(Paul Edwards 1967:455). 
Elsewhere Aristotle clearly indicates that "nature" 
has its own law, when he says that "universal law is the law 
of nature. For there is as everyone to some extent divines, 
a natural justice and injustice that, is binding on all men, 
even on those who have no association or covenant with each 
other" (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1373b6-9). This law of nature, 
besides being universal, it is also "permanent and 
unchangeless" (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1375a31-32). 
Does the above exposition of Aristotle's notion of 
nature give us any clear knowledge or understanding o~ the 
nature of reality as it is in and of itself and of the 
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nature of moral action? Can the "Unmoved Mover." which is 
identified with "Final Cause" or teleological cause be known 
objectively? These questions are important because they seem 
to underscore the contents of moral action; and in the case 
of this work, the morality of IVF/ET. They call for a study 
of human knowledge about what "is", and therefore what 
humans do with, or about the "is". 
According to Aristotle, the condition for knowledge of 
anything is if we know the primary condition, of what he 
calls "first principle" (Aristotle 184all-14) . The grasp of 
this first principle of any existent reality, or what "is", 
is the preserve of "intuitive reason" (Aristotle Nie. Ethics 
114la7) . Aristotle contends then that anything that has a 
cause outside of itself can be known by demonstration; 
however, the cause of its being what.it is itself (in other 
words, its substance or nature), cannot be demonstrated 
(PoAquinas Analytics 93b15-20). 
Elsewhere in his moral account Aristotle says that the 
essential nature, that is the first principle of human 
action is known only through intuitive reason (Nie. Ethics 
114la7), rather than by demonstration, or logical proof. 
This is to say that first principle of human action, which 
is crucial for judging an action as good or bad, 
praiseworthy or blameworthy, right or wrong cannot be known 
by any physical observation or logical proof, but only by 
"intuitive reason." It will be interesting to know whether 
"nature" as the first principle of human action is, in and 
of itself, "good" and "right" and for this reason can be 
called "the good and the chief good ... what is right" 
(1094a20-24} . 
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For a clue to the issues just raised this author turns 
to Aquinas, a philosopher whose ethical thought is rooted in 
"nature" as having a "law". 
Thomas Aquinas on natural law. 
The attempt to understand the philosophical meaning of 
the term "nature", was necessary for an excursus into 
Aristotle's treatment of that term. In a similar vein, it 
seems necessary to know what Thomas Aquinas thought of 
"Law", since some authors claim that he is the father of 
natural law (Boyle 1992:4}. Furthermore, Aquinas has a 
specific treatment of the essence of law. An understanding 
of the essence of law will help to illuminate its 
relationship with the essence of "nature". When this is done 
then we can combine "nature" and "law" into the notion of 
natural law and illuminate Aquinas' development and 
application of "natural law" philosophical theory to human 
actions. 
Aquinas' joining of nature and law would be arbitrary, 
if Aquinas was not in agreement with Aristotle's 
:understanding of "nature" in its various denotations. On 
this condition therefore, it is the opinion of this author 
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that in general, except with some Christian qualifications, 
Aquinas is in conformity with Aristotelian view of the 
nature of reality and of the role of nature {Aquinas, Qn 
Being and Essence 29-72). 
To the question, what is law? Aquinas first 
distinguishes the different kinds of law namely, eternal 
law, natural law, human law, divine law, {Aquinas Ia IIae, 
q. 91: art. 1-6), and gives a descriptive definition of law 
in its most general meaning. He says that "law is a kind of 
direction or measure for human activity through which a 
person is led to do something or held back" (Aquinas Ia 
IIae, q. 90: art. 1). Aquinas then notes that both 
"direction and measure come to human, act from reason". 
Citing Aristotle's notation that the function of reason is 
to plan for an end, Aquinas concludes in consonance with 
Aristotle, that reason is the originating source of human 
actions; and that "law is something that belongs to reason" 
(Aquinas Ia IIae., q. 90: art. 1). 
More particularly, taking the effect of law into 
account, he says: "law is nothing but a dictate of practical 
reason, issued by a sovereign who governs a complete 
community" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 90: art. 1 and 2 ) . Aquinas 
took it for granted that "the world is ruled by a divine 
pro~idence" {Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 22~ art. 1 and 2), and that 
"it is evident that the whole community of the universe is 
governed by God's mind" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 91: art. 1). 
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Hence by virtue of the universal rule of things by divine 
reason, this divine reason "has the nature of law" (Aquinas 
Ia IIae, q. 91: art. 1), and has "eternal" conception 
because, God's mind or reason, pre-exists time or the 
temporal (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 91: art. 91). This explains 
why divine reason, which is tantamount to law, "should be 
called eternal" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q·. 91, art. 1). 
Having established divine reason as the eternal and 
universal law or principle, which directs everything, 
Aquinas proceeded to show that there is also law in the 
natural world, a "natural law". The following is Aquinas' 
derivation of natural law: 
Law is a rule and measure, ... and therefore can 
exist in two manners, first as in the thing which is 
the rule and measure, second as in the thing that is 
ruled and measured, and the closer the second to the 
first the more regular and measured it will be. Since 
all things are regulated and measured by Eternal Law, 
... , it is evident that all somehow share in it, in 
that their tendencies to their own proper acts and ends 
are from its impression. 
Among them intelligent creatures are ranked 
under divine Providence the more nobly because they 
take part in Providence by their own providing for 
themselves and others. Thus they join in and make their 
own the Eternal Reason through which they have their 
natural aptitudes for their due activity and purpose. 
Now this sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent 
creatures is what we call 'natural Law. 1 ••• the light of 
natural reason by which we discern what is good and 
what evil, is nothing but the impression of divine 
light on us (S.T.Ia IIae, q.91, art. 2). 
65 
Natural law, therefore is the means through which all 
existent is ruled by eternal law; that is by divine mind or 
reason. On the one hand it is eternal law as a principle of 
action, as nature, in every natural being. On the other hand 
natural law is the understanding by which humans 
intellectually comprehend eternal law and guide their own 
actions accordingly, giving them rational order (law) 
according to human nature. 
Aquinas then asks whether, this eternal law, as God's 
"wisdom", or "reason", or "idea" is known by everyone. His 
answer to this question is qualified.· "No one, except God 
himself and the blessed who see him in his essence, can know 
the Eternal Law as it is in itself, but every rational 
creature can know about it according to some dawning, 
greater or lesser, of its light" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 93, 
art. 2). One notes also that, the eternal law as God's 
reason or idea is seen as an "unchangeable truth" (Aquinas 
Ia IIae, q. 93 art. 2). 
From the point of view of the above, there is no doubt 
in Aquinas' view that every human being, one way or another, 
with his or her reason which is a share in divine reason, 
knows something that is true solely by its participation in 
eternal mind or reason, which is an "unchangeable truth" and 
"law". This is what Aquinas refers to as the "general 
principle of natural l~w" (Aquinas, Ia .IIae, q. 93, art. 2). 
But what must not be forgotten among the interpreters and 
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users of natural law theory is that "people share in the 
truth in varying degrees, and accordingly know the Eternal 
Law, some more, some less" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 93 art. 2). 
It is of special interest and importance to note that 
Aquinas distinguishes the way irrational creatures are 
subject to the eternal law, from the way rational creatures 
are subject to it. Irrational creatures obey the eternal law 
by being moved by the power of the law itself as it is 
impressed upon them by God in a given and fixed manner 
(their nature) . Rational creatures are al.s.Q subject to the 
eternal law but in a different way. They obey this law 
through the means of "understanding," that is by 
intellection or reason. 
With this Aquinas asks whether natural law has many or 
only one principle by which creatures act (Aquinas Ia IIae, 
q. 94, art. 2). Due to the relevance of his answer to this 
important question, in relation to the ongoing discourse 
about IVF and artificial insemination, some of the details 
of his long reply need attention here. 
(A) He says that there is only one precept of the 
natural· law (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2), because 
firstly, law of itself is a precept. Secondly he says that 
law as a natural consequence of human nature, must have a 
sin~le precept because man though he is a unity, is complex 
because he has many parts. This seems to imply as Aquinas 
suggests that the single precept of law in the unity of a 
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person is represented in the many parts of the human nature, 
including man's sensuous parts. In this way natural law may 
se.em to have many precepts. Thirdly, Aquinas argues that 
natural law has only one precept because, law is derived 
from reason which is only one {Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 
2) • 
(B) Aquinas also has an answer from the point of view 
that natural law has many precepts. It is widely accepted 
that it is Aquinas• position that natural law has many 
precepts (Grisez Germain, 1969:343). 
Aquinas then addresses the point that natural law has 
many precepts by drawing an analogy between the principles 
of natural law and the first or self-evident principles of 
demonstration. For him, what the principles of natural law 
are to practical reason, are what the axioms of science are 
to theoretical reason because both are kinds of self-evident 
principles (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). For Aquinas 
certain things are self-evident to everyone, while others 
are not self-evident to everyone. 
What is meant by "self-evidence"? As Aquinas sees it, a 
thing can be self-evident in two senses, namely 
"objectively" that is, in and of itself, and "relatively to 
us", that is as it presents itself to us or as individuals 
see it. For him a thing is self-evident if and only if, that 
which is said of a subject, belongs essentially or 
inseparably to the subject. In this sense whenever a 
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statement about what is self-evident is made, that which is 
said of the thing is immediately understood by anyone who 
has the understanding of that which is said of the thing or 
subject. 
In another sense he says that, to anyone who does not 
have the understanding of that which is said of a thing, it 
is not self-evident to him (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). 
It is only objective in relation to the one who knows what 
is said of the subject. He judges for example that, "man is 
a rational animal" in itself, "is a self-evident 
proposition" because, "to say 'man' is to say, rational". 
Yet to someone who does not know what "man" is, this 
proposition would not be self-evident (Aquinas Ia IIae Q. 
94, art. 2) . 
Aquinas distinguishes this kind of self-evident 
principle which is only known to some, from those that are 
known by everyone. For example, that "every whole is greater 
than its parts" is a self-evident principle which is known 
by everyone. Broadening his differentiation, he sets apart 
this type of self-evident principle from those known only to 
the highly educated. For instance to anybody who knows that 
an angel has no body, "it is self-evident that an angel is 
not circumscribed in a place". However this is not the case 
with those who do not understand the philosophical point 
about the relation of body .and place (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 
94, art. 2). 
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In consideration of the class of things which are self-
evident to everyone, Aquinas says that the first is "being", 
because being is an idea which is included in every 
statement about an existent thing; and human beings know 
automatically. It therefore needs no proof to show that such 
a thing exists. In other words, being itself is 
indemonstrable, it is not demonstrated by way of proof. 
Humans grasp it in another way. 
Aquinas resonates with Aristotle by saying that the 
first self-evident principle in the realm of theoretical 
knowledge is that the same person at the same time can 
believe the same thing to be and not to be; hence this is 
naturally the starting point for all other theoretical 
principles (Aristotle Met. 1005b29; Aquinas, Ia IIae, q. 94, 
art. 2). The notion about self-evident principle plays a 
similar important role in Aquinas' natural law theory, and 
so it will in the ongoing discourse about IVF/ET. Aquinas 
holds that the first self-evident principle in thinking 
about how to act (practical thinking as opposed to 
theoretical thinking) is "do good and avoid evil" (Aquinas 
Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). 
Aquinas draws a parallel between "being" in relation to 
"theoretical reason" and "good" in relation to "practical 
rea~on". He says that just as "being" is the first thing the 
human mind can grasp when it beholds a thing, (first 
principle of theoretical reason), so too "good" is the first 
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thing which "practical reason" inclines to in its activity. 
"Reason" is here called "practical" because it produces 
action, it does something. Moreover, like every agent it 
acts towards an "end", and the meaning of an end is 
precisely to be "good." 
Aquinas concludes that the first principle of 
practical reason is based on the meaning of "good" namely 
that it is that which all things seek after {Aquinas, Ia 
IIae, Q. 94, art. 2). This establishes what Aquinas calls 
"the first command of the law, namely "that good is to be 
sought and done, evil to be avoided'; all commands of 
natural laws are based on this" {Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94 art. 
2). Aquinas. adds "Accordingly, then natural law commands 
extends to all doing or avoiding of things recognized .by the 
practical reason itself as human good {Aquinas, Ia IIae, q. 
94, art. 2); and to the avoidance and shunning of the 
apprehension of their contraries as bad (Aquinas q. 94, art. 
2). On this rests the central contentions of the defenders 
of the natural law theory in its application to human 
reproduction, a contention which will be addressed much more 
fully later. 
One may still ask the following question. From where 
does the notion of evil come into play, since reason in its 
theqretical functions can only behold·"being" and "good" 
respectively; "good" being the corollary of "being"? At this 
point the age old question resurfaces, namely: from whence 
came evil into the world? Given Aristotle's and Aquinas' 
notion of "being" as that which is the first principle of 
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any existence, and its opposite as non-being or 
nonexistence, it seems problematic to establish the origin 
of evil. But this important question is well beyond the 
scope of this project. 
The first reality which theoretical reason grasps is 
"being itself" "good" is the first thing which practical 
reason apprehends, in its natural inclination to do 
something (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). Of necessity 
these coincide in the end of every agent (Aquinas Ia IIae, 
q. 94, art. 2), an end which "carries the meaning of to be 
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good" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). That is, the "good" 
to which man is inclined through being apprehended by 
practical reason (in this author's deduction), coexists with 
the first reality of theoretical reason. For as Aquinas said 
earlier, before reason does something, it must first know 
what it does; and since what it is inclined to do is good, 
it must first be, in order for it to be known and be done. 
This is "reason" in necessary coincidence and cooperation 
with itself in its theoretical and practical self. 
"Necessary coincidence" is here comparable to that 
inseparable unity between the Aristotelian "matter" and 
"form", or "means" and "end". It is not a mechanical 
cooperation between two independent,beings. Instead it is 
the way to be of a being, what this author calls, being-in 
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goodness. This coincidence of being and goodness will prove 
to be important when one particular natural law argument 
about IVF/ET is examined later. 
Now Aquinas observes a three tiered hierarchical order 
in the law of nature which corresponds with the order in 
creaturely natural tendencies. First, there is the human 
tendency towards the good of the nature which humanity 
shares in common with every creature, ·for instance, 
everything has the basic natural tendency to preserve its 
own being. In accordance with this law, those tendencies by 
which humans preserve their lives and defend them when they 
are under threat fall under this natural law. Secondly, 
there is in humans a certain inclination towards certain 
goods which are in accordance with their nature, but which 
they share only with other animals, for instance sexual 
intercourse, education of their offspring and so forth. 
Thirdly there is in humans, the special inclination towards 
the good of his nature which is proper or specific to them 
as rational beings. For instance, humans have the natural 
inclination to know the truth about God and creation and 
about their own natural ends and about living in society. 
Thus it is natural, in a very strong sense, for humans to 
shun ignorance and avoid offending those with whom they live 
in ~heir society (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2}. 
Aquinas' excursus into the question whether natural law 
contains many precepts or only one, ends with the following 
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conclusion: Although there are many precepts of the natural 
law, there is a convergence of the precepts into one precept 
which counts as one natural law. His explanation of this 
answer is that, the many precepts represent different 
emotional or irrational drives of human nature, which are 
then controlled by a single precept, reason, through its 
understanding of this threefold hierarchy of natural 
inclinations. In this way, all that is controlled by reason 
falls under the single control of the law of reason, hence, 
it can be said that natural law has only one precept 
(Aquinas, Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). When the many 
inclinations or directives to action (precepts) are in 
conflict, unity is established by reason, according to the 
natural hierarchy just mentioned. 
One of the principal arguments against IVF and 
artificial insemination has been that the practice is 
unnatural and therefore inunoral, according to some 
interpretations of the natural law ethical theory. This is 
why the work of the father of natural law theory needs to be 
examined here. Aquinas held that man acting according to his 
reason acts according to natural law and so according to his 
natural tendencies. The process by which reason does this is 
to go from the general to the particular, that is from what 
is ~nown to everybody to individual details or particulars 
which are not known by everybody (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. -94, 
art. 4.; Aristotle Physics 184al-25). However as was pointed 
74 
out above, theoretical reason and practical reason function 
differently in relation to reason's natural tendency, namely 
to know being or truth on the one hand and to do the good on 
the other. 
As Aquinas saw it, theoretical reason concerns itself 
with natural truths which cannot be other than they are, and 
about which theoretical reason will always say the same 
thing either in general or in particular. To the contrary, 
practical reason which deals with human acts can come to 
different correct judgments in matters of particulars or 
detail, the universal general principles notwithstanding 
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 4). 
Aquinas said that truth is the same for everybody both 
in general and in particular in terms of theoretical 
rational knowledge even though it is to be recognized that 
not everybody recognizes truth in the conclusions, that is 
in general. But with respect to practical reason which deals 
with human acts, he said that practical truth and rightness 
are not the same for everybody with respect to particular 
decisions. Furthermore "even those who are equally in the 
right on some particular course of action are not equally 
aware of how right they are" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 
4). Aquinas' sununarizes these points in this way: 
So then it is evident that with respect to general 
principles of both theory and practice what is true or 
right is the same for all and is equally recognized. 
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With respect to specific conclusions of theory the 
truth is the same for all, though all do not equally 
recognize it, for instance some are not aware that the 
angles of a triangle together equal two right angles. 
With respect to particular conclusions come to by the 
practical reason there is no general unanimity about 
what is true or right, and even when there is agreement 
there is not the same degree of recognition (Aquinas Ia 
IIae, q. 94, art. 4). 
As will be demonstrated below, those who conclude that 
IVF/ET is irmnoral on the basis of natural law reasoning have 
failed to take adequate account of this difference between 
theoretical and practical reason within natural law theory. 
They have also mistakenly held that, within natural law 
theory, every possible act is either prescribed or 
forbidden. 
Now it is> true that, for Aquinas, every act of reason 
is responsive to natural inclination, and so every rational 
act is virtuous (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 3). But 
virtuous acts considered in themselves are not all 
prescribed by the natural law because there are many 
virtuous acts to which humans are not naturally inclined 
directly, but which upon the examination of reason "have 
been found by men to be conducive to human well-living" 
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 3). 
Some of such acts Aquinas cites are: temperance in 
relation to food, drink, and sexual intercourse, and all of 
"which are indeed ordained to the natural cormnon good, just 
as other matters of law are ordained to the moral cormnon 
good" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. ·94 art. 3). What this means is 
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that a sound natural law judgment about a particular act of 
IVF/ET or about a specific social policy of supporting 
IVF/ET as an available treatment for infertility will depend 
on factors in the lives of the particular persons and in the 
life of their society that cannot be deduced from general 
theoretical principles. 
What message does this analysis of human reason in its 
theoretical and practical functions, hold for those who 
apply the natural law ethical theory attributed to Aquinas 
to the ongoing ethical debate about IVF and artificial 
insemination? In particular, is what is true and right and 
good something relative for Aquinas? This question about 
relativism or subjectivism, is obviously of some interest in 
relation to the topic of this study. But before these 
questions are answered in detail, an examination into a 
second main ethical theory which is prominent in the current 
arguments about IVF and artificial insemination seems 
appropriate. 
Deontological ethical theory 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, defines 
Deontological ethics as "the branch of ethics dealing with 
right action and the nature of duty without regard to the 
goo~ness or value of motives or the desirability of the ends 
of any act" (1983). A review of this branch of ethics 
reveals more than one kind of theory. There is "act-
deontological theory"; "Rule deontology"; "the divine 
command theory"; and "the Kantian theory" (William K. 
Frankena 1973). The contents, similarities and differences 
between these components of deontological ethics can be 
shown by a brief survey of each. 
Act-deontologism 
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The thesis of act-deontological theory is that "the 
basic judgments of obligation are all purely particular ones 
such as, "In this situation I should do so and so," and that 
general ones such as, "We ought always to keep our promises" 
are unavailable, unless, or at best derivative from 
particular judgments" (Frankena, 1973:17). 
Act-deontologists hold the general position that there 
is indeed a duty to do what is right and to abstain from 
what is wrong. However, they maintain that each act or 
situation must be decided according to its own individual 
merit without any general rule to guide us to action, 
because "each situation is different and even unique" 
(Frankena, 1973:16, 24-25). 
According to Frankena, its method for the determination 
of the morally right or wrong is to be "clear about the 
facts in the case and then" form a judgment about what is to 
be ~one, either by some kind of "intuition" or "decision" 
(1973:23), depending on one's choice. 
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Intuitionism is the epistemological philosophical view 
that our basic moral principles for the evaluation of human 
actions as right or wrong are both "self-evident" and "self-
justifying" (Frankena, 1973:102). As one might expect, 
objections are raised to this view. 
According to Frankena, intuition as a principle for 
moral judgment has serious difficulties. One difficulty he 
says is based on the findings of human physical and 
psychological sciences. Frankena, says that anthropological 
and psychological evidence run counter to the intuitionists' 
position, because there is no special faculty which 
perceives what is right or wrong as it is in itself. Another 
argument against act-deontological ethical theory has been 
advanced by R. M. Hare: 
... to learn to do anything is never to learn to do an 
individual act; it is always to learn to do acts of a 
certain kind in a certain kind of situation; and this 
is to learn a principle .... without principles we 
could not learn anything whatever from our elders .... 
every generation would have to start from scratch and 
teach itself. But ... self-teaching like all other 
teaching is the teaching of principles (R. M. Hare, 
1952:60-61). 
On the basis of the foregoing objections act-
deontologism is declared untenable by its opponents. It 
would, in any case, provide no general guidance to 
individuals or societies regarding IVF/ET. Therefore, it 
will receive no further consideration here. 
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Rule-deontologism 
This kind of deontological ethical theory maintains 
that understanding a "rule" is a necessary condition for the 
determination of the rightness or wrongness of any given 
moral action. One of the usual examples cited for this kind 
of deontologism is "we ought always to tell the truth" or 
"keep your promises" (Frankena 1973:17). Unlike the act-
deontologists, rule-deontologists insist that rules are the 
foundation and reference points for the judgment of the 
rightness or wrongness of an individual action. 
A very similar form of moral reflection employs rights 
as the foundation of moral judgments rather than rules. Some 
important issues regarding IVF/ET are currently debated in 
terms of rights; for instance, a couple's proposed right to 
have children by any means they choose. In the present 
general context of discussing ethical theories, however, it 
seems best to consider rights-theories as a sub-class of 
rule-deontological theories. 
One general objection to this theory, argues that there 
can be no rule or right which does not admit of exceptions, 
nor is there any set of rules or right which does not admit 
of conflicts between the rules (Frankena, 1973:25). To this 
difficulty, according to Frankena, w. D. Ross suggests a way 
out.. He distinguishes between 11 actual" duty and 11 prima 
facie" duty, between what is "prima facie" right and what is 
"actually" right (Frankena, 1973:26). It is contended that 
what is actually right and obligatory is what we actually 
ought to do in a particular situation while prima facie 
rightness will identify what might :Pe called "candidates" 
for rightness, which must then be reflected on further to 
determine which of them is actually right. 
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According to Frankena, "something is a prima facie duty 
if it is a duty other things being equal, that is if it 
would be an actual duty if other moral considerations did 
not intervene" (1973:26). So discussions of what ought to be 
done or what social policy, for example, regarding IVF/ET 
ought to be supported would have two parts: (i) determine 
what prima facie rules or rights are involved; (ii) address 
their conflicting requirements if any. 
But now we must ask if the distinction between actual 
and prima f acie rules and rights has gained us any insight 
into how these conflicts, when they occur, are to be 
resolved. One possibility is that the rules or rights are 
weighed or ranked in some way; anoth~r is that the 
foundation of moral thinking is in fact one master rule or 
one supreme right. The approach of Kant, to be discussed in 
a moment, is one example of the latter. The most common way 
of ranking rules is in terms of their consequences, or the 
good that they do. The consequentialist approach will be 
examined after Kant. 
It seems that little or no explicit attention at all 
has been paid to this notion of prima facie duty in the 
81 
current debate about the possibility of helping infertile 
couples to have children of their own through the 
technological intervention of IVF and artificial 
insemination. What rules of duty or right might guide 
infertile couples who desire to have children of their own 
genes? Are there rules constraining them from using the new 
inventions of human technology or rules requiring their use? 
What moral considerations about the status of the human 
embryo might intervene on their prima f acie duties to 
require or to prevent a couple from making use of the only 
means of reproduction available to them? Are there prima 
facie rights of the human embryo or.prima facie rights of 
its parents? For the parents have means for the choice of 
the possibility of the life of the child. Some of the prima 
facie rights of the embryo might include: the right not to 
be deformed, the right to enjoy full dignity due to a human 
embryo, or as some would claim the dignity of the human 
person. But it is not generally in these terms only that 
opponents or defenders of IVF/ET have formulated their 
arguments, so this approach will be mentioned only in 
passing in this essay. 
The divine command theory 
. The divine command theory also called "theological 
voluntarism" is another form of deontological ethics. As the 
name suggests, the tenet of this theory is that "the 
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standard for right or ·wrong is the will or law of God" or in 
other words that "an action is right or wrong if and only if 
... it is conunanded or forbidden by God and nothing else" 
(Frankena, 1973:28). 
It is not hard to see that this theory will meet with 
serious challenge particularly from the point of view of an 
atheist or agnostic; nor is it hard even for a believer to 
see some of the difficulties it involves. One of such 
problems, is as old as ancient Greek philosophy, and has 
been associated with Socrates in Plato's dialogue, 
Euthyphro. It is: "How can we know what God conunands or 
forbids (Frankena 1973:29)?" Recall also another question 
attributed to Socrates; "Is something right because God 
conunands it or does He conunand it because it is right 
(Frankena, 1973:29)?" The Socratic reply to this question 
was that "God conunands something because it is right." The 
important point which is to be noted here is the implication 
of this answer, which is that "what: ~s right is so, 
independently of whether God conunands it or not, or, in 
other words, that God only reveals what is right and does 
not make it right or create its rightness merely by willing 
it" (Frankena, 1973:29). So the divine conunand theory 
actually does not get us very far. Even if God does reveal 
what is right, what is right is so, whether or not God 
commands it. 
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So, the question persists: How does anyone know what is 
right where what is right can presumably be known, both by 
believers and unbelievers in God? Therefore, the divine 
conunand theory will provide little assistance to this 
project, and will not be pursued further. Many proponents of 
natural law ethical theory have also seen a theological 
grounding for human moral life. The best of these have seen 
the inadequacies of the divine conunand theory and offered 
other explanations of the relation between human morality 
and the divine. But since this is a philosophical analysis 
of the morality of IVF/ET, these religious and theological 
accounts will be left out of consigeration. 
" . 
Kantian deontological ethical theory: 
No short summary of the highly complicated and 
monumental work of Kant's ethics can capture its 
philosophical content in its entirety. But this is not to 
say that nothing worthwhile can ever be said about it 
succinctly. An a~tempt will be made to extract and present 
here those ideas in Kant's moral philosophy which are 
commonly regarded as central to his ethical theory and which 
may shed light on the issues under discussion here. 
According to Kant, 
(1) . "Nothing in the world-indeed nothing even 
beyond the world-can possibly be conceived which could 
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be called good without qualification except a good will .... 
The good will is not good because of what it 
effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to 
achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of 
its willing, i.e., it is good of itself .... it would 
sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something 
that had its full worth in itself. Usefulness or 
fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment this 
worth ([Kant] Lewis W. Beck, 1959:9-10). 
Simply put, the good will is the absolute condition for the 
good. This reminds one of the biblical injunction which says 
that from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. A 
good will therefore is the sole condition for the 
qualification of any human action as good or morally right. 
Also, in Kant, one reads: 
(2). [Thus the first proposition of morality is that to 
have moral worth an action must be done from duty.] 
•.• An action performed from duty does not have its 
moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved 
through it but in the maxim by which it is determined . 
... Duty is the necessity of an.action executed from 
respect for law .... To duty every other motive must 
give place, because duty is the condition of a will 
good itself, whose worth transcends everything ([Kant] 
Beck, 1959:16-20). 
How can we know that a will to act in a certain way is a 
good will? Kant believed that there is a single law of 
morality which ought to guide humans in their actions. This 
law.he called the "Categorical imperative" because it is not 
based on any condition or desires. 
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{3}. There is therefore only one categorical 
imperative. It is: Act only according to that maxim by 
which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law .... The universality of law 
according to which effects are produced constitutes 
what is properly called nature in the most general 
sense ... then the universal imperative of duty can be 
expressed as follows: Act as though the maxim of your 
action were by your will to become a universal law of 
nature {[Kant] Beck, 1959:39}. 
Kant however recognizes that there are different kinds 
of duties: "duties to ourselves" as distinguishable from 
duties "to others," and that all of our duties do not hold 
equal value, hence he distinguishes also "perfect and 
imperfect duties" {[Kant] Beck 1959:39}. 
Kant also argued that other imperatives for duty can be 
derived from the categorical imperative hence the following 
two other imperatives: 
{a}. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in that of another, always as an end 
and never as a means only [Kant] Beck, 1959:47). 
{b} Every rational being must act as if he, by his 
maxims were at all times a legislative member in the 
universal realm of ends {[Kant] Beck, 1990:57}. 
Since H. J. Paton's interpretation .. and analysis of Kant's 
moral philosophy is widely respected {Frank, N. 1990:343) 
the use which will be made of Kant's ethical theory in this 
section shall be based on Paton's view of Kant's moral 
philosophy. 
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For the purposes of this work, the essay limits self to 
the use which both proponents and opponents of IVF/ET have 
made of the Kantian or deontological ethical theory in 
general. First, these technologies are under focus as a 
"means" to the achievement of an "end"; a child. What is the 
moral value of these reproductive technologies in a non-
consequentialist theory of morality? 
One may be skillfully "a good doctor or a poisoner" 
(Paton 1951:162). This is to say that one can be skillfully 
good or skillfully bad. As Kant sees it, actions are only 
good for the realization of the law as such (1951:169). This 
is to say that even if an action as skill is the means with 
which a good end is realized, this does not necessarily mean 
that the action is good per se. 
Following the foregoing line of .thought, however, 
opponents of the new means of human,~. r,eproduction could 
therefore conclude that the new means of human reproduction 
may not necessarily be right or good just because it 
produces a good end. However, proponents of the technology 
in question may revamp the argument in another way. In 
accordance with Kant's moral theory, what is important is 
that an action is good and right on the basis of the 
principle with which it is willed; "a principle of 
univ~rsality and so of impartiality between myself and 
others" (Paton 1951:168). 
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On this view therefore one stands in the best position 
for a moral evaluation of in vitro fertilization and 
artificial insemination in specific relation to infertility 
among married couples and the medical scientists who are 
engaged in the progress of the technology. This specificity 
is re-enforced in a culture such as in Nigeria where child 
bearing is one of the primary reasons for marriage and 
therefore the indispensable "form" and "value" of marriage. 
This value of marriage (children as the end of marriage in 
the Nigerian culture} among other values will therefore play 
an important role in the evaluation of the morality of the 
use of IVF/ET as the best available.means for infertile 
couples to bear their own genetic children. 
The role of culture 
Can one presume that what is right is relative to 
individuals or a community of people? The pertinence of the 
foregoing questions takes its propriety and importance 
within this author's examination of the human experiences of 
the problem of infertility and the new reproductive 
technology of IVF/ET, which seeks to.alleviate this problem. 
In other words, how does one know what is "good" or "right", 
"bad" or "wrong", in and of itself? 
How .can one distinguish good laws of nature from bad laws of 
nature when both laws produce the same thing? 
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It seems that the ethics of the new reproductive 
technology is first and foremost the question of human 
knowledge. The question, what do we know? comes before the 
question, is what we know right or-wrong, good or bad? To 
what do humans attribute what they know, and therefore what 
they do? How does humanity grasp the laws of which it has 
no concept? How can we ever say or represent anything if we 
have no idea of what we are saying or representing? Thus to 
obey a law, we must have the concept of the law and its 
properties. 
Aristotle and Aquinas argue that, what the first 
principle of theoretical reason grasps first is being while 
what the first principle of practical reason has the first 
tendency to do is good. If this thinking is correct, there 
follows then a logical question: where in the first time-
bound place, does the individual or a cormnunity of people 
behold being, with their own eyes, grasp what it is or means 
with their own mind, determine what to do in relation to 
this being or good with their own mind and will and carry 
out their own determinations with their own hands; guided by 
their own reason, the reason of which they shared with other 
members of the human race from "eternal reason" or "law of 
nature"? 
It is the belief of this author that it is no place 
other than in the individual's or cormnunity's own "birth 
home", his or her first environment,_ that is the environment 
89 
into which the individual was born, in which he or she has 
grown, and developed all the recognized faculties that 
qualify a human being as a human person, yes, the 
individual's habitat or as it is commonly called, the 
individual's or community's culture. It is in this 
environment that the cultivation and sharing of primary 
concepts of "right" and "wrong", "good" and "right", "bad" 
or "evil" and "wrong", takes its meaningful inception. It is 
therefore, this culture, that will determine for itself the 
appropriateness or otherwise of the use of IVF/ET. But 
first, we must ask: is there a need for this technology? 
Opponents to this general idea will be quick to spot 
that it sounds like relativism. Yes, it sounds like one; but 
is it one? The reply to this question is suspended to a 
later time in this work. Before then here is a required 
home-work for the opposers to position. It is this: Why is 
the history of philosophy laden with more than one ethical 
theory, and which do you accept without condemning the other 
or others and for what reasons? 
In the face of the multiplicity_of deontological 
ethical theories, the task of applying deontological ethical 
theory to IVF/ET becomes even more problematic. With this, 
it is time to review the last important deontological 
ethical theory, the Kantian version. 
It is time then to examine the "objectivity" or 
"absoluteness" of an action or the "subjectivity" or 
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"relativity" of an action. The first question that thrusts 
itself upon us in this inquiry is: Can an action be said to 
be good and therefore morally right' only from one point of 
view? Or put in another way, can a human action derive a 
positive moral meaning only from one perspective? It appears 
that an obvious reply to these questions is not in the 
affirmative. There are many different ways of viewing and 
accomplishing a task rightly. 
If the above is true then one may ask, can a single 
action be both good relatively and universally; or both 
right relatively and universally? In what ways can one's 
action be said to be subjectively good and right and 
objectively good and right? The foregoing questions are very 
Kantian and are derived from the following: "Can I will the 
proposed action, not only as falling under a subjective 
principle valid merely for myself, but also as falling under 
a law valid for everyone in a similar situation?" (Paton 
1951:170). In Kant's view, according to Paton, one must 
start with the maxims which are good for the person, that is 
with the subjective principle which "are concerned with the 
good for me" (1951:170). 
In willing an end one is at the same time willing all 
the known and yet unknown means towards the attainment of 
the end which is willed. The series is like a succession of 
events. A thing while following fro~.one preceding event, 
necessarily leads to another, until the desired end is 
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attained. As J. H. Paton has said, "Man does not will one 
thing as a means and another as an .end" (1951:125). This 
view parallels that of Aquinas which holds that a means 
necessarily is connected to its end. That is, means and end 
involves not two separate actions but only one integrated 
whole - a view that will be crucial in evaluating the 
morality of IVF/ET in the next chapter. 
The means and ends argument could be pursued from 
another perspective. It is here assumed that if the 
necessary end of a desired good is to be achieved, the 
necessary rules or laws which holds these series of things 
in place must be respected. For nothing exists without 
following a rule of its own nature either in its actual 
existence or in process to it. Similarly the IVF/ET 
processes have their own laws which must be obeyed 
rationally if a child is desired as an end in itself rather 
than as a means. For human reason cannot judge the various 
important components of IVF/ET as means wrongly and still 
expect to achieve a proper end - the biological and rational 
laws must be in proper order to achieve a desired child 
through the means of IVF/ET. This is to say that the medical 
engineering that brings about the fetus must grasp the 
concept of the entire enterprise in actuality and in process 
or ~n theory and practice. The laws must be known if they 
must be respected to do their dutiful work for Kantians or 
for the naturalists, in the so-called natural way. 
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However, this is not to say that the medical scientists 
are the creators of the laws in question from nowhere. 
Rather, it is to say that the concept which they are 
grasping or knowing, and respecting are the same laws of 
nature which, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant talked about, and 
which are in the various natures of things, including human 
beings. 
The means and end connection provokes thoughts of every 
day experience. Some times people bite their own tongues, 
while chewing food that will nourish them. Some times too, 
people have in the process of eating food, swallowed bones 
which landed them on surgical tables for medical 
intervention. Experiences have shown that such untoward 
events do happen and that they are part of the risks we take 
in daily living of eating food. We cannot stop eating food 
because of the possible hazard of biting our tongue and 
cause pain to ourselves or swallowing bone that will result 
in going to the hospital for surgery. Or, when one is faced 
with the prospect of undergoing an operation, one does not 
forego the surgery because of the possible risks of loosing 
one's life, the ultimate of all the side effects or dangers 
of any serious surgery. The real ethical issue is whether 
the reason for eating is right, which in Kantian terms means 
acc9rding to the Categorical Imperative. 
Instead of judging the matter by the means, on one 
hand, we have learned what to do when we must eat some foods 
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that contain bones, so that we don't end up in the hospital 
for surgery. We become more intentionally careful. Still, 
even when all care precaution is taken, some mishaps happen. 
On the other hand, medical scientists are constantly 
perfecting their knowledge of medical surgery to minimize 
risks and prevent lose of lives. In spite of their efforsts 
some mishaps still occur. So the physical harms which the 
children born of the new technological means of reproduction 
may suffer could simply be sufficient reason for the medical 
scientist to be more intentionally careful in their skills. 
But they will not, in and of themselves, be sufficient 
reason to stop helping the needy infertile couples. The 
reason for that helping must be judged directly. 
In certain cultures, as in the Nigerian, in most cases, 
the SQl.e reason for any marriage is the reproduction of 
children. Marriage is about children. Marriage does not 
attain its full value and recognition, either in the eyes of 
the couple or in those of their community, if no child has 
been born from it. In many instances, one child is 
considered insufficient. In such examples, other means such 
as polygamy are sought to increase the number of children in 
the family. This is because the value of children in the 
Nigerian society, is immeasurable and irreplacable by other 
impQrtant values in marriage and life. The desire to bear 
children is a desire to do what one must do in order to be 
whole and happy in a culture where children are the 
foundation stone, pillar and main "wealth" of any marriage 
and of the whole culture. Other reasons, such as having a 
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companion of one's own to help one in one's daily, many and 
varied needs, especially in one's old age, are simply a 
corollary to having children. The joy which attends the 
birth of a child in this culture has other corollaries as 
well. One thing gives rise to another. But the end of 
marriage in this culture is to have children. 
This means that a marriage partner is being used as a 
mere means in a childless marriage, that a childless 
marriage is, in a real sense, no ~rriage at all, a 
contradiction that cannot be willed.as a universal law. 
The reader is left to judge for himself or herself, 
whether the end of marriage in the reader's culture is to 
have children. The reader is also left to determine whetper 
having children is obligatory once one decides to marry. If 
it is not obligatory, then one may conclude that having 
children in the reader's culture depends on one's choice, or 
desire. In other words, it is relative to the individual's 
disposition or choice. 
But in the Nigerian society, it is expected that all 
men and women ought to marry and they,ought to bear children 
in the usual manner when they marrY., all things being equal. 
In the absence of all things being equal, then the 
individual and community have to do what they can do, as a 
duty, to meet what is deemed an obligation for all, namely 
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to marry and reproduce children. Therefore it is a thesis of 
this dissertation that IVF/ET as one of the results of human 
effort that can help the helpless is a genuine duty. But the 
Nigerian cultural view of marriage as a mere means to an end 
instead of being an end in itself makes the Kantian view of 
morality or the Categorical Imperative vulnerable. 
Most of those in favor of IVF/ET have supported the 
mo.rality of these reproductive interventions on the bases of 
their positive consequences rather than using the Kantian 
line of argument just sununarized. An examination of the main 
tenets of the ethical theory of Utility, variously called 
Utilitarianism or Consequentialism is therefore in order. 
Utilitarianism 
Jeremy Bentham (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1863) are 
the two best known proposers of utilitarianism in moral 
theory. As in Kant's case, the attempt for the moment is to 
expose the key points in the ethical theories of these 
authors. Later, in the next chapter, more of the relevance 
of their application to the ethical debate concerning IVF 
and artificial insemination will be seen. 
Jeremy Bentham 
Frank N. Magill has advanced the following as the 
"principal ideas" in the ethical philosophy of Bentham: 
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The first principle of moral philosophy is the 
principle of utility which states.that every man is 
morally obligated to promote the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number of persons. 
The principle of utility takes account of the fact 
that all men are governed by an interest in securing 
pleasure and avoiding pain. 
Only the consequences of acts are good or bad; 
intentions are good or evil only insofar as they lead 
to pleasure or pain. 
Since suffering is always bad, all punishment is 
bad; but punishment must sometimes be administered in 
order to avoid the greater suffering that an off ender 
against society might bring to others (1990:344). 
John Stuart Mill 
Frank N. Magill, presents the following abstract of the 
central concepts of John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory of 
moral action: 
Those acts are right and good which produce the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. 
An act derives its moral worth not from its form but 
from its utility. 
Although it is the intrinsic worth of pleasure which 
gives value to acts conducive to pleasure, some 
pleasures are better than others in quality. 
The proof of the value of pleasure is that it is 
desired, and the proof of the claim that some pleasures 
are better than others is that experienced, rational 
men prefer some pleasures to others. 
Justice is the appropriate name for certain 
social utilities by which the general good is realized 
(1990:401). 
It needs to be clarified that the idea of maximizing 
good is the central idea in the utilitarian concept. The 
expression, "greatest number of persons" can be misleading; 
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Bentham's and Mill's moral theory does not reduce to a 
"head-count." The main tenet of utilitarianism, according to 
these authors, is the maximization of values or what is 
valuable and the minimization of the painful or harmful for 
eye:r:::yone as much as possible. 1 As in the deontological 
ethical theory, there are different types of utilitarianism, 
even though "utility" remains the basic motivating force to 
human actions. For the purposes of this work the author 
highlights two of those which Frankena identifies. "Act 
utilitarianism" and "Rule Utilitarianism." 
Act utilitarianism 
According to Frankena, "act utilitarian" hold that one 
can tell what is right in any given situation by direct 
appeal to the principle of utility and find out which of the 
actions open to him or her is likely to produce the greatest 
amount of good and least amount of evil. The emphasis is on 
the general effect which the doing of a particular action by 
an individual will have in a particular situation, rather 
than the effect which everyone's doing of an action will 
have in any situation (Frankena 1973) . 
. On the basis of the main tenets of coosequentialism/utilitariaoism, that is the maximization of ~alues 
or what is beneficial and the minimization of disvalues or what is harmful to the individual or society, 
proportionalism will be treated as the same with this theory in the next and subsequent chapter. 
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Rule utilitarianism 
Unlike act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism 
emphasizes the greatest benefit which the utility of rules 
will have in any given moral action, rather than the 
greatest benefit of an action in a particular situation. In 
other words, which of the rules open to one or a group of 
people will yield the greatest amount of advantages rather 
than disadvantages for the people affected (Frankena, 
1973:39)? In its emphasis on rules for morality, it is 
similar to rule-deontologism; but here the rules are 
selected because of their utility. As indicated the last 
footnote there is a deep connection between Aquinas theory 
of natural law (proportionality) and consequentialism or 
utilitarianism. The connection will become obvious in the 
application of Aquina's teaching on how to evaluate the 
morality of any human action to IVF/ET in the chapters that 
follow. Therefore the 'immediate issues raised by the 
utilitarian/consequentialist ethical theory as applied to 
IVF/ET are fully discussed in these chapters. 
Conclusion 
The survey of the foregoing ethical principles of human 
action brings a single undeniable fact to a glaring light. 
Tha~ fact is the enormous difference among them. The various 
strands of deontological and utilitarian principles are an 
obvious validation of the scientific and philosophical claim 
that "no theory ever agrees with all the facts in its 
domain" {Paul Feyerabend, 1975:55). 
99 
A common factor among them is the recognition that there 
is "right" and "wrong", "good" and "bad"; but as to what 
these are in themselves or in relation to matters of human 
action, is a case of deep division of opinions. All the 
ethical theories under inquiry have had their share of 
criticisms, but it is not the intention of this essay to go 
into those criticisms. The consequentialist/proportionalist 
theory applied in this work is not intended to claim to 
capture all the important moral points raised by IVF/ET. 
Instead, in view of the complexity of issues raised by this 
technology and the array of people it involves, 
consequentialism/proportionalism is the most appropriate 
moral theory suited for the moral evaluation of IVF/ET. This 
claim will become clearer as this essay progresses. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE MORALITY OF IVF/ET: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF CDF 
One of the most systematic and best known works on the 
issue of IVF/ET has already been mentioned. It is: 
Instruction On Respect For Human Life In Its Origin And On 
The Dignity of Procreation: Replies To Certain Questions Of 
The Day (Congregation For The Doctrine Of the Faith 1987, 
henceforth CDF) . 1 For reasons which this essay will show 
shortly, CDF argues that the only morally acceptable avenue 
to married couples to reproduce their own kind, even in the 
extraordinary circumstance of infertility, is through the 
"conjugal act" (CDF 1987:27). This position, as will be 
explained, is based on a kind of natural law (deontological) 
moral argument which views !VF/ET and artificial 
insemination as unnatural, hence immoral. This chapter will 
show that the arguments of CDF are mistaken in their 
application of the natural law ethical theory to the 
morality of IVF/ET. It will also show that IVF/ET is 
demonstrably consistent with the natural law 
All· references to this work will be from the official English translation of the Latin Original. Another 
source of this document is: Origins 16:no. 40, Mar. 19, 1987, pp. 698-711. 
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{proportionalist) ethics as expounded by Aquinas with regard 
to the morality of human action. To this end, it will be 
necessary to ask and re-examine: what does it mean for anact 
to be natural? The argument here will show that the 
contention that !VF/ET is unnatural, in the sense intended 
by CDF in its natural law ethical argument against IVF/ET, 
is false, and that instead IVF/ET is natural because the 
actions of human reason that are operative both in these 
processes and in judging the appropriateness of !VF/ET are 
natural. For reason is precisely the condition of moral acts 
and the moral human person. 
From this it will follow that acts proceeding from 
properly judging human reason, like !VF/ET in the proper 
circumstances, are therefore natural in the relevant sense, 
and so morally justified. 
Two lines of reasoning will be offered in support of this 
view: {1) To be unnatural in the sense in which !VF/ET is 
viewed by CDF, does not necessarily mean an act {in itself 
or by nature) is immoral; {2) The values, achievable by 
!VF/ET outweigh on balance any disvalues of !VF/ET in 
sufficient measure that having IVF/ET available and 
acceptable for married couples yields more total good than 
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of not having 
!VF/ET. 
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This second line of reasoning is built on the basis of 
the first line of reasoning. For if one concedes to the view 
that an act can be judged by itself or is immoral by nature, 
then any argument based on benefits and burdens, or 
proportionality, becomes meaningless. This complicated 
wording is necessary to show that haying and not haying 
IVF/ET are the courses of action being compared, and that, 
for each of them, the relevant values/disvalues 
dvantages/disadvantages) need to be compared. That is, both 
positives and negatives have to be weighed for .e,acii 
alternative before these alternatives (having and not 
having) are compared with one another. 
To carry out these tasks, this chapter will first 
summarize Janssens' concept of "ontic evil". 2 Secondly, it 
will summarize Aquinas' view of the structure of Moral law, 
examined in detail in chapter two. 
Thirdly, there will be a detailed analysis of Janssens' 
interpretation of Aquinas' teaching on the structure and 
morality of .Qlll! human act, since CDF, bases its natural law 
arguments against IVF/ET, on "fundamental principles, of an 
anthropological and moral character" which, according to it, 
"are necessary for a proper evaluation of the problems" 
(1987:3) and which are purportedly derived from Aquinas' 
. Explaining Janssens' concept of ontic evil first is necessary because this notion is already proniinent in 
Janssens' understanding and interpretation of Aquinas' teaching on debita proponio (due proportion). 
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teaching. This detailed exposition is necessary because CDF 
fails to see what Janssens correctly sees in Aquinas' 
teaching on the subject just mentioned; namely, that an act 
cannot be judged by itself without reference to the human 
subject who wills the act in relation to a desired end. 
My own natural law reasoning based on this analysis will 
support the claim that !VF/ET is natural in the relevant 
sense and, more importantly, therefore not immoral in view 
of Aquinas' conception of the structure and morality of 
human action. Also my reasoning will draw from Janssens' 
notion of ontic eyil which is sometimes inevitable in many 
human actions. 
Fourth, there will be an outline or summary of CDF's 
document 3 on !VF/ET. Fifth will be a critique of the 
weaknesses of this document's reasoning on !VF/ET while at 
the same time offering an alternative (proportionalist or 
consequentialist) view of natural law ethics which supports 
!VF/ET in general, and in particular, in Nigeria, as against 
CDF's deontological interpretation of it. 
As already indicated, in these arguments about the 
morality of IVF/ET, the chapter will for the most part rely 
on the work of Louis Janssens4 who is one of the most 
Instruction On Respect For Human life In Its Origin And On The Dignity Of Procreation: Replies To 
Certain Question O/The Day, by Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith, Vatican City. 1987 . 
. Louis Janssens' work "Ontic Evil and Moral Evir, in, Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1,: Moral 
Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. by Charles Curran and Rihard McCormick. S.J. 1979, will be our main 
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respected authorities in Thomistic moral thinking. Janssens' 
idea of ontic eyil, in conjunction with Aquinas's concept of 
debita proportio (adequate, due, or commensurate 
proportion) , will be crucial in addressing the issue of 
conflict of moral values encountered in this chapter. 
Concept of ontic evil 
According to Janssens, modern day moralists employ the 
concept "Ontic evil" 5 instead of "physical evil" because 
·"the contemporary meaning of 'physical' corresponds more to 
the meaning of •material'" (1979:60). What then is ontic 
.e..Yi.l? "Ontic evil" is "any lack of perfection at which we 
aim, any lack of fulfillment which frustrates our natural 
urges and makes us suffer" (Janssens 1979:60). Janssens, 
sees this kind of evil as being "essentially the natural 
consequence of our limitation" (1979:60), because we humans 
are, obviously, very limited beings in many ways. 
However, Janssens warns that: 
guide . 
our limitation itself is not an evil - to be created to 
be limited - but, because we are thinking, willing, 
feeling and acting beings, we can be painfully hampered 
. Some moral thinkers, use the term •pre-moral evil" interchangeablly with •ontic evil". See Richard 
Westley, Guidelines For Contemporary Catholics: life, Death and Science, The Thomas More Press, 
Chicago, Illinois, p.62, 1989. 
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by the limits of our possibilities in a plurality of 
realities that are both aids and handicaps" (1979:60). 
Janssens expresses these limits of human possibilities in 
the midst of realities that are both aids and handicaps in 
one word: "ambiguity" (1979:60). Our ambiguity is operative 
in all human actions in which "the concrete act [is] made up 
of the material and the formal element (means and end)" 
(1979:60). 
Janssens cautions readers not to confuse moral evil 
with ontic evil because, "ontic evil and moral evil are not 
the same" (Janssens 1979:67). There is, however, "a 
connection between ontic evil and moral evil" (Janssens 
1979:67). As already noted, ontic evil hampers the 
development of the human person or group of persons and 
therefore is harmful to human beings. Sometimes human 
actions involve moral evil which are harmful to the human 
individual. This means that moral evil can constitute ontic 
evil in that it impedes the development of the individual 
human being of group of community of persons (see Janssens 
1987:67). More specifically, the relationship between ontic 
evil and moral evil is seen in the moral interactions 
between human persons. In Janssens words, 
since morality is chiefly concerned with the human 
relationships and the well-being of human beings, it 
cannot remain unconcerned about the ontic evil which in 
all its forms handicaps and harms the development of 
individuals and communities (1979:67). 
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Summary of the structure of moral law as taught by Aquinas 
This topic was discussed in chapter two, so only the gist 
of that chapter needs to be recapitulated here. Aquinas 
viewed_ morality, or "natural law," as having a single 
precept in one way, but multiple precepts in another sense. 
For Aquinas, law must have a single precept because man, 
though he is a unity, is complex because he has many parts. 
This is to say that the single precept of law in the unity 
of a person is represented in the many parts of the human 
nature, including man's sensuous parts. But natural law has 
only one precept because law is derived from reason which is 
only one (Aquinas S.T. Ia IIae., Q. 94, art. 2; emphasis 
mine) . The complexity of a person in his/her composite 
reality or material nature includes that persons have 
desires (irrational appetites) that come under the proper 
guardianship of reason. This proper rule of reason over the 
bodily nature is necessary to avoid conflict in the unity 
of the human person in his/her several material, social, 
emotional, spiritual and other needs. One can say, because 
there are multiple precepts (laws), then there are multiple 
means to achieve an end; but reason is the sole judge of 
which means to use (though it sometimes judges rightly and 
sometimes wrongly) . 
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(B) But Aquinas also offered reasons for saying that 
natural law has many precepts. He did this by drawing an 
analogy between the principles of natural law and the first 
or self-evident principles of demonstration. Aquinas held 
that the principles of natural law are to practical reason, 
what the axioms of science are to theoretical reason. In 
each realm of reason's search for understanding, there are 
self-evident first principles (Aquinas Ia IIae, q.94, art. 
2) . For Aquinas, the first self-evident principle in 
inquiring about how to act ~practical thinking as opposed to 
theoretical thinking) is "do good and avoid evil' (Aquinas 
Ia IIae, q.94, art. 2). 
He then drew a parallel between "being" in relation to 
"theoretical reason" and "good" in relation to "practical 
reason". As he saw it, just as "being" is the fi~st thing 
the human mind can grasp when it beholds a thing, (first 
principle of theoretical reason), so too "good" is the first 
thing which "practical reason" inclines to in its activity. 
When "reason" is focused on action and doing something, it 
is called "practical" reason. Practical reason, that is, 
reason seen as the reason of an agent, acts like every agent 
towards an "end"; and the general meaning of any end for 
reason is precisely in terms of "good." Thus Aquinas 
concluded that the first principle or origin of the activity 
of practical reason is that which all things seek after, 
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which is the general meaning of "good" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 
94, art. 2) . 
With this understanding, Aquinas identified what he 
called the first command of all law, namely 'that good is to 
be sought and done, evil to be avoided'; all commands of 
natural laws are based on this" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, 
art. 2). This then at the most general level is what is 
called moral law. Next, in order to clarify what he means by 
"natural law", Aquinas adds, "Accordingly, then natural law 
command extends to all doing or avoiding of things 
recognized by the practical·reason itself as human good" 
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2); and "to the avoidance and 
shunning of the apprehension of their contraries as bad" 
(Aquinas q. 94, art. 2). This is to say that, with regard to 
rational human actions, Aquinas used the phrase "natural 
law" and "moral law" equivalently. For Aquinas reason ia. the 
natural law - the guiding principle, without which no human 
action receives any specification. It is this natural law 
theory that CDF intends to apply in its Instruction. But 
this chapter will argue that CDF misapplies this theory in 
concluding that the human reproductive technology of !VF/ET 
is unnatural and therefore is inherently immoral. 
Before that argument begins, an issue relevant to that 
argument needs to be examined in order to show how an acting 
person is necessarily related to his activity. 
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The structure of human action 
A proper analysis of the morality of IVF/ET, especially 
in relation to CDF's arguments, also depends on 
understanding Aquinas' exposition of the structure of human 
action and of his systematic division of the characteristics 
of the human person. According to Louis Janssens, "Thomas 
Aquinas, approaches the topic of the structure of the human 
action in the light of his views of the acting subject, the 
inner act of the will" (1979)41). In other words, a theory 
about the eyaluation of any strictly human action should not 
precede a correct understanding of the moral character of 
the human subject. One of the arguments of this chapter, as 
will be shown when Aquinas' teaching on the morality of any 
given human action will be explained, is that the proper end 
of an action is determined solely by its relation to human 
nature. 
As Janssens, explains: Aquinas calls the will, "an 
essential condition of any explanation of strictly human 
actions because the will, as rational appetite, is 
specifically characteristic of the human being and 
consequently, only the acts which emanate from the will are 
properly speaking human acts" (1979:41), as contrasted with 
mere activities of humans. Following this, Aquinas first 
considers "the act of the will" before he turns "his 
attention to the external aptions which are also acts of the 
will itself ... although they depend on other faculties for 
110 
their realization'.' (Janssens 1979:41). In doing so, Aquinas 
says: "Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a 
power, are caused by that power in accordance with nature of 
.it.a object. But the object of the will is the .end and the 
gQQd. Therefore all human actions must be for an end" 
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 1, art. 1; emphasis mine). 
Therefore, in talking about the morality of !VF/ET, one 
is talking, first and foremost, about the structure and 
characteristics of human beings on which the morality of 
!VF/ET depends. As Aquinas says: 
"Now man is master of his actions through his reason 
and his liil..l.; whence, too, the free-will is defined as 
the faculty and will of reason. Therefore those actions 
are properly called human which proceed from a 
deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in 
man, they can be called actions of a man, but not 
properly human actions, since they are not proper to 
man as man" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 1 art. 1; emphasis 
mine) . 
So !VF/ET does not derive its meaning or moral significance 
just from itself as a set of material events and in 
isolation. Instead it takes its meaning and moral 
significance from the human beings and their ends who 
willfully carry out the act for specific purposes for 
themselves. 
The reader should note that one aim of this exposit~on is 
to show that the human "agent, consequently, is so 
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essentially related to the structure of the activity that 
his activity can only be called human to the extent that it 
originates within a thinking and willing subject who is 
therefore capable of a free act of the will" (1979:41; 
emphasis mine) . 
As has been noted, although there is only one precept 
of the natural law in the unity of a human person, that law 
is represented in different ways in the different parts of 
the human person, because of the complexity of the structure 
of the human person. So, the human will must have its own 
precept, inherent to itself,' that moves it into willing 
something. This precept is only powerful and useful to the 
extent it Qlll.y moves the will, pure and simple. This precept 
is human reason as judge of ends. Therefore just as it is 
true to say that a rational being cannot do anything without 
the will; so it is true to assert that he/she cannot do 
anything independent of reason. This is not, however, to 
argue that every action in which reason involves itself, is 
morally good, properly considered. 
But human reason as a judge of .e.rui.e., is not all that 
"nature" or "natural law" amounts to. Thus, the reader is 
again reminded that in chapter two, Paul Edwards and Vacek 
Edward, respectively referred to "nature" as "the laws and 
principles of structure by which the behavior of things may 
be explained"; or "the intrinsic principles of human growth 
including our biological, psychological, intellectual and 
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religious dimensions." As noted earlier, this implies that 
since there are many laws, there are also many means to an 
end. But reason decides which means to adopt in relation to 
the human person's end. The fact that there are several 
possible means of pursuing a particular end in view means 
that, this end in view is not the only important element in 
the consideration of the acting subject. That is, the means 
is also important, not only the end in view in the person's 
consideration. In order words neither means nor end can be 
omitted in any moral reflection; both must be considered. 
For example, in order for a couple to bear a genetic 
child, their sexual organs and hormonal or chemical 
substances must be in good condition, and they must be able 
to perform the sexual act for the desired child to come into 
existence. Without these material and organic elements and 
the performance of the sexual act itself, the desired child 
can never come into being. This means that although the 
couple's ultimate end of having a genetic child is valuable 
in itself, the couple cannot rule out the fact that having 
the normal means, the normal sexual organs and hormonal or 
chemical bodily substances, is also very important. Bearing 
a genetic child necessarily implies having the required 
means, normally the biological materials and the ability to 
perform the sexual act itself. Moreover, if any of the 
required material organs or chemical substances are in 
irremediable dysfunctional condition, proper attention must 
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be paid to the question of means in order for the ultimate 
goal of a genetic child to be attained. Necessarily, the 
material elements (means) to bearing one's own genetic child 
must be well cared for. 
Similarly the material elements and activities involved 
in IVF/ET, as alternate means designed to reproduce a child, 
must be well considered to be in the appropriate condition, 
in order for a child .to be properly, morally conceived. This 
material means of IVF/ET may be of special value and 
necessary for an infertil~ couple to conceive; but it cannot 
be treated just anyhow by those involved for the sake of 
their ultimate end. The material elements in both the 
traditional means of human reproduction and in IVF/ET are, 
in each instance, indispensable elements in human 
reproduction. But they must still be carefully judged for 
their use to be morally appropriate. 
Reason must examine these means in the light of the 
will's orientation to the (human) good. For the good in 
general and even the good in more specific goods like human 
reproduction is not available without the material elements 
(means) used to attain them. Without material means in any 
human action, the will would be merely analogous to 
theoretical reason, bereft, as it were, of its other side, 
practical reason in that it produces no action. Material 
elements are needed if the will is to attain its end. For 
although the "will" may, will what theoretical reason 
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beholds as its goal, the will can do nothing except willing 
that something actual happens. So it is practical reason 
which, as it were, translates the will into reality, by 
engaging other human faculties' necessary organs into 
action. It does this by devising a proper means towards the 
attainment of what is willed by the faculty of the will or 
what is beheld and named by theoretical reason - the "good". 
Now the specific good of reproduction requires in the 
ordinary case material acts including sexual intercourse, 
gestation, bearing a child, caring for it and educating it 
in order for that end of reproduction to be achieved. But 
for some couples who cannot reproduce by ordinary sexual 
intercourse, another set of material acts, including acts of 
organs, and other bodily products or parts, namely, IVF/ET, 
is available. The fact that some means may be more commonly 
used than others is not morally significant, and in any 
case, both need moral examination as means to the good end. 
Therefore, the fact that IVF/ET in the circumstances of 
infertility of couple is the sole possible means for child-
bearing does not imply that IVF/ET is automatically a good 
means, even if we assume for now that child-bearing as an 
end-in-view is a good, a point that will later be 
demonstrated carefully. 
Making this point clearly is necessary because sometimes the 
only possible means to a good end is itself morally 
unacceptable. 
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It has in fact been argued by CDF that, even though 
IVF/ET is the sole means of achieving human conception in 
some situations, this means is not well ordered in its 
practical reality and so the use of IVF/ET is immoral. 
Sometimes people intentionally set out to achieve ends they 
know to be morally wrong, as when someone voluntarily and 
willfully, kills another human being simply to end his/her 
life. In those cases, the end in view is immoral. But at 
other times a person does moral wrong while having a good 
end by choosing a means to that end which is moraly 
unacceptable; and sometimes this occurs when the means 
chosen was the only possible means to the end. In such 
cases, the moral person must forego the worthy end in order 
to avoid the morally unacceptable means. 
Part of the present inquiry is to determine if IVF/ET 
is a morally acceptable means to reproduction, given that 
CDF has argued that it is morally unacceptable. Of course, 
people sometimes unintentionally engage in immoral actions. 
For it is sometimes difficult to separate a good means from 
a bad one and a person may mistakenly use an unacceptable 
means to a worthy end. Louis Janssens clarifies this point 
by saying that even when morally bad means are chosen, 
humans are so structured that they are chosen for the sake 
of human good as long as the action being performed by the 
subject is from the will to achieve the good end. He s~ys: 
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"this principle can be applied to each human act, even 
a sinful act, since in any sinful act, man still 
intends to reach for something which is apprehended as 
something good, at least for some particular 
tendencies, although it is not in accord with the true 
good of the whole person contra naturam rationalem 
secundum rei veritatem (1979:42) 
Aquinas describes what is going on in such a situation in 
these words: 
That to which the will tends by sinning, although in 
reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, 
nevertheless is apprehended as something good ~nd 
suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man 
by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious 
habit (Ia IIae, q. 6, art. 4) 
That is, it is falsely apprehended as a morally acceptable 
means to something that is a genuine part of possible human 
good. But the complication which arises from the fact that 
both moral and immoral action originate from the same 
principle of the human will, does not by that very fact 
destroy the basic fact that the end in view of the acting 
subject, determines the culpability or commendability of 
the actor, because the human subject in his/her action seeks 
"to realize that which is good - the proper object of the 
will - means that we aim at this good as the end of our 
action" (Janssens 1979:42). 
Viewed in this light, Janssens, says that, "the .e..il.d is 
the primordial element of the structure of an action, 
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because it is the proper object of the act of the will"; and 
that "the subject or the inner act of the will is involved 
in the definition of the end" (1979:42; emphasis mine). In 
Aquinas's words, "every end of an action, therefore, is to 
be taken as an end of the subject, of the inner act of the 
will" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 18. art. 6). However, this does 
IlQ.t. demonstrate that the end in view is simply the 
determiner of the morality of an act; it only indicates that 
the end in view is structurally essential, and therefore an 
essential component of the moral judgment. 
It would seem that the problematic or intertwined 
nature of means and ends question, involved in human action, 
is unavoidable. In Janssens' opinion, Aquinas wanted to 
avoid two extreme views - one is a subjectivistic 
interpretation, the other is an objectivistic (i.e. without 
reference to the human subject) explication view of human 
action. Because of the complicated nature of what is 
involved, a full rendering of Janssens' understanding of the 
issue at stake seems appropriate: 
It is clear now that the end is the primordial element 
of the structure of an action, because it is the proper 
object of the act of the will. But it is equally clear 
that the subject or the inner act of the will is 
involved in the definition of the end. St. Thomas 
considers this thought over and again. "Voluntas 
proprie est ipsius finis." "Finis propries est objectum 
interioris actus voluntatis." Every end of an action, 
therefore, is to be taken as an end of the subject, of 
the inner act of the will, viz., a finis operantis 
Thomas does not give this principle the 
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sense of a subjectiyistic interpretation of human 
activity. He will emphasize that a definite good, as 
object and end of an inner act of the will, cannot be 
pursued by the subject by any kind of action (Janssens 
1979:42-43; emphasis mine). 
That is, moral judgment must attend to the means, the 
material actions needed to achieve an end, as surely as it 
must attend to the end. But equally, moral judgment must not 
focus solely on the ·material actions involved without 
reference to the end of the subject pursuing them; for these 
material actions are not considered as properly human 
actions save in relation to the willed pursuit of an end in 
which they are grounded. 
According Janssens, although Aquinas wanted to avoid a 
subjectivistic account of human action, focused solely on 
willed ends, he nevertheless maintained his position as well 
that no human activity can be morally evaluated without 
reference to human subject who, is the origin of the 
activity. With this, Janssens goes on to say that Aquinas, 
... will not abandon the position that the subject or 
the inner act of the will must be considered as the 
starting point; on the contrary, he will always stress 
that the end of the inner act of the will (or the finis 
operantis) determines the concrete structure of the 
action which fits this end (finis dat speciem actui 
humano) (Janssens 1979:43) . 
. It is at this intellectual juncture that Janssens, 
points out that a major error on the part of certain authors 
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or traditions6 is the presupposition that an human action 
can be morally evaluated independent of the acting subject. 
Building on his understanding of Aquinas, Janssens explains 
the error of these authors or tradition in these words: 
Our textbooks distinguish between finis operis and 
finis operantis. The intention of the authors is 
evident; it is an attempt to secure a moral eyaluation 
of the action itself (in eel, as related to the acting 
subject. Now it is to be noted that Thomas never uses 
this distinction in his De Actibus Humanis, although he 
knows it. He mentions it in his commentary on Petrus 
Lombardus. But he accentuates immediately that the 
finis operis is always converted into a finis 
operantis: finis operis semper reduncitur in finem 
operantis. His reason for this teaching is clear: he 
draws it from the very definition of end. To the mind 
of Thomas there is no end without the inner act of the 
will of the subject and yice-yersa. The end is in the 
strictest sense of the word the peculiar object of the 
inner act of the will. In other words, the good, which 
is the appropriate object of the will, can only be 
termed an end insofar as it is aimed at by the subject 
in and through his action; it is always a finis 
operantis (Janssens 1979:43; emphasis mine). 
That is, in any actual human act, whether performed or 
still only potential and under consideration, there can be 
no end-of-the-act other than the end-of-the-act-as-
considered-by-the-actor. The act in the abstract does not 
exist in relation to any end. The act, as a class for 
theoretical analysis, can be said to have some abstract 
While Janssens gives J. Mangan as his example, this chapter will focus on a similar error in the 
document on reproductive technologies of Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith. 
120 
existence, as a set of observable or mechanical behaviors, 
for example. But as an act-for-an-end, the act can only be 
considered as an act-of-an-actor-considering-it-for-an-end. 
There is no relation of act to end save by and by reference 
to an actor, no finis operis without a finis operantis. 
From this it is clear that, first, an human act cannot 
be morally evaluated independent of the human agent. 
Therefore, secondly, and in view of the first, an act has a 
moral meaning because of the end of the agent; but this does 
not mean it has meaning solely because of the end. Thirdly, 
because an human actor must always employ a means to a 
desired end, he or she is practically (in terms of practical 
reason) involved in that means, at least if the agent 
actually wishes to attain his/her desired end; that is, the 
means itself is in a sense indispensable (or several means 
are if several are possible) . This is to say that just as 
the end is desired for its value or for itself, so is the 
means desired in order to achieve that end. It is in this 
light that Aquinas could say that the end "is aimed at ~ 
the subject in and through his action". 
This is also why Aquinas taught that what is true of 
the means is also true of the end in terms of morally 
evaluating an human action; but again this does not imply 
that an act can be morally evaluated solely from the point 
of view of the end. Janssens explains: 
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According to Thomas ... "The finis operis is that to 
which the action is directed by the acting subject (ab 
agente); for this reason it is called the cause of the 
action (ratio operis) . The finis operantis is the goal 
at which the agent in the end (principaliter) aims," 
(Janssens 1978:42-43; emphasis mine). 
That is, the finis operis is always a finis operantis in 
Aquinas' view. Now this inseparable7 or necessary connection 
between means and the end of human action warrants Janssens 
to say that: 
This view of Thomas is of far-reaching importance 
because the determining situation of the subject in the 
activity makes it possible to consider our actions Il.Qt. 
as a succession of separate and disjointed actions but 
as the integrated moments of a life history in which 
unity and wholeness can be ·realized by virtue of the 
ends of the agent (1979:43; emphasis mine). 
This analysis of the structure of human act, will still be 
incomplete without an examination of how the human will, 
strives towards its end; that is, the good to be achieved. 
Here again Aquinas guides us. According to Janssens, 
Aquinas, believed that an agent's will can strive to its end 
"either in an absolute way when it wills the end in itself 
.'The terms "inseparable" or "necessary", here mean that an end always has a means, not vice-versa. 
For, there are things which exist as mean to something else, but are not always used for those ends. Or even 
when they are used, they do not always yield the inteded end. But when an end is achieved, then it always 
has a means. 
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and by itself (absolute secundum se), or when it wills the 
end as the reason that it wills the means to the end (in 
ratione volendi ea quae sunt ad finem)" (1979 :44;) 8 • This 
means that in the first of the two ways, a good can be 
striven for, or valued for its own sake abstractly, that is, 
without being connected with an action; for example, when 
one wills to have good health without doing anything to gain 
it (Janssens 1979:44) 9 • 
Aquinas' exemplifies the first of the two ways by 
contrasting it with the second way: 
Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and 
the same movement,-to the end, as the reason for 
willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it 
is another [that is, distinct] act whereby the will is 
moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act 
precedes the other in time; for example when a man 
first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating 
by what means to be healed, wills to send for the 
doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the 
intellect: for at first a man understands the 
principles in themselves; but afterwards understands 
them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the 
conclusions on account of the principles (Ia IIae, q. 
8. art. 3) . 
A correct understanding of the above text will show 
that there is no way the will can accomplish the end which 
it wills or desires absolutely in itself and for its own 
, Aquinas, S.T. Ia Ilae, q. 8, art. 3. 
, Aquinas S.T. Ia Ilae, q. 8 art. 3~ S.T. Ia llae, q. 12, art. 1. 
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sake, without devising and willing a particular means to 
attain that absolute end. This means that, if the end is to 
be attained, then a particular means must be chosen if 
already in existence; or a particular means must be devised 
if not in existence, in order to achieve the end that is 
willed. Thus, without some particular means, the agent's aim 
and valuing of that kind of good in general will be 
frustrated. This is not to overlook the possibility that the 
aim of the agent may still not be attained even with the 
consideration of a means toward the end because even a means 
that is often effective can still fail sometimes and some 
things initially considered effective means are in fact not 
effective. For example, it is true that neither conjugal act 
nor IVF/ET always produces children even when those means 
are available. Sometimes, neither of these two means of 
human reproduction is free from the mishaps which make the 
end unattainable. 
According to Janssens Aquinas, distinguished these two 
elements of a human act: "The intentio (intention) is the 
striving toward the .end to the extent that it is within the 
range of the means.' 'The electio (or the choice or 
selection of the means) is the concentration of the will on 
the means to the extent that they bear upon the attainment 
of the end"' (1979:45; emphasis and parenthesis mine). There 
is in this account an obvious interrelationship between 
intentio and electio. Although the intention concentrates on 
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the end, it is at the same time mindful of the means which 
is in turn the focus of electio, and vice-versa. For without 
means to achieve an end, intention is empty and all that is 
possible is valuing the end absolutely, as in the first way 
mentioned above. 
The relevance of these concepts in the evaluation of 
the structure of IVF/ET, can hardly be exaggerated, because 
they describe the essential structure of an action, such as 
the action awaiting moral approval or disapproval here. For 
the human, "will" and "reason" cannot aim at a goal 
effectively (that is other than abstractly, in general), 
without aiming at a particular choice (electio) of means for 
achieving that goal. As Janssens points out, the material 
sense of intentio and electio "are the same since they 
contain the idea of the whole act, end and means", although 
"they are formally quite distinct" (Janssens 1979:45). This 
is not to imply that there is an unbreachable, necessary 
connection between the intention and the choice of a 
particular means, because there can be other and possibly 
better means which may in the end yield greater and better 
results; but in all activities of practical reason, intentio 
and electio are inextricably bound together. Janssens 
distinguishes between the formal structure of intentio and 
the electio, by specifying clearly their foci and intent: 
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The intentio is directly aimed at the absolute element 
of the structure of the action, that is, the end itself 
which is the reason that the means are willed and 
consequently is the principle of the act ... , the 
electio signifies the relative element of the act, 
viz., the means {by its own definition means indicates 
a relation to the end which is only useful until the 
end has been attained} ... {Janssens 1979:45; emphasis 
mine} . 
But it needs to be acknowledged that the above still 
does not tell us how one is to distinguish a morally good 
act from an immoral one, given that the nature of the human 
being means that humans are capable of willing both moral 
and immoral acts. Before this important issue of how to 
distinguish a morally good action from an immoral one, is 
examined, however, Aquinas' teaching about the morality of 
the voluntas (the will), because of its essential relation 
to the issue to be discussed, needs to be explained first. 
The morality of the voluntas (the will) . 
By way of summary, so far, it is clear that according 
to Janssens' interpretation of Aquinas's position on the 
morality of human action, "the good which is the proper 
object of the will is also its end." Accordingly that end is 
also "a moral good (vere bonum) when it corresponds to 
reason" (1979:47-48}. Surprisingly too, even if a particular 
good "is not within the realm of reason, it is still a good 
(apparens bonum), as far as it is consonant with a 
particular appetite, in spite of the fact that it is morally 
vitiated" {Janssens 1979:48). 
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In order to unravel this apparent contradiction, 
Aquinas introduces his readers yet into another concept, 
before giving the conditions by which to know a morally good 
from morally vitiated will, from which in turn we can 
distinguish a morally good action from a bad one. This new 
concept, is inner disposition in connection with the 
virtues. For in order to understand Aquinas's teaching on 
Voluntas (the will), we need to study his teaching on 
virtue, which he claims is condition si ne qua non for an 
human agent to perform a morally good action. As Janssens 
affirms: "Whether or not the subject is taking the moral 
good as the end of his action depends on his inner 
disposition" (1978:48; emphasis mine). The virtues he says 
are acquired dispositions (habits) which direct us 
toward the moral good as the end, even when we do not 
act .... A virtuous person is directed toward the moral 
good because he loves and wills it as an end by virtue 
of an inner disposition (Janssens 1978:48). 
Janssens supplies us with an example of what is meant by 
virtue as disposition in our actions. He says, for example, 
when a person acquires the virtue of Justice, a person would 
by this disposition be in a suitable or proper state to ~ 
and ~ the social relation and conditions that fit the 
dignity of man, even in circumstances when the person finds 
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it impossible to overcome certain obstacles in his/her own 
actions (cf. Janssens 1978:48) . 10 
It is in this regard that virtue becomes the primary 
subject of interest for Aquinas as regards the morality of 
the will. For if a person is always disposed to act justly, 
or to love, the person will never in any circumstance ~ 
otherwise because by habit (that is, through a series of 
intentional and practical repetitive efforts) it has become 
his/her nature (his/her character/personal human condition) 
to act justly or to love. The overall result is (along with 
other virtues) that the person becomes a good person who 
always wills to act morally even though, under certain 
circumstances, he/she is unable to do good even when he/she 
wills it. Janssens words the idea in this way: 
... virtue makes the subject who possesses it a good 
subject. It is the source of the morally good simplex 
actus voluntatis which enables us to set our will on 
the moral good in an absolute sense and for its own 
sake. So the first moral qualification [of a good 
person] does not concern the particular acts but the 
subject himself who by virtue of his virtuous 
dispositions is turned towards the moral good as his 
end (1978:48). 
See Thomas Aquinas Ia llae, q. 20, art 3; or as Aristotle says: ... "the work of man is achieved only in 
accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, 
and practical wisdom makes us take the right means." Nicomachean Ethics 1144a 7-10 
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or as Aristotle, from whom Aquinas derived his idea of 
virtue in connection with a morally good will, words it: 
Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions 
there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, 
so too in the moral part there are two types, natural 
virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the 
latter involves practical wisdom {Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 1144b 13-17). 
This concept of virtue will be returned to later, where it 
plays a complementary role in aiding the human subject to 
make a prudent judgment because a prudent person is always 
inclined to right reason. 
Exterior act (actus exterior) 
As has already been indicated, the will does not operate in 
a vacuum nor does it operate alone in any activity. That is, 
an action that is to be done in pursuance of a goal must be 
performed both with something intangible as the activity of 
mind or {practical) reason and with something tangible or 
sensible in a physical sense as the means to the goal. Or as 
Janssens puts it, 
"Our will must rely on the medium of other faculties 
and our bodiliness as agencies which enable it to 
·effect a real contact with reality. For this reason our 
action is not only an inner act of the will {interior 
actus voluntatis) but also an exterior event {actus 
exterior) {Janssens 1979:46). 
129 
The morality of the human action 
By way of recapitulation Janssens says that, it was 
Aquinas's conviction that "the inner act of the will (end) 
and the exterior act (means) are one and the same concrete 
act" (1979:49); or in Aquinas own words: "internal and 
external actions are different in the physical order: yet 
... they combine to form one thing in the moral order" (Ia 
IIae, q.19, art. 3). This led Aquinas to come to the 
conclusion that both means and end "must also be treated as 
.QD.e from moral view point" (Janssens 1979:49), that is, the 
whole package. Nevertheless, "Thomas chooses as his starting 
point the acting subject, the end which is the proper object 
of the inner act of the will and which impresses the 
qualities of good or evil on the action: finis enim dat 
speciem in moralibus" (Janssens 1979:50). But this quotation 
must not be misunderstood: it does not reduce morality to a 
question about the end in view; the means must also be 
subjected to careful reflection. 
In this regard, Janssens points out something in the 
above statement of Aquinas' moral teaching that has created 
confusion for some moralists in interpreting Aquinas' 
natural law moral theory. On the one hand Aquinas "says that 
the species moris - the goodness or the malice of the act -
is determined by the end, the object of the inner act of the 
will" (Janssens 1979:50}. But on the other hand Aquina~ 
"writes that the si;>ecies moris of the exterior act depends 
130 
on the fact whether or not its object is in keeping with 
reason (secundum rationem or praeter rationem)" (Janssens 
1979:50). Or Aquinas says: "good, inasmuch as it is in 
accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against 
reason, diversify the moral species" (Ia IIae q. 18, art. 
5) • 
Some Thomists have therefore, held that, making these 
two seemingly contradictory statements, Aquinas was 
acutually indicating that "the morality of the exterior 
action can be evaluated by itself and as an element which is 
disconnected from the subject or the end of the inner act of 
the will" (Janssens 1979:50). But Janssens quotes Aquinas to 
show that, "primacy of the end, the formal element ... must 
be the starting point of the search for the insight into the 
morality of the action" (Janssens 1979:50). Thus he quotes 
Aquinas: 
"Nevertheless, the inner act of the will is the formal 
element of the exterior action, because the will itself 
acts through the medium of the body and because the 
exterior actions concern morality only insofar as they 
emanate from the will ... From this follows that the 
species moris is formally dependent on the end (of the 
inner act of the will) and materially dependent on the 
object of the exterior action" (Janssens 1979:50) . 11 
. Janssens cites Ia Ilae, q. 18, art. 6 ad 2, for this quotation that he makes of Aquinas. 
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There are two ways in which this act can be morally 
defective: (1) the end may be disordered. That is for 
Aquinas, the end of the inner act of the will may not 
necessarily be always good; for "the end itself may be good 
or bad" (1979: SO). Or (2), the means may be defective. As 
Aquinas says, "Although external things are good in 
themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due 
proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they 
are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the 
quality of goodness" (Ia IIae, q. 18, art. 2). On one hand 
therefore, when "the end is bad, the whole action is fruit 
of a mala voluntas and because the action is only human as 
far as it emanates from the will (voluntarius) it is 
entirely bad" (Janssens 1978:50). But, if on the other hand 
the end of the agent is good, then: 
"the entire action is necessarily good if it is not a 
mere velleitas but rather the very will to bring about 
an end, or in other words, if it concerns a real 
intentio finis which involves the effective will to 
realize an end for its own sake and also as reason and 
cause of the action (ratio et causa volendi) (Janssens 
1978:51). 
This last clause assumes that the material means towards the 
end in view is also good. But the morality of an act remains 
problematic when the end in view is good but the means is 
bad or involves some evil consequences. Here, one needs to 
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consider the fact that for Aquinas, evil is not an absolute 
in itself. For as Aquinas says: 
Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting 
some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in 
its species, not because it has no object at all; but 
because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for 
instance, to appropriate another's property (Aquinas Ia 
I Iae, q. 18, art. 5) . 
This means that evil is always in relation to something, not 
an absolute in itself; it is a privation of or deprivation 
of some value. It is something that affects another thing 
that is good in itself. 
Now, how does one know that the exterior act (the 
means) that involves evil is or is not in keeping with the 
good/end of an action, or reason which is the measure of 
good/ends, that is; of morality? Aquinas answers this 
question as follows: 
although the goodness of an action is not caused by the 
goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be 
good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. 
Consequently the very proportion of an action to its 
effect is the measure of its goodness (Aquinas Ia IIae, 
q. 18, art. 2) . 
The guiding principle here is to keep in mind that, for 
Aquinas, an action is immoral if it is disproportionat~ or 
incommensurate to reason on one hand, that is, to the ends 
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reason affirms and chooses. It is moral if it is adeguately 
proportionate or commensurate to good ends, that is reason. 
Put in another way "The means of the exterior acts 
participate in this moral goodness when they not only serve 
the purpose of effecting the end but moreover, when they are 
in the correct proportion to the end according to reason" 
(Janssens·1978:54). According to Janssens, this principle 
for moral action has some rational cognitive implication in 
Aquinas's thinking. Thus Aquinas writes: 
... it is essential to the voluntary act that its 
principle be within the agent, together with some 
knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is 
twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of 
the end consists in not only apprehending the thing 
which is the end, but also in knowing it under the 
aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to 
that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the 
rational nature (Ia IIae, q. 6, art. 2). 
It should be clear from all of the above that according 
to the dictates of human reason, an action is morally good, 
"when it is directed toward the end in keeping with the 
order determined by the reason and eternal law" (Janssens 
1979:54); but the act is immoral when it deviates from the 
rule of reason whether with reference to the specific end in 
view or in relation to the overall good (see Janssens 
1979:54). 
But there is still a question of how to determine 
whether the means involved in an action are proportionate or 
disproportionate to the end in view, that is, how we can 
' 
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objectively determine a good or bad means, without falling 
into the error of ethical subjectivism or relativism. 
Aquinas was well aware of, and so avoided the seeming 
subjectivism involved in his reasonings as Janssens pointed 
out. Thus Janssens would say that since end and means as 
constituent parts of an action both "must in Aquinas's 
thought be judged morally in the light of the objective 
measure of morality" (1979:55); then just as the subject's 
"intention must aim at an end which is morally good 
according to reason" (Janssens 1978:55) so also must the 
subject's exterior action "be materia debita proportio). In 
addition, the material object or means must be in due 
proportion to that end ... if there is to be no 
contradiction between end and means" (Janssens 1979:55; 
emphasis mine) . The last clause adds a further test beyond 
proportionality of the morality of an act. 
Janssens translates this doctrine about the morality of 
an action into four descriptive conditions for an act to be 
moral. (i) The ontic evil should not be intended or willed 
per se. (ii) There should be no intrinsic contradiction 
between means and end or the whole action. This is not to 
imply that Aquinas is deontological when the term 
"intrinsic" contradiction between means and end is employed 
here; because for Aquinas there is no such thing as good or 
evil in itself without reference to a human will and 
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intention/end. 12 (iii) Human subjects have the moral 
obligation to reduce as much as possible the ontic evil 
which comes about when we act". (iv) Humans must also 
consider the place of the end of the action in the totality 
of human life. The fulfillment of these conditions requires 
the presence of the virtues, especially prudence. The 
virtues, especially prudence enables the acting person to 
judge the whole action according to good reason. 
Janssens expands our understanding of these four 
conditions. The first condition: (i) The requirement of a 
debita proportio. We need to ask, when may we allow ontic 
evil in our acts? (1) If ontic evil is per se intended, the 
end itself (the object of the inner act of the will) is 
morally bad and since this is the formal element in the act 
and therefore the reason and cause of the exterior action, 
violation of this condition vitiates the entire action. In 
doing this a person would allow ontic evil precisely as a 
deficiency that frustrates human inclination to do good and 
avoid evil; moreover doing so is harmful to the long term 
development of the virtuous and so of human individual and 
common good. Therefore, one should never will ontic evil as 
the end of our action or human good. As Janssens puts it: 
"the entire set of moral laws and principles exists for the 
. For a comparative view of traditional concept and use of the principle of double effect, to judge the 
morality of human action, and the proportionalist understanding of this principle, cf. Richard Westley, Life, 
Death and Science, The Thomas More Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1989, pp. 47-71. 
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real well-being and the true development of man and society" 
[so] it is obvious that we would fall into immorality if 
we should strive for ontic evil itself and for its own sake, 
because ontic evil necessarily impedes and precludes the 
development of man and society" (Janssens 1979:69}. In this 
sense, Aquinas says the individual is never justified, not 
even in the case of self defense, in willing the death of a 
human subject as an end, for example, because this would 
make his act per se an act of murder" (Janssens 1979:69}. 
However, there can be situations in which intending a 
(partial} ontic evil as the end of our actions is 
justifiable, namely, when it is for the sake of a greater 
common good which supersedes the individual good. 
The second condition (ii) : There should be no intrinsic 
contradiction between means and ends. This condition 
demands that "When the single and composite act is viewed 
from the point of view of reason (secundum rationem}, it 
must be found without an intrinsic contradiction between the 
means (exterior act as material element} and the morally 
good end of the inner act of the will (formal element)" 
Janssens 1979:71}. Or as Janssens differently words the 
idea: "Put into terms of the philosophy of values, this 
means that the means must be consistent with the value of 
the end" 1979:71}. As Janssens indicates, the goodness of an 
end alone is not a justification of a bad means or the 
action. He writes: 
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"However essential this condition [good end] may be, it 
is not yet sufficient, because "the moral end as formal 
element only deserves to be labelled as the reason and 
the cause of the exterior action if this action is a 
means which, in conformity with reason (secundum 
rationem), has a debita prgportio to the end, which 
only in these conditions puts the stamp of its moral 
goodness on the totality of the act" (Janssens 
1979:71). 
What is meant by saying that there should be no intrinsic 
contradiction between the means and the morally good end of 
the inner act of the will, is that "no intrinsic 
contradiction between the means and the end may be found in 
the total act when the act is placed in the light of reason" 
(Janssens 1979:71). 
The problem here is in acknowledging that a means is 
inconsistent with an end that is good; for as a means to 
that good, one has at least some evidence that what reason 
sees as a means is good. But in such a case, Janssens says 
of the inconsistency that "I cannot but register this 
evidence cognitively even when it concerns a truth which 
displeases me or which interferes with my own prof it or 
pleasure" (1979:71). 
According to Janssens, when reason finds itself in this 
situation, it is said to be "disinterested" because it is 
functioning as free will facultas liberlis (see Janssens 
1979:71-72). That is, though the means is seen as a means to 
a good end, the will is not necessarily determined to will 
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that means. In recognizing the inconsistency with the end, 
this freedom of the will makes the will submit 
"itself necessarily and gratuitously to the truth which 
it embraces as evidence or as something which has all 
the appearance of evidence. It affixes to the truth the 
strictest connotation of necessity, absoluteness and 
universality so that it rejects any suggestion of a 
negation of itself (Janssens 1979:72). 
The idea of reason not negating itself, is central to 
judging the consistency of means to the end of the action. 
For the human subject who is involved in the action, which 
is a united whole event, a single package involving means 
and end, is also himself/herself a united whole constituted 
of rational and corporeal elements - a single unified being 
who wills and is rational, emotional, temporal, spatial, 
social, and above all limited, so that one element of 
his/her being is necessarily affected by his/her action or 
judgment of means to the action (see Janssens 1979:60-66). 
Janssens expresses what is involved here forcefully in the 
following words: 
When it is obvious to me that I, the subject of the 
whole action, use a means which is the negation of the 
value (or the principle) I am affirming in my idea of 
the end, I am forced to be aware of th.is contradiction. 
This contradiction is the source of my feeling guilty: 
the awareness of the inner disunity of the subject 
which has turned its free will against its rational 
understanding when it aimed at an end it could not 
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rationally sanction or when it used a means by which it 
negated the value it affirmed by the end. My self is a 
united self, a subject which is undivided, and I 
preserve this unity only when I apply my will to use 
the means and to realize the end to my reason 
(1979:72). 
In view of this undivided unity in both human action as a 
whole, and the human subject himself/herself, it is 
important not to disassociate oneself from the good which 
the human reason (person) sees if an action is to be to the 
well-being of the person. Hence Janssens says: 
My reason is necessarily ordered to the truth. It is 
like a pivot on which everything hinges. My power to 
will is free. Hence, there is only one way to preserve 
myself as a united subject: I must order all the 
aspects of the act of my will to the disinterested 
understanding of my reason. That is the fundamental 
axiom of morality (1979:72). 
But ontic evil is sometimes inevitable in our acts. 
That inevitable reality is the focus of the third and fourth 
conditions. That is, sometime we must act even when there is 
ontic evil because it is unavoidable. As Janssens says: 
"We cannot do away with ontic evil in our act without 
depriving our actions of their effectiveness and 
without sooner or later endangering the realization of 
our morally good ends. Within these restrictions, the 
implication of ontic evil in our actions does not mean 
that no attention should be given to the debita 
proportio of the mean to the end" (1979: 79) . 
In giving attention to debita proportio the human 
subject is then left to consider correctly how the ontic 
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evil properly fits into the whole good end. In other words 
the ontic evil must be examined in relation to the goods 
both in particular (and in general. As Janssens has 
unambiguously remarked: 
The question to which we refer here is known as the 
problem of the relation of the debita praportio and ontic 
evil. If the presence of ontic evil as such would always 
endanger the debita praportio of our action, it would be 
impossible to act morally, because it is impossible to 
prevent ontic evil. The danger lies in the fact that moral 
evil is mentioned too soon. This happens every time a moral 
judgment of an exterior act does not include a judgment of 
the end and of the agent. This is taking ontic evil for 
moral evil (1979:73}. 
Condition (iii} : "We have the moral obligation to 
reduce as much as possible the ontic evil which comes about 
when we act" (Janssens 1979:79}. This thesis is already 
implied in the first condition that ontic evil should never 
be the ultimate goal of our intention: but the focus of this 
condition is that we must preserve the proper proportion of 
the means to the end. It is immoral to will ontic evil which 
disproportionately obstructs the growth of the individual 
and society because the object of morality is to promote the 
individual and the society (see Janssens 1979:79-80). Humans 
have the moral obligation to lessen or prevent ontic evil 
where it must be prevented or lessened. 
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Janssens offers two reason for this aspect of our moral 
obligation: 
The first one follows from the definition of morality: 
moral activity fundamentally concerns the truly human 
development of man and society and the struggle against 
ontic evil which impedes this development. The secondly 
reason follows from the meaning of our activity in the 
world: by our activity we must turn the world of nature 
into a world of culture. In other words, our activity 
is ordered to the realization of the objective culture 
for the promotion of the subjective culture of each and 
everyone. In this respect ontic evil is anything which 
impedes the progress of objective culture and the 
increase of the share of each and everyone in the 
resources of objective culture (Janssens 1979:81). 
Condition (iv): "In the actualization of a good end and 
the deliberation about the means to this end, the genuinely 
important question is what place this end has in the 
totality of human existence" (Janssens 1979:81). Asking this 
question enables the acting subject to assess the relation 
of the end to other important elements of the action and 
therefore helps the acting subject not to look at his/her 
action as something isolated from other things or events. As 
Janssens puts the idea: 
To act, consequently, means that a subject actualizes 
his intentions in and by an active contact with 
reality. If we begin this way from the acting and 
willing subject, it is possible to look at our actions 
as something more than a succession of isolated, 
diversified and scattered acts (Janssens 1979:81). 
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As was mentioned earlier, the fulfillment of these four 
conditions depends on a person's aquisition of the virtues. 
Thus, Janssens reminds us of Aquinas' use of the virtues and 
their role in shaping a morally good action. Prudence, he 
points out, holds a special place among the virtues which 
dispose human subject to will and perform morally good 
action. This is to say that human reason which directs every 
act, must have within itself the virtue of prudence whose, 
"function is to safeguard the debita prqportio of the means 
to morally good ends" (Janssens 1979:55; emphasis mine). 
Aquinas's own words on this issue are as follows: 
a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that 
virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that 
virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is 
ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason 
various virtues are necessary. But right reason in 
regard to the very end of a virtue has no other 
goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as 
the goodness of the reason is participated in each 
virtue (Ia IIae, q. 20, art. 3; emphasis mine) . 13 
This means that for a person who has acquired the moral 
goodness of justice, or truthfulness, for instance, through 
See also Aquinas' theory of the mean; "The Philosopher says ... that moral virtue is a habit of choosing 
the means" (la llae, q. 64, art. 3). This reference to the philosopher, is to Aristotle. "There are three kinds 
of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. 
the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all ; ... " (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, book II, 1108b 8-10). 
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intentional repetitive practices so that being just or 
telling the truth has become an habit of the person, he/she 
would be more prone to act towards the good, because a 
prudent person acts according to right reason. 
The practical problem therefore seems to be how we can 
train ourselves to be virtuous, especially to be prudent. 
That is, being good habitual judgers of means proportioned 
to our ends in-view (condition iii) and to the whole of 
human good (condition iv) that is their fundamental context 
so that in every instance of one's action, the agent is able 
to strike a mean between two extremes of excess and 
deficiency. Of course, it is possible that in some 
particular instances a virtuous person, that is, a person 
with habits of right reason, can sometimes misjudge this 
balance between two extremes, and fall into one of them 
because of his/her imperfect condition as a rational being. 
But he/she cannot nonetheless be termed a vicious or an 
immoral person on the basis of a particular instance of 
misjudgment. For in general, when all the particular 
instances of his/her actions/behavior are looked at, if 
he/she is virtuous he/she judges proportionate means. 
Now that this work has examined what the father of 
natural law ethical theory has to say about the morality of 
human action, it is now well situated to examine how one 
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tradition14 of interpretation of this theory has applied it 
to question of the morality of IVF/ET technology. A textual 
exposition of one such work will be made first; and then its 
analysis of the morality of IVF/ET will be examined and 
criticized. 
Textual exposition 
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on 
the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of 
the Day. 
This document has an introduction, three parts, and a 
conclusion. This work will make a summary exposition of this 
document accordingly. 
Introduction 
From the start, CDF acknowledges that a proper 
evaluation of the morality of !VF/ET and artificial 
insemination "presupposes a proper idea of the nature of the 
human person [because] it is only in keeping with his 
true nature that the human person can achieve self-
realization as a 'unified totality': and this nature is at 
the same time corporal and spiritual" {1987:8; emphasis 
mine). Moreover, the "natural moral law expresses and lays 
down the purposes, rights and duties which are based upon 
the bodily and spiritual nature of the human person" 
See footnote 8 above, Congregation. 
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(1987:8; emphasis mine). It then emphasized that this moral 
law "must be defined as the rational order whereby man is 
called by the Creator to direct and regulate his life and 
actions and in particular to make use of his own body" (CDF 
1987:8; emphasis mine}. 
CDF points out that while the biological and medical 
sciences are resources for good, in that "they might 
constitute progress in the service of man," they may also be 
sources of evil since they "involve serious risks" (CDF 
1987:5}. CDF argues that "what is technically possible is 
not for that very reason morally admissible" (1987:10}. In 
all these basic claims, CDF parallels views of Aquinas 
already explained more fully above. 
Part :r 
Respect for human embryos 
The effort of CDF in this section is "to respond to the 
numerous moral problems posed by the technical interventions 
upon the human being in the first phases of his life and 
upon the processes of conception" (1987:12}. Regarding this, 
it states that the "human being must be respected-as a 
person-from the yezy first instant of bis existence" (CDF 
1987:12; emphasis mine} because "from fertilization the 
biological identity of a new human individual is already 
constituted" (CDF 1987:13). This status of the embryo it 
argues, "demands the unconditional respect that is morally 
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due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality" 
{CDF 1987:13-14). 
Relying on the moral principle of proportionality, CDF 
argues that therapeutic medical procedures on the human 
embryo are morally right, if they do "not involve 
disprqportianate risks for it but are directed towards its 
healing, the improvement of its condition of health, or its 
individual survival {CDF 1987:15; italics original; emphasis 
mine) . 
In that connection, CDF entrusts the responsibility of 
ensuring the well-being of the fetus to its parents in these 
words. "Whatever the type of ·medical, surgical or other 
therapy, the free and informed consent of the parents is 
required, according to the deontological rules followed in 
the case of children" {CDF 1987:15; emphasis mine). It is 
quite clear that the basic moral standard CDF is applying on 
this issue is deontological, not one of proportionality. As 
will be shown, CDF's arguments against IVF/ET are also 
deontological in structure, rather than being based on 
proportionality issues. At the same time, however, CDF does 
offer some proportionalist thinking about IVF/ET in its 
worries about harm to embryos and about technological 
domination of human reproduction in the IVF/ET procedure. 
Based on parental autonomy to assume medical 
responsibility towards the well-being of their embryonic 
offsprings CDF does use a proportionality argument as · 
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already noted, regarding therapeutic interventions for 
embryos or fetuses: 
strictly therapeutic intervention whose explicit 
objective is the healing of various maladies such as 
those stemming from chromosomal defects will, in 
principle, be considered desirable, provided it is 
directed to the true promotion of the personal well-
being of the individual without doing harm to his 
integrity or worsening his conditions of life (1987;15-
16; emphasis mine). 
Other methods such as experimentation or research also need 
to be immoral because they "damage or impose grave and 
disproportionate risks upon embryos obtained in vitro" (CDF 
1987:18). 
In agreement with Janssens first condition, discussed 
above, CDF argues that: "It is therefore not in conformity 
with the moral law deliberately to expose to death human 
embryos obtained 'in vitro' (CDF 1987:18-19). 
Part II 
Interventions upon human procreation. 
Homologous artificial fertilization: IVF/ET and artificial 
insemination between husband and wife. 
CDF begins this section with a definition of the 
subject matter and a clarification of its area of concern: 
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By "artificial procreation" or "artificial 
fertilization" are understood here the different 
technical procedures directed towards obtaining a human 
conception in a manner other than the sexual union of 
man and woman. This Instruction deals with 
fertilization of an ovum in a test-tube (in vitro 
fertilization) and artificial insemination through 
transfer into the woman's genital tracts of previously 
collected sperm (CDF 1987:21). 
CDF begins its analysis by stating that "every human 
being is always to be accepted as a gift and blessing of 
God" (1987:23). CDF immediately adds a statement of the 
conclusion it will defend: "However, from the moral point of 
view a truly responsible procreation vis-a-vis the unborn 
child must be the fruit of marriage" (1987:23). 
The reasoning to this conclusion begins with the 
premise that in CDF's view, there is a necessary connection 
between marital sexual intercourse and human reproduction, 
on one hand; and on the other hand, a necessary link between 
sexual intercourse of married couples and unity between 
them. Given this starting point, CDF poses the question: 
"What connection is required from the moral point of view 
between procreation and the conjugal act" (CDF 1987:26)? It 
then responds to this question with three related claims. 
The first of these claims is this: 
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(a) The Church's teaching on marriage and human· 
procreation, affirms the "inseparable connection, 
willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own 
initiative, between two meanings of the conjugal act: 
the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning. 
Indeed, by its intimate structure, the conjugal act, 
while most closely uniting husband and wife, 
capacitates them for the generation of new lives, 
according to laws inscribed in the very being of man 
and of woman" ... "By safeguarding both these essential 
aspects, the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal 
act preserves in its fullness the sense of true mutual 
love and its ordination towards man's exalted vocation 
to parenthood (1987:26; emphasis mine). 
On the basis of the "inseparable connection" which CDF 
sees between the conjugal act and human reproduction, CDF 
argues that, "it is never permitted to separate these 
different aspects to such a degree as positively to exclude 
either the procreative intention or the conjugal relation" 
(1987: 26-27) . 
In this light, CDF states that: "homologous artificial 
fertilization, in seeking a procreation which is not the 
fruit of a specific act of conjugal union, objectively 
effects" (1987:27) an end similar to that of "contraception" 
which "deliberately deprives the conjugal act of its 
openness to procreation and in this way brings about a 
voluntary dissociation of the ends of marriage" (CDF 
1987:27). Therefore, 
fertilization is licitly sought when it is the result 
of a "conjugal act which is per se suitable for the 
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generation of children to which marriage is ordered bx 
its nature and by which the spouses become one flesh". 
But from the moral point of view procreation is 
deprived of its proper perfection when it is not 
desired as the fruit of the conjugal act, that is to 
say of the specific act of the spouses' union (CDF 
1987:27; italics original, emphasis mine). 
(b.) The second claim in response to CDF's question 
about the implications of its premise is the following: CDF 
holds that the "moral value of the intimate link between the 
goods of marriage and between the meanings of the conjugal 
act is based upon the unity of the human being, a unity 
involving body and spiritual soul" (1987:27). In this 
connection, CDF contends that the conjugal act is a 
"'language of the body'" involving "'spousal meanings' and 
parental ones" (1987:27); and that it "is an act that is 
inseparably corporal and spiritual" (CDF 1978:27). For it 
"is in their bodies and through their bodies that the 
spouses consummate their marriage and are able to become 
father and mother" (CDF 1987:27). 
CDF then argues that this language of the bodies of 
married couples must be respected. This means that "the 
conjugal union must take place with respect for its openness 
to procreation; and the procreation of a person must be the 
fruit and the result of married love" (CDF 1987:27-28). From 
this, CDF concludes that "Fertilization achieved outside the 
bodies of the couple remains by this very fact deprived of 
the meanings and the values which are expressed in the 
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language of the body and in the union of human persons" (1987) . 
(c) Thirdly, CDF asserts that "Only respect for the 
link between the meanings of the conjugal act and respect 
for the unity of the human being make possible procreation 
in conformity with the dignity of the person" (1987:28). For 
this reason CDF argues that a child must be the product of 
his/her parents' love; and therefore he/she "cannot be 
desired or conceived as the product of an intervention of 
medical or biological techniques; that would be equivalent 
to reducing him/he~ to an object of scientific·technology" 
(1987:28). For, CDF argues, 
The moral relevance of the link between the 
meanings of the conjugal act and between the goods of 
marriage, as well as the unity of the human being and 
the dignity of his origin, demand that the procreation 
of a human person be brought about as the fruit of the 
conjugal act specific to the love between spouses (CDF 
1987:28; emphasis mine). 
The above having been said, CDF's asks: "Is homologous 
in vitro fertilization morally licit?" CDF has developed 
several arguments that are negative this question. Although 
it admits that for some couples, "recourse to homologous IVF 
and ET appears to be the only way of fulfilling their 
sincere desire for a child" (CDF 1987:29), CDF nevertheless 
insists that "IVF and ET certainly cannot be preferred to 
the acts of conjugal union, given the risks involved for the 
child and the difficulties of the procedure" (1987:29). Here 
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for a moment, it should be noted, CDF offers a 
proportionalist reasoning. But the basic structure of CDF's 
argument is deontological ·, holding that IVF /ET is immoral 
because it is unnatural. 
CDF affirms that the "desire for a child - at the very 
least openness to" conceiving a child, "is a necessary 
prerequisite from the moral point of view for responsible 
human procreation" (CDF 1987:29); but CDF argues further, as 
Aquinas/Janssens have been seen to do, that having "good 
intention is not sufficient for making a positive moral 
evaluation of in vitro fertilization between spouses" 
(1987:29). At this point, however, CDF departs from the 
Aquinas/Janssens interpretation of natural law reasoning. 
For CDF now continues: "The process of IVF and ET must be 
judged in itself and cannot borrow its definitive moral 
quality from the totality of conjugal life of which it 
becomes part nor from the conjugal acts which may precede or 
follow it" (1987:29; emphasis mine). 
Nor, CDF holds, would IVF/ET be permitted "even in a 
situation in which every precaution were taken to avoid the 
death of human embryos" (CDF 1987:30), because human 
fertilization outside the body of a woman "entrusts the life· 
and identity of the embryos into the power of doctors and 
biologists and establishes the domination of technology over 
the origin and destiny of the human person" (1987:30; 
emphasis mine) . 
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In CDF's perspective, then, even with the technical 
aspect of IVF/ET set aside, when the morality of the 
procedure is considered from rational point of view, it is 
still impermissible because IVF/ET "is neither in fact 
achieved nor positively willed as the expression and fruit 
of a specific act of the conjugal union" (1987:30; emphasis 
mine). 
Homologous artificial insemination is evaluated, and 
morally condemned by CDF for the same basic non-
proportionalist, deontological reasons it declares IVF/ET 
immoral, namely that such an act disassociates the two 
necessary meanings of the conjugal act. The following 
explanation may provide more light: 
Artificial insemination as a substitute for the 
conjugal act is prohibited by reason of the voluntarily 
achieved dissociation of the two meanings of the 
conjugal action. Masturbation, through which the sperm 
is normally obtained, is another sign of this 
dissociation: even when it is done for the purpose of 
procreation, the act remains deprived of its unitive 
meaning (CDF 1987:32). 
At this point CDF mentions two general criteria by which 
medical intervention in human reproduction, can be morally 
evaluated. The medical art is to be evaluated "with 
reference to its technical dimension" and "in relation to 
its goal which is the good of persons and their bodily and 
psychological health" (CDF 1987:32). 
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CDF also considers the suffering of married couples pn 
account of infertility. It acknowledges that, on the part of 
these couples, "the desire for a child is natural"; and even 
affirms that "This desire can be even stronger if the couple 
is affected by sterility which appears incurable" (1987:33-
34) . Nevertheless, it claims that "marriage does not confer 
upon the spouses the right to have a child, but only the 
right to perform those natural acts which are per se ordered 
to procreation" (CDF 1987:34). Here the expression "per se 
ordered to creation" means acts in which the unitive and 
procreative meanings the CDF sees as necessarily connected 
have not been separated. 
As an alternative to IVF/ET and artificial insemination 
CDF suggests "adoption, various forms of educational work 
and assistance to other families and to poor or handicapped 
children" (CDF 1987:34). 
Part III 
Moral and civil law 
In this section CDF states that the right to life of 
every individual human being, the family, and marriage are 
basic human values, which form the foundation of an orderly 
civil society. It then calls on political and legislative 
authorities to intervene to limit immoral reproductive 
technologies "since an uncontrolled application of such 
techniques could lead to unforeseeable and damaging 
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consequences for civil society" (1987:35). Such an 
intervention would be necessary "to ensure the common good 
of people through the recognition of and the defense of 
fundamental rights and through the promotion of peace and of 
public morality" (CDF 1987:35). CDF acknowledges that there 
is "no sphere of life" in which the civil law can "take the 
place of conscience or dictate norms concerning things which 
are outside its competence" (1987:35-36). So civil law "must 
sometimes tolerate, for the sake of public order, things 
which it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting" 
(CDF 1987:36). In this connection CDF identifies two sets of 
rights that must be protected by civil or political and 
legislative authorities: 
(a) "every human being's right to life and 
physical integrity from the moment of conception until 
death; (b) the rights of the family and of marriage as 
an institution and, in this area, the child's right to 
be conceived, brought into the world and brought up by 
his parents" (CDF 1987:36). 
CDF concludes its document by saying that: "In the 
light of the truth about the gift of human life and in the 
light of the moral principles which flow from that truth, 
everyone is invited to act in the area of responsibility 
proper to each ... " (1987:40). 
A critique Of CDP's version of natural law morality on 
IVP/ET and artificial insemination. 
The exposition of CDF's argument above shows that at 
least two15 major lines of argument are developed in its 
156 
non-proportionalist arguments that !VF/ET, is fundamentally 
morally vitiated. The first line of argument is based on the 
inseparability of conjugal act and its two meanings: the 
procreative and the unitive (love-giving) . 16 The second line 
of argument may be called the argument from respect for the 
conjugal act ("language of the body") and respect for the 
natural law (the link between the meanings of the conjugal 
act: the unitive and the procreative) argument. But these 
two lines of argument are essentially the same, except that 
CDF words them differently. For this reason, they will be 
treated as one, though under separate sub-sections. Morever, 
because of this, any counter-argument that shows that CDF's 
basic moral norm, the natural law has been mistakenly 
applied to the conjugal act and its two meanings by CDF will 
automatically disprove both lines of arguments, because the 
first is the ground of the second . 
. This distinction of the CDF's arguments into two main lines of argument is used by a number of 
commentators favorable to the CDF's position. See for example, "Catholic Moral Teaching On In Vitro 
Fertilization" by William E. May, in: Reproductive Technologies, Marriage and The Church; The Pope John 
XXIII Medical - Moral Research and Education Center, Rraintree, Massachusetts, 1988, p.109 . 
. Ibid. 
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To begin with CDF's first line of argument, a key point 
to note is the meaning of "natural" or "natural law" in 
relation to the conjugal act according to CDF. Nature here 
involves "an inseparable connection, willed by God and 
unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between 
the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning 
and the procreative meaning. "17 According to a proponent of 
CDF's position, these unitive meaning and procreative 
meanings, are "love-giving" and "life-giving" respectively 
(see May 1988:109). 18 
In CDF's view, it is necessarily one and the same 
physical act which unites the marital partners in the 
expression of their love (unitive meaning) and in which they 
bring about the new life of a child (procreative) . If either 
of these elements is absent, the act is viewed as radically 
deficient, both as not fulfilling the two aspects of human 
nature that it is this act's job to fulfill, and as not 
fulfilling the two aspects of the physical act itself, which 
is the second line of argument. 
Because this connection, CDF holds, is necessary in the 
natural performance of the act, anything, that is, any human 
. Henceforth, for philosophical reasons of terminology or phrasiology, "will of God" or the "inseparable 
connection, willed by God ... " will be called "natural" or "natural law", except where their direct quotation 
is necessary .. 
. See footnotes 15 for this reference. 
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intervention separating the two meanings makes it unnatural. 
CDF argues that there is therefore a moral inseparable or a 
morally necessary connection between marital sexual 
intercourse and human reproduction, as well as a morally 
necessary link between sexual intercourse of married couples 
and unity between them. To deliberately prevent either aim 
or to deliberately separate them from occurring in one and 
the same act is therefore immoral precisely because it is, 
CDF holds, unnatural. 
It is because of this pattern of argument that CDF's 
position is described here as deontological. The argument is 
grounded in a principle that what is necessary and natural 
alone is moral and therefore that what is counter to the 
necessary, natural pattern is immoral. This is a 
deontological, not a consequentialist mode of argument. 
The above claim of CDF is flawed in three important 
respects. It is flawed on metaphysical or logical grounds. 
It is flawed from the point of view of moral evaluation. It 
is flawed on practical grounds. In addition, in the logic of 
CDF's arguments, there is an assumption that IVF/ET is 
analogous to contraception, which CDF believes had been 
demonstrated to be immoral years earlier. 19 Thus it states: 
. See Encyclical Lener Of His Holiness Pope Paul VI On The Regulation Of Birth ( Humanae Vitae) 
1968, pp. 11-12,· John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, •contraception and the Infallibility of the 
Ordinary Magisterium • in: The Teaching of Humanae Vitae A Defense: Is its Teaching Infallible? Are its 
Norms Defensible? by John C. Ford et al, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1988, pp.119-219. 
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"Homologous artificial fertilization, in seeking a 
procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of 
conjugal union, objectively effects an analogous separation 
between the goods and the meanings of marriage" (1987:27). 
This argument from analogy will also be shown to be 
mistaken. 
·The order of this critical work will be as follows: I. 
The metaphysical or logical flaw of the inseparability 
argument. II. The error from moral objectivism; III. The 
flaws of the inseparability argument on practical grounds. 
IV. The argument from analogy between contraception and 
IVF/ET. Then a fifth kind of claim by CDF, on marriage and 
the right to procreate, will be examined. 
One thing needs to be pointed out first. It is clear 
from the exposition of CDF's arguments above that, although 
CDF makes frequent use of two sources of moral norms, that 
is, using both proportionality and deontological arguments, 
it relies principally on its deontological interpretation of 
natural law ethical standards in drawing its fundamental 
conclusion against the morality of IVF/ET and artificial 
insemination, without significant dependence on the 
proportionality issues. For example, with regard to 
proportionality criterion in !VF/ET, CDF mentions the 
proportionality theme in this way: "As with .all medical 
interventions on patients, one must uphold as licit 
procedures carried out on the human embryo which respect the 
life and integrity of the embryo and do not involve 
disproportionate risks for it· ... 1120 But it is an 
unconditional deontological criterion based on CDF 's 
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interpretation of the natural law moral tradition, that CDF 
considers decisive for the morality of IVF/ET. For example: 
Science and technology requires, for their own 
intrinsic meaning, an unconditional respect for the 
fundamental criteria of the moral law: that is to say, 
they must be at the service of the human person, of his 
inalienable rights and his true and integral good 
according to the design and will of God (CDF 1987:7; 
emphasis mine) . 
One further preliminary point deserves notice. CDF, as 
an official teaching institution within the Roman Catholic 
Church, holds the theological position that the conclusions 
of its moral arguments are also human reason's best grasp of 
the will of God for human conduct. For CDF, God's will is an 
unconditional standard and humans are under an unconditional 
obligation tq obey it. So it is not surprising that CDF's 
arguments about IVF/ET, are intended to reach unconditional 
conclusions, and so are deontological in character. But its 
arguments against !VF/ET in this document are of a 
philosophical, not a theological nature, as the above 
exposition has shown. Therefore it is appropriate here to 
subject them to a careful philosophical examination . 
. This proponionality principle issue, will be considered in detail in the next two chapters. 
161 
The inseparability argument 
(1) What does CDF mean by natural law? In this case, it 
refers to the natural or necessary connection, between 
sexual intercourse and human procreation, and a moral 
requirement not to separate them by human intervention. This 
means that an act of intercourse must both procreate and 
unite husband and wife, or at least must not be deliberately 
prevented by an human intervention from doing so, as IVF/ET 
does by moving the procreative event out of the conjugal 
act. 21 But in Chapter Two, Aquinas' teaching on a "natural 
law" understanding of morality was seen to focus on the 
doing of good and avoidance of evil at the command of 
practical reason, not on a rigid concern with the material 
or, in this case, biological characteristics of an act. 
To see this, consider that the way the.se two meanings 
of the conjugal act are intertwined in actual occurrences of 
the conjugal act, is such that it is not possible to claim 
that either of the two meanings ever takes precedence over 
the other22 or that they are necessarily of equal value to 
every couple performing the act in the biologically typical 
. This is a rewording of Richard McCormick's clarification of the understanding of correct meaning of 
inseparability and will of God in conjugal act, as stated by CDF. See "Human Rproduction: Dominion and 
limits"·by Richard McCormick, in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4, Dec. 1996 p.390 . 
. Some authors prefer to say "hierarchical ordering of ends". See footnote 19. for source. 
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way. For some married couples, the unitive meaning has a 
fuller sense and meaning, linked as it is with mutual sexual 
gratification, or companionship, or friendship. For other 
couples the desire for children dominates. CDF's argument 
requires that such differences be viewed as unnatural 
because of the requirement that one and the same 
biological/physical act is unitive and procreative. But many 
conjugal acts do not procreate and many conjugal acts do not 
unite the marital partners in any way but externally, in 
spite of the partners' best intentions regarding both ends. 
The CDF does not explain why these aspects of the conjugal 
act are considered necessary and therefore are ~ 
considered natural when they are both present together, even 
though they so often occur separately. To claim that it is 
only when both occur together that the act is consistent 
with nature and therefore only then that human nature is 
properly fulfilled in this act, is to beg the fundamental 
question of what is natural here. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the exposition, CDF holds in 
the first line of argument that: human material separation 
of the material-uniting-of-the-partners, and the materially-
procreating a child (by making the activities materially 
parts of what CDF declares to be separate acts) is immoral 
because it involves both a material act and an intention 
that are contrary to the nature as CDF views it, of the 
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conjugal act as a material reality; that is, an act that is 
both materially unitive and materially procreative. 
One author23 in the natural law tradition of CDF has 
attempted to illuminate CDF's position by distinguishing the 
immediate and the ultimate reasons for the marital act. On 
the immediate reason, he wrote: "mutual attraction of man 
and woman and the desire for a common life is the more 
proximate cause for the marital act as we view it 
phenomenologically" {John M. Haas 1988:97}. In other words, 
the most immediate and powerful reason why people marry in 
particular instances is "mutual attraction ... and the 
desire for a common life". 
But in Haas' view, this immediate reason need not be 
the ultimate end as a metaphysician sees it. He writes: 
However, the metaphysician wants to understand the 
marital act in its most general sense and sees that the 
end it ultimately serves is the generation of new life 
and the perpetuation of the species. As St. Augustine 
said, "What food is to the health of man, intercourse 
is to the health of the race". We need intercourse, and 
we need it because it generates babies (John M. Haas 
1988: 97} . 
In saying the above, Haas assumes that what is, for 
him, the most proximate end of the procreative act cannot be 
at the same time its ultimate end. In other words, he 
. John M. Haas is one the ardent supporters of, and commentators on the CDF's document. See footnote 
23 below. 
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assumes that the union of the spouses cannot be valued for 
its own value/good but only in connection with another end, 
procreation. 
Haas also takes it for granted that "mutual attraction 
and the desire for a common life" is the only possible 
phenomenologically acceptable proximate reason for the 
marital act, on one hand; and that the "generation of new 
life and the perpetuation of the species" are the only 
existing, possible and acceptable metaphysically ultimate 
reasons for marital act on the other hand. Nevertheless, he 
writes paradoxically: "The good of procreation is in a sense 
more fundamental in intercourse than the other goods of 
mutual support or sexual gratification" {Haas 1988:97; 
italics original). 
Admittedly, this claim could be true for some couple, 
especially those who value and have need for children. But 
it would not be necessarily true for every married couple, 
especially those in old age who are not burdened by any lack 
of children, not necessarily because they do not value or 
need them, but because they do not need them in the 
metaphysical sense Haas wrote above. This means that for 
these old couples, the so-called phenomenological reason for 
the conjugal act, "mutual support or sexual gratification" 
would take precedence for them, and the so-called 
"metaphysical ultimate reason" would not even be available. 
This is to say that what is adequate as an explanation for 
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one couple's conjugal act, may be inadequate for another's 
conjugal act. The unity of the two meanings that CDF takes 
as necessary and normative because natural is not even 
available for many instances of the conjugal act. 
If the goods/ends under consideration are of value only 
when united, as CDF holds, then should not a married couple 
that seeks one of the meanings as their end or value, but 
does not necessarily seek the other be at the risk of deep 
contradiction or other unnatural condition? Yet, as has been 
argued already, there are numerous conjugal acts without 
children in which the couples are very united, just as there 
are countless conjugal acts leading to children, but without 
the unitive meaning. Of course, the mere fact that such acts 
occur does not itself demonstrate their naturalness or moral 
rectitude. The point is rather that CDF's metaphysical 
premise that the two meanings occur together necessarily in 
the natural material realm is false. 
Moreover, simple precedence of one over the other is 
not the only alternative to the inseparability of the two 
ends that CDF argues for. Procreation can also be the basis 
of unity , as it is among most couples in Nigeria, the 
country of the author. This is because, in that country, the 
conjugal act without children as one of its goods is itself 
readily dispensable. In other words, procreation gives 
meaning to conjugal act as unitive and to its other goods as 
well. 
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Similarly, mutual help to each other can be the primary 
reason for the unity between husband and wife; and this in 
turn can give meaning to conjugal act, so neither the 
conjugal act nor procreation need be the primary focus in 
their marital relationship. For example, suppose a wealthy 
physically ch~llenged 84 year old man, mutually agrees with 
an intelligent and caring 80 year old and poor woman to 
marry primarily for mutual help. The husband would provide 
the wife and her poor relatives economic assistance for 
their present and future well-being. The woman would provide 
the husband with domestic and other needed care until death 
and execute his will after death. They are faithful to their 
promises and agreement and may be quite happy. Although they 
have non-procreative (because of age) marital intercourse, 
it does not matter to them as much as 'their commitment to 
mutual help that binds them faithfully together till death. 
In such a marriage, there is unity and love, guaranteed 
by the type of help both of them committed to each other. 
This is an example to show that neither the conjugal act nor 
procreation is necessary to give meaning to every instance 
of marriage. It is what the couple cherish most that is the 
primary meaning to marriage and that is what unites them. In 
this story, it is mutual help and love for each other. 
CDF clearly expresses its claim that there is a natural 
law of inseparability in the conjugal act between material 
procreation and material unity, in statements like the 
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following: "By safeguarding both these essential aspects, 
the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal act preserves 
in its fullness the sense of true mutual love and its 
ordination towards man's exalted vocation to parenthood." 
This claim is insupportable for two reasons: (1) The 
inability of conjugal act to produce children sometimes, 
compels one to ask: what essential aspects of conjugal act 
is to be preserved if this act cannot produce one of its two 
essential ends or meanings? Conjugal act can then only 
preserve what it produces, namely its unitive value, not 
what it cannot produce, namely a genetic child, because 
infertility reduces it to a non-functional state with regard 
to procreation. 
(2) The clause: "By safeguarding both these essential 
aspects, the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal act 
preserves in its fullness ... " holds a self-defeating 
implication. The implication is that the natural law (in 
CDF's sense) in conjugal act with regard to its two 
essential meanings can only be truly {fullness) natural law, 
when the two meanings are present. Or as some advocates of 
CDF's position put it "the full meaning of the conjugal act 
cannot be preserved unless both meanings are acknowledged" 
{Haas 1988:101). Haas goes.ahead to defend the metaphysical 
or natural connection between conjugal act and its two 
meanings by saying: 
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"The Church, through the contemporary language of the 
inseparability of the unitive and procreative meanings 
of marriage, is doing what the metaphysician had done 
in the past. She is merely describing the reality of 
marital union and saying that it ultimately does not 
make sense unless both meanings are recognized and 
respected in each and every conjugal act." (1988:101). 
The point that is being defended in this section's 
argument is that in reality, although some married couples 
recognize and respect the view that procreation and unity 
between them as spouses is valuable, (and worth preserving), 
the inability of conjugal act to procreate sometimes, even 
when every single act of conjugal act is open to 
procreation, makes this claim metaphysical flawed and 
logically unacceptable. For it to be acceptable, both 
conditions must be present, whenever the act can plausibly 
be called natural. If not, then either nature is itself 
sometimes incomplete and therefore insufficient, or CDF is 
begging the question of what is natural and appropriate for 
human conduct. 
The two material aspects of the conjugal act are not 
only distinguishable, they are also separable as the various 
example above clearly show. Therefore the inseparability 
argument is metaphysically flawed. 
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The error of moral objectivism 
Another major weakness of CDF's moral contention 
against IVF/ET is its assertion that "the process of IVF and 
ET Jill.w.t. be judged in itself and cannot borrow its definitive 
moral quality from the totality of conjugal life of which it 
becomes part nor from the conjugal acts which may precede or 
follow it." According to Janssens, "this is one of the 
currents of thought contested by Thomas" (1979:68). Among 
other things, this moral judgment reveals a narrow focus on 
an act viewed materially without due consideration to other 
valuable elements relative to the act. For as Janssens 
attests, "According to Thomas a moral evaluation is only 
possible about a concrete action, considered as a whole, 
composed of end and means" (Janssens 1979:68). The claim of 
Aquinas is indicated by the very definition or meaning of 
means; namely "means involves being-related-to-the-end" 
(Janssens 1979:68). A material act undertaken as a means 
therefore, "is not subject to a judgment that considers it 
as an absolutely unrelated thing. The judgment must judge 
the debita ~roportio of the means by virtue of which the 
totality of the act participates in the moral goodness of 
the end" (Janssens 1979:68-69; emphasis mine). 
CDF while on one hand acknowledging that "one cannot 
ignore the legitimate aspirations of sterile couples", 
disregards those aspirations on the other hand as relevant 
to the morality of IVF/ET. Instead CDF judges the process of 
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IVF/ET solely.by itself without regard to the intentions of 
childless couple and the medical team who are involved in 
the process of IVF/ET. Previous discussion has made it clear 
that mere legitimate good intention is not sufficient by 
itself to assure the morality of an act. But CDF's argument, 
falls into the opposite error of moral objectivism - a focus 
on the act or object alone; this is a view Aquinas carefully 
avoided in his teaching on natural law morality, as was 
demonstrated earlier. 
The previous analysis of the structure of human action 
as expounded by Aquinas shows the exact opposite of CDF's 
claim that an act can be morally judged per se without 
reference to the human subject from whom the act originates. 
In that analysis, it was clear that llQ human act can morally 
be evaluated solely by itself without reference to the human 
subject who is the origin of the activity. For it is the 
human subject that gives meaning to his/her activity not 
vice versa. This is not to imply a subjectivistic 
interpretation of human action which seeks to judge the 
moral legitimacy of an human action from the point of view 
of the human individual alone - a stance which Aquinas also 
carefully avoided. It was already indicated in Aquinas' 
position that human actions are not to be considered merely 
as "a succession of separate and disjointed actions but as 
the integrated moments of a life history in which unity and 
wholeness can be realized ... " (Janssens 1979:43). In this 
context, the action has to be judged by all four of the 
conditions articulated by Janssens above. 
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That is, since the moral legitimacy of an human action 
can neither be evaluated only from the moral horizon of the 
human subject involved in the act, nor purely from the angle 
of the material act itself without reference to the 
performer of the act, then the morally reasonable step is to 
take into consideration .all the valuable elements on both 
sides of the equation of means and end, in order to 
determine whether an individual or group of individuals 
might proceed with an action or not. In other words, the 
whole package of all relevant issues and elements that are 
involved in an act, both materially and formally, should be 
duly considered. A moral judgment must attend to the means, 
(material element) needed to achieve an end (formal 
element), as surely a$ it must attend to the end. 
Consequently, a moral judgment must not focus solely on the 
material actions involved - the material process of IVF/ET -
without reference to the end of the subject who is pursuing 
them - procreation. For these material actions are not 
considered as properly human actions except in relation to 
the willed pursuit of an end in which they are grounded. 
The exposition above, of Aquinas's teaching about the 
morality of an human act as interpreted by Janssens, showed 
that "the inner act of the will (end/formal element) and the 
exterior act (means/material element) are one and the same 
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concrete act" (Janssens 1979:49). In this understanding, 
Aquinas concluded that the "end" and "means" relationship, 
"must also be treated as one from the moral viewpoint" 
(Janssens 1979:49). With this consistency of thought, 
Aquinas "reacted sharply against those who are of the 
opinion that the material event of an act can be evaluated 
morally without consideration of the subject, of the inner 
act of the will or of the end" (Janssens 1979:49). 
For our purposes then, if IVF/ET is 
considered as nothing but the material event ... [it] 
is an abstraction to which a moral evaluation cannot be 
applied. This object-event becomes a concrete human act 
only insofar as it is directed towards an event within 
the inner act of the will. Only this concrete totality 
has a moral meaning. It is the end of the inner act of 
the will which specifies the malice or the goodness of 
the act (Janssens 1979:49; emphasis mine). 
IVF/ET as an act is neither separated nor separable 
from the human reason which directs itself to act or from 
the end for which the human reason acts, nor from the 
proper nature of the human person who is necessarily 
connected to this act as its origin, and can in no way be 
separated from it. If an human act always originates from a 
person, then it is mistaken to say that the act can be 
judged either as good or bad by itself because an act, 
cannot act itself. Thus IVF/ET as means cannot perform-or be 
considered in terms of any rational or intentional activity 
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to bring about an end. In fact, if it were true as CDF 
claims that !VF/ET can be judged by itself, the claim that 
CDF also makes that it may cause harm to the embryo would 
then make no sense at all, because causing harm refers to an 
other (somebody/something else) that is affected as a 
result. In other words, if this act is truly judged by 
itself, then CDF's judgment would have to refer to nothing 
beyond the act itself, either as cause or effect. "According 
to Thomas a moral evaluation is only possible about a 
concrete action, considered as a whole" (Janssens 1979:69). 
An accurate understanding of Aquinas' criteria for 
judging the morality of human action, indicates that, when 
reason engages in moral judgment it employs .bQt.h 
proportionalist and deontological (the intended end) 
criteria to do such judging correctly. In Aquinas' standard, 
when an human person pursues what reason recognizes as a 
good end, through what it also recognizes as a good means, 
his/her action would be considered perfectly moral. But when 
on the other hand, reason recognizes the end as evil and 
intends that evil, automatically the action becomes 
perfectly immoral; in which case the agent's action can be 
referred to as out of character, or contrary to his/her 
proper condition in his/her capacity as a participator in 
eternal reason - moral law - do good and.avoid evil. 
Now in this account, even when reason recognizes and 
intends a good end, the material action or means to the end, 
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can still be immoral if it is disproportionate to the 
intended good/end, or if disproportionate to other aspects 
of human good. CDF however would say that the criterion is 
whether the act is unnatural in itself, an act contrary to 
nature. In fact according to Aquinas, if as much 
commensurate or adequately proportionate means is used, 
though ontic evil may still occur, the action is still 
moral, although it may not be perfectly good as was seen in 
the discussion of means, examined earlier. In such a 
situation, some undesired and regrettable evil will occur, 
what Janssens refers to as "ontic evil" - an ambiguity in 
some human actions. But in such cases, as long as the end is 
good (the deontological element), the other question is 
whether the means producing evil produce even more good and 
are, in comparison with other possibilities, the best 
possible in the situation. 
One legitimate aspiration of an infertile couple which 
CDF should have considered in the moral issue of IVF/ET and 
artificial insemination, is the infertile couple's desire to 
have children - a desire which is in conformity with CDF's 
pre-condition for responsible human procreation. For example 
CDF says: "The desire for a child-or at the very least an 
openness to the transmission of life-is a necessary 
prerequisite from the moral point of view for responsible 
human procreation" (1987;29). 
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To be sure, again CDF is correct to say that "good 
intention alone is not sufficient for making a positive 
moral evaluation of in vitro fertilization". But good 
intention is not the only moral criterion involved in this 
procedure. There are several positive values at stake in the 
process: the immediate and future well-being of the 
infertile couple and those of the larger community of the 
couple in some cultures where child bearing and rearing are 
in most cases the main sustenance of a marriage. There is 
also the unity which having one's own genet~c child fosters 
between spouses, especially in cultures where this unity is 
threatened by childlessness; there is the conjugal life of 
the couple that continues in spite of IVF/ET; and above all 
there is the child who is desired. 
There are also disvalues to be considered: the 
suffering of the infertile couple; the suffering of the 
larger community especially in cultures where childlessness 
is one of the causes of the break up of some families; 
possible harms to the desired child - physical, 
psychological and even death; and harms of physical injury 
specific to the mother. These values and disvalues, are the 
essential elements that are involved in the proposed act 
that must be taken into consideration in order for a moral 
judgment to be made fairly. Instead, CDF dismisses them in 
support of a deontological moral evaluation of a material 
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act in itself, independent of its formal characteristics as 
an object of human choice. 
It should be quite obvious now, that an application of 
Aquinas' deontological teaching about the morality of any 
human action, including the processes of IVF/ET, shows that 
IVF/ET does not have any moral meaning except with reference 
to the human agent who wills both the end (the child) and 
the means (!VF/ET) toward that end (the child); and that all 
things considered, this means-end-combination is the 
principal criterion for the determination or the morality of 
this procedure. As Aquinas would see it, considering the 
good and evil involved in this procedure, the good end to be 
achieved, is still proportionately higher than the 
comparative evil involved; so that this procedure is morally 
justified, in spite of the potential inherent evil (ontic 
evil) in it. 
How much these values and disvalues me.an to the couples 
and the larger society, should all be taken into critical 
consideration to judge the morality of IVF/ET; or to decide 
whether to perform an act or not when there is a conflict in 
moral demands. A specific case might help to clarify the 
issue. Can the most serious disvalue - the death of the 
embryo, which is probable in the procedure of IVF/ET, 
outweigh the weightiest value, the live birth of a child, 
which is also possible in the act of IVF/ET? As JoAnn V. 
Pinkerton, and James J. Finnerty, worded the idea: "This is 
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not a choice between absolute· good and evil but an attempt 
to balance two competing interests, both of which pose 
nearly equal moral worth" (1996:292; emphasis mine). Note 
that the death or life of the embryo at stake only has 
meaning in relation to an human society or other human 
beings who desire the life of embryo and equally do not 
desire the death of the embryo; but who never-the-less, must 
do the balancing or proportionate reasoning. 
If the embryos dies, the sufferings of the infertile 
couple, and in some cases the larger community of the couple 
that are associated with infertility continues. Worse still, 
other disvalues closely related to the death of the embryo 
may arise to worsen the existing sufferings of those 
affected by its death. For example, a more depressed and 
daunted life of existence is more likely than not to set in. 
To the contrary, if the embryo survives, the sufferings of 
the childless couple would discontinue, at least in the 
sense associated with infertility. But more importantly, 
other values that are in direct relationship with the 
survival of the embryo will even augment the overall well-
being of the parents. For example, a more lively and joyful 
and hopeful life is more likely than not to arise. As Mbiti 
says, "every birth is the arrival of 'spring' when life 
shoots out and the community thrives" (1969:110). 
But since it is equally true that death of an embryo 
brings sorrow, the persons who must do the balancing, or 
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proportionate reasoning, must consider which is more 
valuable, life or risk of death? In the opinion of this 
author, life is certainly more valuable. Therefore, in this 
specific sense, IVF/ET would not be a morally 
disproportionate means of human conception, even when it 
involves the risk of loss of life, because life is more 
valuable than death. 
In view of all the arguments above, it is therefore 
doubtful whether CDF's arguments about (1) the 
inseparability of conjugal act from its procreative and 
unitive meanings; (2) that the morality of IVF/ET can be 
judged by itself, and so (3) that IVF/ET is unnatural, can 
convince anyone not already committed to the policy which 
advocates and insists on the exclusive use of "conjugal act' 
for human conception, given the helplessness to which 
infertility reduces some married couples. 
Inseparability argument flawed on practical grounds 
Moreover, if it is true that there is such a necessary 
natural law binding the conjugal act to its supposed two 
meanings, then artificial means such as contraceptives and 
natural processes such as infertility, which prevent 
conception, and human interventions such as IVF/ET and 
artificial insemination, that produce human life outside of 
conjugal act, should not practically have been .able to 
prevent or cause human conception. That is, the ability of 
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both contraceptives and sterility to sever this so-called 
essential relation between conjugal act and its two meanings 
undercut the claim that this is a natural law. They give 
evidence that the connection between the conjugal act and 
its purported two meanings or ends is of a different sort 
than claimed by CDF. 
As has already been hinted at, there is to the contrary 
no natural necessary connection between conjugal act and its 
two so-called essential meanings. That is, conjugal act is 
separable from unity and procreation. The biological or 
physiological constitution of a woman that prevents her from 
becoming pregnant at some periods in her reproductive years 
(safe period} is another evidence of a dissociation between 
conjugal act and procreation. Properly understood in its 
rigorous logical end, procreation can never occur during 
this period. This means that given this safe period, natural 
law in CDF's understanding as something necessary, is more 
applicable to the dissociation between conjugal act and 
procreation, than it is between conjugal act and procreation 
for reason already given. In addition, this dissociation is 
evidence of an intelligent and responsible mind that sees 
the totality of human needs with regard to conjugal act and 
its procreative meaning. It is also an evidence that human 
reproduction must be seen in context. Human beings run into 
serious moral difficulty when they focus narrowly on a 
specific meaning of something - a word or action. They 
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should be open to other possible meanings of such words or 
actions. Those other meanings can never be known or 
appreciated except with reference to the individual or group 
of individuals that give it meaning. 
What is important is bmf, those who should benefit from 
the value of this natural mechanism in a woman, use it for 
their purposes and general well-being. All things 
considered, does the use fit into their overall life's 
purposes or not? A similar question mu.at. precede any moral 
question regarding !VF/ET and artificial insemination. 
Thus if one holds: all that is natural is ipso facto 
good without qualification, then the natural device in the 
female constitution which prevents her from conceiving 
children is also good, regardless of how it is used to 
achieve some ends. Similarly, if one holds that all that is 
unnatural (no necessity) is by this very fact bad without 
qualification, then all intelligent human products which 
achieve certain ends are bad regardless of their ends. 
Some moralists have pointed out with concern the 
implications of the inseparability of the unitive and the 
procreative meanings of conjugal act in marriage, which 
!VF/ET is said to sever. For example McCormick has asked in 
connection with the two meanings of conjugal act: 
Specifically, must these be held together in every act 
(thus no contraception or !VF), or is it sufficient 
that the spheres be held together, so that there is no 
procreation apart from marriage, and no full sexual 
intimacy apart from a context of responsibility for 
procreation (1996:391)? 
McCormick's question is apt in that there are infertile 
couples who in spite of their engagement in conjugal act, 
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remain both childless and united in marriage. It is possible 
that such couples, though they may believe that having 
genetic children in marriage, is both meaningful and 
valuable, but they may not be the most meaningful and 
valuable reasons why some people marry; or the ~ reason 
for marriage. As has already been shown, it is possible to 
find couples in marriages in which conjugal act itself is 
excluded from the beginning; yet they are united because of 
the help they offer one another. 
It therefore can be argued that procreation or 
procreative intention need not be a criterion for marriage, 
or for conjugal act. In other words, these conditions ought 
to be separated from marriage because of other primary 
reasons why.some people marry: friendship, companionship, 
love, or for mutual help; though these people need not 
reject the procreative meaning or value of marriage or 
conjugal act. It is the value which they cherish most that 
impels them into and unites them in marriage. 
Now would conjugal act in such marriages be condemned 
as unnatural or immoral because they did not produce 
children? Predictably, the answer to this question is: no. 
For if conjugal act is condemned in such cases, the 
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condemner is faced with the problem of legitimizing conjugal 
act in marriages, which by the constitution of a woman's 
body (menopause, or safe period of a woman during her 
reproductive years according to natural law), human 
conception is excluded ab initio. 
The point of this analysis should therefore be clear: 
what is preventive or procreative of human life, does not 
necessarily by this very fact of being preventive, or 
procreative within, or outside of what is stipulated as 
natural law, become unnatural or immoral (when human action 
is involved), except in the proper view of the totality of 
means-end package which .1lll.la.t. involve a debita proportio. 
It has been argued in this section that, if it was true 
that there is such a necessary connection between conjugal 
act and its two alleged two meaning - unitive and 
procreative meanings then, nothing can practically prevent 
conjugal act from achieving these two meanings. This section 
of the dissertation has shown that negatively, infertility 
and artificial contraceptive devices can successfully 
prevent conjugal act from attaining these two meanings or at 
least one of them, thereby calling into question the alleged 
necessary connection. Positively, IVF/ET can successfully 
produce human conception even where conjugal act has failed 
to achieve at least one ~f its alleged two necessary 
meanings, thereby again, challenging the claim of a 
necessary connection between conjugal act and its two 
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alleged meanings. Moreover, conjugal act itself sometimes, 
is unable in practical terms to realize its two supposed 
meanings as has been shown. Therefore, the inseparability 
argument of CDF is flawed on practical grounds. 
The analogy between contraception and IVF/ET argument. 
A question that arises from CDF's inseparability claim 
is: what is the human intervention or initiative that can 
dissociate this natural law between conjugal act and its two 
meanings? For CDF there are two factors. The first is 
contraception: "Contraception deliberately deprives the 
conjugal act of its openness to procreation and in this way 
brings about a voluntary dissociation of the ends of 
marriage" (CDF 1979:27). The second is !VF/ET by analogy: 
"Homologous artificial fertilization, in seeking a 
procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of 
conjugal union, objectively effects an analogous separation 
between the goods and the meanings of marriage" (1987:27). 
CDF claims that it is in the nature of the conjugal act 
that it necessarily has two meanings: unitive meaning and 
the procreative meaning; and CDF argues that contraception 
and !VF/ET both violate this natural pattern and for closely 
analogous reasons. But CDF's reasoning on this point is 
flawed because of the profound disanalogies between them. 
Contraception is an human intervention which actively 
prevents procreation. Infertility, though sometimes 
184 
attributive to some human causes, is ordinarily not a result 
of human action; it is a physical evil, that prevents 
procreation. That is, the interference with procreation is 
profoundly different in the two instances. In addition, the 
two actions work in opposite directions, both causally 
(materially) and in the actors intentions (formally) . 
Contraception prevents conception/procreation; IVF/ET, when 
successful, brings about conception/procreation. In order to 
claim that the two activities are closely analogous, CDF, 
must overlook profound metaphysical and moral differences 
between the two acts. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate for CDF to use the 
analogy between contraception and IVF/ET in relation to the 
two meanings or ends of conjugal act, because while 
contraception could prevent human conception, but not 
conjugal act, IVF/ET neither prevents the procreative nor 
the unitive meanings of conjugal act. But contraception by 
preventing procreation, does not as a matter of fact prevent 
conjugal act nor its other relevant meaning - unitive 
meaning, conjugal act is not necessarily procreative and 
unitive. On this foundation, that it is not necessarily 
procreative and unitive, a couple may opt to use conjugal 
act as a means to the attainment of one of the benefits of 
marriage - the right to conjugal act which may or may not be 
open to procreation to some couples. 
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Since in reality IVF/ET is causative while 
contraception is preyentiye of human procreation, the two 
concepts are not the same. Therefore, it is a category 
mistake to assert that creating life and preventing life are 
analogous in the practical sense of achieving the same 
meaning or valued end. The analogy between contraceptives 
and IVF/ET is itself analogous to saying that: a person who 
prevents the drowning of an only child of his/her parents, 
stands on the same moral judgment platform as a person who 
willfully causes the drowning of an only child of his/her 
parents. To be, and llQt. to be, ~ conceptually opposed to 
each other. This is to say that some similarities between 
contraceptives and IVF/ET are not worth examining. But the 
moral judgment about contraception, eyen if it were 
justified, would not therefore {by reason of that 
justification) pass on to IVF/ET. So, the analogy does not 
hold. 
In addition, whether or not IVF/ET succeeds, normal 
sexual intercourse between husband and wife continues. 
Still, IVF/ET by design is geared towards procreation; which 
means that, there is procreative intention, to say the 
least. In its proper context, IVF/ET "in seeking a 
procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of 
conjugal union" simply means that, another method of 
reproducing human life is used instead of conjugal act-under 
a specific circumstance; which hampers one of the ends of 
conjugal act. 
Marriage and the right to procreate argument 
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There is a further inconsistency in CDF's arguments 
against IVF/ET. CDF maintains that every conjugal act is 
procreative in nature and at the same time holds the view 
that spouses are unjustified in defending IVF/ET by claiming 
that non-procreative conjugal acts are defective and they 
may therefore, by right, act to correct them. If there is no 
such right, then the procreativeness of the act would seem 
to be a contingent matter, not something with the necessity 
of nature. Also, CDF argues that "marriage does not confer 
upon the spouses the right to have a child, but only the 
right to perform those natural acts which are per se ordered 
to procreation" (CDF 1987:34}. But CDF does not offer any 
coherent development of this argument in support of their 
claims about a right to have children or its absence, nor 
any further explanation of the relation of such a rights-
based position to the morality of IVF/ET. Lack of any 
further argument by CDF on this claim gives no ground for 
further criticism here. 
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Conclusion 
In its own right, IVF/ET is a valued means, of human 
reproduction, the use of which originates from two rational 
(proper to nature} persons a married couple who are bound 
together by mutual love, a love out of which this couple 
mutually desires, seeks and expects a child - the fruit of 
their mutual love. Many people will readily approve of the 
view that, mutual loye, nQt. conjugal act is the major reason 
for couples to desire to have a child, that it is mutual 
love not conjugal act that unites husband and wife and 
enables them to endure one another's hardships mutually. 
This very process does not in any way prevent couples from 
engaging in marital sexual intercourse in its unitive 
meaning. 
Opponents would agree that a good intention is good in 
itself; that is, abstractly and that a bad intention, is 
also bad in itself, also abstractly. Opponents would also 
concede to the view that a good means in itself (abstractly) 
is good; just as they would consent that a bad means is bad 
in itself (abstractly}. Now as was demonstrated earlier, in 
Aquinas' view, if an intention (form/formal) is good and the 
means (mater/material) to achieve that good (formal) 
intention is also good, then the action is also morally 
good. This would be a good will, willing a good act. 
Similarly, if an intention (form/formal) is bad and the 
means (mater/material) is bad, then the action is also.bad 
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or immoral. This would be a bad will, willing a bad act. But 
if an intention (form/formal) is good but the means 
(mater/material) is a mixture of good and bad in that it 
produces both good and bad results, then the act may not 
necessarily be bad, depending on the proportion of ontic 
evil in the means (material element) involved in the 
achievement of the good (formal) intention or the overall 
good in the Qile. act. This would be a good will, not 
necessarily willing a bad means but willing the 
proportionately greater good involved in the integration of 
the good and the bad. 
An act such as IVF/ET can never be judged morally by 
itself. On the contrary a moral evaluation of any act IVF/ET 
for example is only possible if it is an evaluation made 
from the point of view of the totality of this act which 
involves means and end. So, in IVF/ET one must consider the 
totality of the process of this procedure, when one 
considers whether or not IVF/ET and artificial insemination 
as means negates the requirement of love which a couple has 
for each other and which in turn, flows into a desire for a 
child or responsible parenthood through IVF/ET. 
All of CDF's arguments are profoundly flawed and fail 
to demonstrate that IVF/ET is an inherently immoral act vi$-
a-vis Aquinas methodology for the moral evaluation of any 
human action. Further consequentialist or proportionalist 
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arguments for and against human embryos, based on Aquinas' 
teaching will be carefully examined in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER POUR 
THE VALUE AND DISVALUE OP IVP/ET: 
A CONSEQUENTIALIST EXAMINATION OP HARM/BENEFIT REVISITED 
Harm and benefit of present policy. 
It has been demonstrated that one malfonnation or 
dysfunction in either the male or female reproductive system 
is sufficient to cause infertility - a condition that 
renders human conception through the ordinary means 
impotent. The preceeding chapter has shown that IVF/ET is 
not morally objectionable for the deontological reasons 
proposed by CDF. 
This chapter will off er a proportionalist or 
consequentialist analysis of IVF/ET with reference to some 
of its specific harms and benefits. This consequentialist 
examination will assume the appropriateness of the criterion 
of debita proportio for the moral justification of a human 
action, as explained in Chapter Three. It will argue that in 
general, humanity will be better off with IVF/ET than 
without it. In particular, it will also argue that infertile 
couples who seek children in Nigeria will be better off with 
IVF/ET available than without it. For the value attached to 
child-bearing (human life) in marriages in that culture 
190 
191 
holds children to be priceless and irreplaceable. This 
chapter shall endeavor to give a careful and detailed 
analysis of the harms and benefits to IVF/ET involves. The 
thesis of this chapter is that a strong consequentialist 
moral justification for supporting IVF/ET can be made. The 
chapter will first show that bearing genetic children and 
the unity of spouses are among the primary reasons and 
values for marriage, both within the perspective of CDF 
being examined here and within the cultural tradition in 
Nigeria. Secondly there will be an examination of the most 
important of the harms or projected harms of this 
technology, followed by an examination of the most important 
of the benefits. The Third section of the chapter will first 
examine psychological harm. The chapter will then focus in 
more detail on some of the possible harms of !VF/ET using 
the scenario of ectopic pregnancy and spontaneous abortion 
as illustrations of three other specific possible harms of 
IVF/ET - the death of embryos; physical harm, that is 
deformity; and harm to the embryo's mother. 
The goal of all this is to demonstrate that the values 
generally achieved by IVF/ET outweigh its commonest 
disvalues. Supporting such a thesis demands a careful 
analysis of the benefits and harms of this technology. This 
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analysis muat. neither ignore how much the means (IVF/ET) and 
its end (genetic child) which IVF/ET seeks are valued by 
those who seek them, nor treat the human subje~ts who 
actually value the means and end (IVF/ET and child 
respectively), as if they, themselves, do not matter or not 
valuable. 
The most important singular value among other values or 
particular goods which IVF/ET seeks to procure is a child. 
This good, together with unity of spouses are among the 
goods valued by people who enter into marriage for the sake 
of a specific good or goods, such as the unity of spouses 
and their respective families. In addition to the specific 
good or value such as the unity of spouses and their 
respective families, are the happiness and joy, etc., 
bearing of a genetic child by infertile couples brings to 
all who are affected by this child's birth. The most general 
good that IVF/ET will yield is the well-being of infertile 
couples and society. 
Infertility is the prevalent evil which the procedure 
of IVF/ET wants to alleviate. This major evil, can also be 
accompanied by other evils such as sufferings of pain and 
misery or anguish to childless couples and their families in 
particular, but also social evils in general such as 
pro~titution and divorce of spouses. 1 
. The social evils will be discussed in the next chapter. It was just important to mention it here. 
193 
Therefore, a comparison of the facts about having or 
not having IVF/ET and of the values and disvalues of having 
or not having it and arguments based .on these facts, values 
and disvalues, will be necessary here. The chapter will make 
extensive use of the work of CDF discussed above because it 
is one of the best known philosophical writings on the moral 
problems of IVF/ET so far. Although that work principally 
develops a deontological argument against IVF/ET nonetheless 
develops some consequentialist or proportionalist arguments 
as well. For example, it says 
As with all medical interventions on patients, one 
must uphold as licit procedures carried out on the 
human embryo which respect the life and integrity of 
the embryo and do not involve disproportionate risks 
for it but are directed towards its healing, the 
improvement of its condition of health, or its 
individual survival (CDF 1987:15). 
The value of children (human life) 
This chapter will assume the position on the value of 
children that is taken by CDF. It will be demonstrated here 
that CDF's consequentialist comments against IVF/ET fail 
(they are not fully developed arguments). That is, on the 
basis of CDF's value assumptions about the two essential 
meanings of marital sexual act (conjugal act), the unitive 
meaning (love of the spouses) and the procreative meaning 
(value of the child), IVF/ET is in'fact morally justiffed. 
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CDF's consequentialist or proportionalist reasoning is 
based on the view that children are a value without which 
the continuation of the human species is impossible. Most 
people would agree that the life or value of a child as a 
human being is of great value because as most people would 
also agree that children are one of the central reasons for 
the labors of their parents in particular and society in 
.{ 
general, and they are the hope of our future. Moreover, 
children are the ~ link between past and future human 
generations; they are a necessary gateway to future 
generation, a necessary means without which posterity has no 
meaning. Again, for sake of clarity, all the above values of 
children are assumed here on the basis of CDF's position 
that procreation and unity of spouses are necessarily linked 
to conjugal act. CDF's deontological position that IVF/ET, 
because it separates these two elements of this act, is 
unnatural, hence inunoral. It's consequentialist conunents 
stress the risk and harms of IVF/ET, although CDF does ot 
develop a full consequentialist argilment. But like CDF's 
deontological position, its consequentialist conunents also 
fail to show that IVF/ET is inunoral. 
Obviously, not every married couple is infertile, so 
the human race will in general continue in existence, but 
not in every particular instance. But the·human race did not 
begin in general but with particular instances of male -and 
female having sexual intercourse, without which there would 
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have been no human race in general ."'so it would be a mistake 
~ to take care of any particular infertile marriage 
seeking children both for their own well-being and as a 
contribution to the general well-being of humanity. 
But it is just the conjugal act which CDF emphasizes, 
that brings about unity of spouses; children also play a 
pivotal role in the unity of husband and wife in marriage. 
For without them many marriages would more easily break up 
than they do today. Haas attests to this fact in the 
following words: 
"Even the bond of marriage comes to be understood as 
indissoluble because of the child, the procreative 
good." Marital indissolubility serves the procreative 
good because it firmly establishes the conunon, stable 
life which will provide the necessary context for the 
nurture and care of the child(1988:97; emphasis 
original). 
Haas is right. If spouses do not provide a stable place 
for the nurture of their offsprings, then they run the risk 
of harming them sometimes seriously, even to the point of 
ruining the basis for other future lives. Children are so 
valuable that many married people would do anything within 
their power and accepted moral rules to have children, 
especially those who enter into marriage primarily for the 
sake of bearing children. But this.point can also be made of 
anything that some people need for survival. As has already 
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been demonstrated, the current cases of IVF/ET where couples 
pay exorbitant amount of money to procure one are good 
examples. This example assumes those who developed this 
technology to help infertile couples who desire to have 
children realize the importance of children in human well 
being. Also as has been stated already, the fact that prior 
to IVF/ET couples in some parts of the world used (as they 
still do) such culturally accepted means, such as polygamy 
to bear and rear children is another important point to 
establish the value of children to maintain human existence. 
The following is a true story. A couple divorced with 
one child. Both remarried. Although they attempted to have 
their own children with their new spouses, they failed. 
After several years of fruitless attempts, both parties gave 
up their attempts, but were still happy in their new 
marriages. The child of the first ma~riage grew up and was 
devastated by the divorce of his parents. The teenager 
arranged six different meetings with his father and mother 
in which serious discursive attempts were made to reconcile 
them. All failed. The teenager decided to attempt a seventh 
meeting using a different method of approach. On the 
appointed day, he arranged for his father and mother to meet 
him in a well known restaurant. 
After their meal the party set off for the boy's room 
at school. On the way close the school, the boy said, "I am 
so hungry." His and mother were surprised at his utterance. 
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"You just had a big meal, what is the matter with you?" they 
inquired surprisingly. The boy said, "Mom and Dad, you know, 
I am hungry for you not food; I am hungry for your love not 
hungry for food. You both brought me into the world and left 
me without you and without your love." At this utterance, 
almost simultaneously, the father and mother called him by 
his name, and each of them saying, "You know I love you." 
The boy replied, "I don't need the "I" of your love. I need 
the "we" of your love. I have been hungry for your "we" 
love, and it seems I will always be hungry for it.' At this 
point, the father and mother turned to each other, then to 
their son and the three hugged themselves and were resolved 
to come back together, as indeed they did. 
The point of this story is principally to illustrate 
two key issues; namely (1) Neither the disvalue that 
prompted the divorce of the boy's parents in their first 
marriage, nor the conjugal act with all its gratification in 
their new marriages, was sufficient to keep them from the 
powerful effect the words of their genetic child had on 
them, a powerful value, before which mere marriage or 
marital sexual intercourse was helpless. (2) In these 
people's lives, children are the most essential values, even 
outweighing other values in marriage. This position on the 
value of children to marriage goes beyond the position that 
CDF takes, but is held very strongly in many African 
cultures. 
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But an opponent could point out other things which the 
above story exemplifies; namely that childlessness need not 
be the only reason for divorce, because parents divorce 
irrespective of children. Nicholas N. Obi articulates 
several other causes of divorce world-wide as follows: 
11 grounds for divorce for different societies, 
creeds and tongues include: repeated or exaggerated 
infidelity or extra-marital sexual experience; 
childlessness or sterility; sexual impotence or 
unwillingness; habitual drunkenness; desertion ... ; 
neglect or failure to support; laziness and economic 
incapacity; incurable madness; unconfessed prior 
marriage and imprisonment; quarrelsomeness or continues 
nagging; brutality - mental and physical cruelty; 
sexual incompatibility and frustration; ... uncontrolled 
jealousy; stealing ... " (1987:93). 
Although this couple divorced themselves in spite of 
bearing a child, yet it is this child who is the compelling 
factor that reunited his parents. 
Writing specifically about marriage and 
procreation in African societies, Mbiti has pointed out that 
lack of children in a marriage is probably the greatest 
single cause of divorce "since inability to bear children 
blocks the stream of life" (1969:145). This implies that 
although there are other reasons for divorce, childlessness 
is ~he most frequent. 
199 
What follows may help a foreigner to African or 
Nigerian culture, to understand the philosophy of marriage 
in that society and the irreplaceable value which Africans 
place on bearing their own genetic children. Caldwell 
and Caldwell saw clearly the irreplaceable role which 
genetic children play in linking this and the other world, 
when during their investigation about fertility in Sub-
Saharan Africa, they wrote: "We try to substantiate the 
proposition that the culture, both with regard to this world 
and the next, has been a seamless whole. The emphasis is on 
societies molded by stress on ancestry and descent" 
(Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:410}. 
There is good reason to believe that the cultural 
belief in a seamless relationship between this world and the 
next and the stress on ancestry and descent are paramount 
concerns in Nigeria. Caldwell and Caldwell have shown by 
their survey of "The Cultural Context of High Fertility in 
Sub-Saharan" that Africans put no l.imit to their emphasis on 
the continuity of heritage. For example: 
In a 1973 study of all couples ... in Ibadan City. 
Nigeria, who had voluntarily limited the size of their 
families to fewer than six live births, we explored the 
widespread condemnation by relatives of these innovators. It 
was found that the most frequent charge against them was 
that of irresponsibility, in that even families with several 
surviving children can be quickly wiped out .... The critics 
usually claim to know instances of families of four or five 
children all dying (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:412}. 
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The underlying reason behind such a criticism is, as 
the above authors state clearly, the commonplace fear of 
dying without children. This reason, among other important 
ones, explains why Nigerians want to bear many children. In 
the survey referred to above, the authors have this to say 
with regard to childbearing: 
In Nigeria a majority of women with 12 or more live births 
said that they wanted to continue childbearing. Restricting 
the analysis to the more meaningful measure of surviving 
children rather than births, and examining the situation 
among women with seven or more surviving children (averaging 
between eight and nine), those stating that they wanted no 
more amounted to only 33 percent in Kenya, 3 percent in 
Ghana, 10 percent in Cameroon, and among the Yorubas of 
Nigeria. surveyed in the Changing African Family Project. 
non at all (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:413). 
Clearly, here a lineage-based philosophy of human existence 
significantly affects, a society's attitudes towards 
procreation. Given this, and the prolific reproductive 
manner by which Nigerian married couples desire and give 
birth to children, a barren couple would find it extremely 
difficult to accept infertility in such a society. 
There are then two sets of powerful values that support 
infertile couples in undertaking IVF/ET: the general value 
of children to both parents in most marriages and to the 
race for its continuation, and the more particular value 
placed by Nigerian and other cultures on children because of 
their lineage-based view of human life. 
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The harms of IVP/ET or disadvantages. 
In comparison with these positive values of IVF/ET, the 
single most powerful group of argum~nts against the 
technology of IVF/ET as a morally acceptable answer to the 
agonizing problem of infertility are arguments based on the 
risks of harm IVF/ET might pose to both mother and fetus. 
The risks and possible harms include: (1) to the embryo: 
psychological harm which, it is contended, the child will 
suffer if he/she knows that he/she is a product of 
unconventional methods of human reproduction. (2) To the 
embryo: wastage/death. (3) To the embryo: exposure to the 
possibility of injury which may result in physical deformity 
or mental damage to the fetus. (4) To the mother: injury or, 
the very unlikely, possibily of the_ death of the mother. (5) 
To society: various social harms that this artificial means 
of procreation, might cause by making possible for example, 
the selection of embryos by sex preference, a practice which 
in itself, might cause a major imbalance in human population 
and one which could exacerbate injustices based on gender 
discrimination. 2 
For critics of IVF/ET, such harms seem sufficient for 
them to suggest that the procedure will have serious 
consequences in the connnunities in which this reproductive 
. This projected harm will not be discussed in this work because it will take us too much afield. 
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technology is used and so it needs to be prevented or 
stopped. But before one holds this position, one needs to 
ask: (1), whether value of children which IVF/ET seeks is, 
on balance, at least worth any one or all of these projected 
ills and, (2), whether infertility, which IVF/ET seeks to 
overcome is worse than any of these harms so that the 
procedure would be justified by its on balance, better 
consequences. This harm issue will be returned to again 
later. 
Benefits of a policy supporting IVP/ET 
As already said, the single most important and 
inunediate benefit of IVF/ET is the capacity of this 
technology to enable a childless couple to have their own 
genetic children. But in addition, it could also lessen the 
fears and anxieties of unmarried people about the 
uncertainty of their ability to bear children in their 
eventual marriages; and it might increase their hope because 
their chances of bearing children would be greater than 
without this technology if they turned out to be unable to 
reproduce children by the ordinary method. 
For example, in our hospitals are many young people who 
are afflicted with diseases such as cancer, the successful 
treatment of which may cause sterility. Glover et al attest 
to this fact when they say: "A number of cancers in young 
people can now be treated by chemotherapy and radiotherapy. 
An instance is leukemia in young women. But the treatment 
makes them sterile, by killing germ;cells in the ovary" 
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(1989:104). When such ill-health strikes unmarried young 
persons in a culture where having children is the basic 
reasons for marriage, the single persons may lose both the 
hope of being married and of having children. 
But with the availability of egg-freezing and sperm-
banking, these young people will increasingly ask for their 
eggs or sperm to be banked before their treatment, so that 
they might still have genetic children after (see Glover et 
al 1989:104). This reproductive technological opportunity 
would bring with itself, special joy to the hearts of these 
young, unmarried, and diseased persons. It would also help 
to protect for them their hopes for,marriage and bearing 
children; this would be more so, in .a society where being 
married and bearing children are two of the life's prides 
and hopes of marriageable men and women and their parents. 
These are two values that would be lost to the above 
identified people in the absence of IVF/ET. 
There is also concrete evidence to show that the hopes 
of the people being talked about are not foundationless. For 
example, as was shown in Chapter One, over 150,000, children 
have been born to infertile couples throughout the globe, to 
infertile couples who without IVF/ET technique, would have 
still been suffering both the anguish of childlessness and 
the lack of joy of having genetic offsprings. 
But the fact that, in general only about 10 to 15 
percent of IVF/ET is successful (Winston and Handyside 
1993:936) must be factored into this analysis. 
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Obviously then, a large percentage of sterile couples still 
cannot be helped by this technology. For example, according 
to Winston and Handyside, fewer than 5,300 babies were born, 
following IVF/ET in Great Britain, where there may be as 
many as 600,000 infertile couples (1993:936}. 
However, no one can doubt the fact that, 10 to 15 per 
cent success rate of IVF/ET procedure represents a sizeable 
reduction in the number of infertile couples among us. It is 
a benefit to those affected. On the other hand following the 
major loss, the loss of child-bearing, resulting from 
infertility, is a host of other evils and human suffering 
also associated with infertility, which IVF/ET would help to 
minimize. For example, it would lessens the amount of guilt, 
shame, anguish, psychological scar, and separation or 
divorce of spouses which mark the lives of many couples on 
account of childlessness. 
This technology of IVF/ET, would be highly useful to 
numerous childless couples in Nigeria, where the purpose of 
marriage is mainly to bear children: (1) It is child 
bearing, if anything within the context of marriage, that 
unites husband and wife. (2) It is this fact of (l} that 
makes marriage worthwhile and attractive to marriageable men 
and women. (3) It is on the bearing of children, that the 
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continuation of the human species is possible; for many 
lines of families have been closed as a result of 
infertility. (4) The fact of (1) is the precondition for the 
boon of good social or recreational, economic, political, 
and religious life. The starting place of these boons of 
life is in the family. (5) Seen from a Nigerian outlook on 
marriage, the fullness of marital joy begins to emerge with 
the birth of a child to spouses. 
Again viewed from the perspective of the Nigerian 
culture, the joy of marriage is only partial and the notion 
of family partial without a child. For a household is 
complete only when at least one child is born into that 
household. In most cases, a household is considered complete 
only when a male and female child have been born into it. As 
Onwuejeogwu has written: "It is evident that at an early 
stage the position of the new family is shaky and may never 
be formed at all if no children are born"(1975:90). 
It is when a child is born that husband and wife begin 
to enjoy the fullness of the joy of their marriage because 
they .th.en qualify for the title, parents. In other words, 
parenthood carries with it a special kind of value and ~ 
which neither marriage nor sexual intercourse with no 
child/ren, are capable of providing. 
As Tola Pearce (1992) has noted, in Nigeria "subfertile 
women or those in search of sons are under pressure to 
produce a child of whatever condition." Thus a connnunity 
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which has a means by which couples unable to have genetic 
children at all cost, are helped to have children would be 
more valuable than another community which has nothing at 
all to help couples in similar or equivalent situation. 
In cultures such as Nigeria where children is the supreme 
benefit and reason for marriage, then, the whole culture is 
better off with the possibility of IVF/ET than without it 
since infertility is a major threat to the realization of 
the most valuable good and by reason of this threat, it 
becomes in turn a threat to other goods, such as unity 
between husband and wife and their families. In this way the 
very institution of marriage as the foundation for human 
family and society is also in jeopardy if infertile couples 
have no recourse. 
Psychological harm 
The opponents of IVF/ET, notably, CD~ and others, 3 claim 
that children born of IVF/ET will suffer psychologically or 
emotionally without specification about the kind of 
psychological or emotional harm these children will suffer. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, this author, will 
understand "psychological" in one of the three sense 
designated by The Random House Dictionary Of The English 
. See, •'Give Me Children or I Shall Die!' New Reproductive Technologies and Harm to Children• by 
Cynthia B. Cohen, in: Hastings Center Repon, Vol. 26, No. 2, March- April 1996, p.20. 
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Language; namely, that which pertains to, or affects the 
mind "as a function of awareness, feeling, or motivation". 
This author will also understand "emotion" in three of the 
five senses the above dictionary defines this term; namely, 
"1. an affective state of consciousness in which joy, 
sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is experienced, as 
distinguished from cognitive and volitional states of 
consciousness. 2. any of the feelings of joy, sorrow, 
fear hate, love, etc. 3. any strong agitation of the 
feelings actuated by experiencing love, hate, fear, 
etc., and usually accompanied by certain physiological 
changes, ... and often overt manifestation, as crying 
or shaking." 
This author would add: such emotional states or 
psychological states or reaction as "shame", "guilt", 
"embarrassment", "worry", "depression", "anger" and others. 
The claim that IVF/ET will cause children resulting from 
them psychological and/or emotional harm seems 
foundationless. Available evidence on the issue of how an 
IVF/ET child would feel on his/her knowledge that he/she was 
conceived by this technological process, indicates 
otherwise: 
Until recently very little has been known about how AID 
children have fared as they have grown up within their 
families, and even now the information is based on the 
experiences of only a small number of individuals. 
Occasionally. usually in the popular press. one hears 
of the experience of adults wbo haye become aware of 
their AID origins and wbo are disturbed by this 
knowledge. Often these individuals have found out about 
their origins accidentally or in a hurtful way during a 
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family quarrel. It may be significant that the young 
people contracted in the Exeter project had all been 
told in a purposeful and planned way. These young 
adults had accepted their AID status equably and none 
of them had found it a particularly traumatic 
experience. They had certainly been sux:prised when they 
were told, but some of that surprise was because their 
parents had kept the matter such a close secret for so 
many years. None of them regretted the fact that ~ 
had been conceived by AID. They were enjoying life and 
happy to be alive and realizeq.that they owed their 
existence to AID. They were also pleased to feel that 
their parents had wanted a child so badly. and that 
they were that child who had fulfilled their parents' 
wishes. One said, ' ... the realization that I had been 
brought into the world, you know, they actually went to 
tremendous lengths because they wanted to have a baby. 
And I suddenly felt that they must love me a tremendous 
amount. that I was vex:y important to them' (David R. 
Bramham et al 1990:82; emphasis mine). 
The citation above indicates that the available 
empirical evidence goes against the opponents of IVF/ET. It 
is not hard to imagin why; namely that the children of this 
technology would have stronger reas9n to be happy that they 
are alive and that they owe their ~x~stence to IVF/ET. That 
is, these children would have nothing to be embarrassed 
about or ashamed of since they have genetic affinity with 
both of their parents {this dissertation is focused on 
homologous IVF/ET) and for the reasons already given. 
But this evidence is n'ot to deny entirely that some of 
the children of IVF/ET might be negatively psychologically 
affected. For as the first six lines of emphasis show in the 
block quotation above, some of the adults of IVF/ET (AID), 
have been quite disturbed by the knowledge of their origin. 
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But we need to consider also the reason and circumstances 
for their disturbance. ·we are told that part of the reasons 
for their disturbance is the manner through which they 
gained knowledge of their origin, namely "accidentally or in 
a hurtful way during a family quarrel". 
The real issue with these people, might well be, not 
that they were conceive by IVF/ET, but rather the way in 
which they gained this knowledge. Moreover, even if one 
should grant that they were more disturbed by the fact of 
the origin of their conception than by the manner through 
which they learned about their origin, it may still be that 
the fact of their very existence matters more to them than 
the process of their conception. In other words, even if 
there is some comparative psychological loss, still most if 
not all when everything in their life is considered, would 
prefer that they were conceived than not conceived. 
A second group among these person were told of their 
origin "in a purposeful and planned way" but still found it 
psychologically painful. Although this group was surprised 
when they were told about the manner of their conception, 
part of that surprise was not so much that they disvalued 
being conceived by the means in question, as it was their 
disvalue of the fact that "their parents had kept the matter 
such a close secret for so many years." But even at their 
expressed dislike, "non.e of them had found it a particularly 
traumatic experience" to be conceived by IVF/ET. Instead, 
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everything considered, they "were enjoying life and happy to 
be alive ... " 
In addition, to return to earlier theme, these young 
people realized how much having children meant to their 
parents; for we are told that "They were also pleased to 
.feel. that their parents had wanted a child so badly, and 
that they were that child who had fulfilled their parents' 
wishes." 
Such evidence, indicates that the children conceived by 
IVF/ET, do not suffer a disproportionately greater 
psychological trauma, upon their learning of the process of 
their birth, than is normal in healthy children born through 
traditional means of conception. Any difference in 
psychological reaction is surely not sufficient to warrant 
condemning IVF/ET on the basis of a projected psychological 
loss and/or emotional harm. If anything, it is the behavior 
of their parents in revealing the methods of birth in 
improper ways, or when revealing them in proper ways, still 
keeping them too long as a secret before revealing them, 
that seem to create some psychological feelings in the 
children, llQ.t. the actual means of conception. But this 
behavior of the parents, even if it should be attended to, 
tells us nothing about the morality of IVF/ET. 
Clearly, in order to avoid or lessen this apparent 
psychological ill feeling, parents of IVF/ET children should 
start early enough to educate the children about the process 
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of their conception. This means that the role of parents in 
this matter is as important to maintain a good psychological 
balance in the children, as it is important for the parents 
to fulfill their natural desire to have children. Society's 
role in this matter about educating the parents of IVF/ET 
children is also clearly important. 
Admittedly, the evidence about psychological harm from 
IVF/ET given above is on AID children. But the above 
analysis provides strong basis for us to claim that IVF/ET 
(AIH) would at the very least fare as well as the IVF/ET 
(AID) . What was assumed because of the very concept of 
IVF/ET-AID is that the children were also told that either 
the egg or the sperm, or both which form the living adult 
human being, came from another person/s; in which case the 
reaction of the IVF/ET AID persons, was not only about the 
fact that they were conceived by an extraordinary method 
(so-called artificial means), but also that their present 
parents are not necessarily their biological parents. As was 
shown above neither of the two issu~s mattered so much to 
them as to be overly psychologically affected. By comparison 
with IVF/ET (AIH), the biological consideration of their 
origin, is excluded from our discussion; so that Qllly the 
one fact of being conceived in the so-called artificial way 
cou~d constitute psychological problem or feeling, if any. 
It seems much more unlikely that IVF/ET (AIH) children 
could develop a disproportionately negative psychological 
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feeling about life in general, on their knowledge of .onl.l! 
the means of their conception, than the children of IVF/ET 
(AID) could develop about life in general on their knowledge 
of both the means itself and the biological issue; such that 
they would have preferred not being alive through that means 
than being alive through it. 
The point was made above that such children would 
naturally prefer to have been born rather than not. But is 
it better to be born or not to be born? Some critics4 could 
say that being happy that one is born and alive depends on 
the kind of life one is experiencing. They could reason that 
if one is experiencing a life of tremendous pain and 
suffering such that one questioned why he/she was born in 
the first place; that is if one is experiencing a life of 
pain and suffering sufficient for one to wish to die rather 
than to live, then it would be more likely that one would 
have preferred not to have been born at all. But if one is 
enjoying life as it is, in its ups and downs, in one's given 
situation such that one is unwilling to die, then one could 
say that it is better to have been born than not at all. 
However, against the above argument, it could be 
claimed that one who lives a regrettable life of pain and 
misery such that one prefers death to life would only be 
pos~ible where one has had an experience of a better life 
. See author, footnote 9. 
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before. For it could be possible that if the life of pain 
and misery is the only kind of life one ever knew, one would 
have no reason to wish to die because one would have no 
better life to compare with. There is in oter words a value 
to such a person's life that even his/her pains cannot 
counter. So few if any persons can consistently hold that it 
would truly have been better not to have been born. As has 
been shown, however, few children, if any, conceived by 
IVF/ET would take this view anyway. 
Therefore these criticism do not appear to be plausible 
reasons to convince a married couple against their wish to 
have their own children just like other couples because, 
life of pain and misery in general, life of pain and misery 
due to serious physical deformity in particular as projected 
will happen to children of IVF/ET, will not be the exclusive 
preserve of those children, for such lives are already among 
us (though we need not intentionally create more; and not 
IVF/ET intentionally does}. Therefore those who oppose 
IVF/ET on the basis of exessive psychological harm to the 
children of IVF/ET have not made a strong enough case. 
Robertson words the idea fittingly: "Preventing harm would 
mean preventing birth of the child whose interests one is 
trying to protect. Yet the child's interests are hardly 
protected by preventing the child's existence" (1994:75). 
Another way to make this point is to say that this set 
of arguments against IVF/ET is too narrowly focused on the 
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risk of harm. The good intent to eliminate as much harm as 
possible does not have room within it for an, equivalent 
intent to produce as much good as possible for all the 
parties involved. 
Another possible harm from IVF/ET: death of embryo 
Some scenarios of disvalue to many married couples 
who absolutely desire to have children are the loss of 
embryonic lives, mostly through the mishaps of ectopic {also 
called extrauterine) pregnancies or through miscarriages 
(also called spontaneous abortions) . "An extrauterine 
pregnancy is one in which a fertilized ovum implants in an 
area other than the uterine cavity" {Martin L. Pernell, and 
Sara H. Garmel 1994:314); while "spontaneous abortion is ... 
a pregnancy terminating before the 20th completed week (139 
days) of gestation" {Pernell and Garmel 1994:306). 
It has been noted already that according to Aquinas, 
from the moral viewpoint, an act is good "only when the 
exterior action is proportioned to the end according to 
reason, when there is no contradiction of the means and the 
end in the whole of the act on the level of reason." Also, 
it has been observed that because of his/her limitations, 
the human person cannot always realize his/her 
pos~ibilities; and so in his/her ambiguity sometimes antic 
evil is experienced in an attempt to do morally good acts. 
The question throughout this chapter is the question of 
proportionality. Is the benefit of children equal to or 
greater than the harm of IVF/ET? 
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Most people would agree that ectopic pregnancy and 
miscarriage are physical evils. Statistics show that these 
conditions are very common throughout the world. In Europe 
for example, extrauterine pregnancies "occur about once in 
every 150 pregnancies. Elsewhere they are more common: in 
Jamaica they occur once in every 20 pregnancies, and they 
are even more common in parts of Africa" (Glover et al 
1989:104). It is estimated that miscarriages in the United 
Kingdom alone, "are about 100,000 hospital admissions a 
year" (Glover et al 1989:104). In the United States of 
America, "about 1 in every 5 pregnancies end in miscarriage" 
(Janet S. Peterman 1988:21). 
The harms that are associated with these pregnancy 
conditions are very grave. For example, (i) they cause 
infertility, sterility, or childlessness among numerous 
married couples (Glover et al:104; Martin L. Pernell and 
Sara H. Garmel (1994:319). (ii) The loss of the lives of 
many embryos are blamed on the ectopic pregnancies and 
miscarriages (see Yvonne Brown 1992:82; Pernell and Garmel 
1994:320). (iii) Sometimes the loss of the lives of both the 
fetus and its mother are blamed on them (see Glover et al 
1989:104; Pernell and Garmel 1994:320). In general "about 1 
in 1000 ectopic pregnancies result in maternal death" 
(Pernoll and Garmel 1994:318) 5 
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A careful study of the harms associated with ectopic 
pregnancy condition therefore is necessary here and could go 
some length in helping to determine whether one should 
support the arguments for IVF/ET or whether one should 
support those against the use of this procedure. Let us now 
examine the examples above accordingly. 
(i) Ectopic pregnancyies cause infertility, sterility, 
or childlessness among numerous married couples. The first 
case against ectopic pregnancy is that it causes infertility 
- "infertility is present in about 60% {Pernoll, and Garmel 
1994:320). Statistics show that 10 to 20% of women who have 
had ectopic pregnancy the first time, will have it a second 
time; and 4-5% of the second time occurrence, "will occur in 
the opposite tube" (Pernoll and Garmel 1994:314}. According 
to Pernoll and Garmel, the normal treatment for this 
percentage of suffering women is "total tubal excision" 
(Pernoll and Garmel 1994:320). This is not to say that the 
4-5% represents all the women who will remain sterile 
without special intervention. It simply means that 4-5% of 
all women affected by second time occurrence of ectopic 
. Spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) will not be examined here because all the major causes of 
miscarriage which can be helped by ivf/et involves a is miscarriage which arises from a "Genetic error" and 
tberef~re which must be instancies of AID, not Alli which is the topic of study. See "Early Pregnancy 
Risks• by Martin L. Pernoll, MD, & Sara H. Gannet, MD, in Current:Obstetric &: Gynecologic Diagnosis 
&: Treatment, eds. Alan H. DeCherney, MD, and Martin L. Pernoll, MD. Appleton & Lange, 25 Van Zant 
Street, East Norwalk, Connecticut, U.S.A., p.312, 1994. 
•, . 
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pregnancy will have their two reproductive tubes cut off. 
This means that the only alternative left is IVF/ET, since 
as has been shown already other alternatives are not as 
beneficial as IVF/ET. The ethics committee of the American 
Fertility Society lends credence to this as follows: 
The most common indication for the use of human IVF 
procedures is irreconncilable tubal damage or 
destruction, which exists in patients who have 
undergone surgical removal of the fallopian tubes 
because of inflammatory disease or tubal ectopic 
pregnancy (1986:328). 
By being the cause of sterility, ectopic pregnancy adds 
to the existing sources childlessness. This situation is not 
helped by the fact that in "the past 5 years, the incidence 
of tubal ectopic pregnancy has increased more than 50\ owing 
to the following factors: epidemic salpingitis; microscopic 
tubal surgery of all kinds ... " (Pernell and Garmel 
1994:320). The growing pain about this upsurge, is that, 
this rise, is bound to increase the number of women 
suffering childlessness due to some form of ectopic 
pregnancy. 
However, there is evidence that IVF/ET themselves can 
sometimes cause ectopic pregnancy. F?r example, Pernell and 
Garmel include "in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer" 
(1994:315) among other factors that can cause ectopic_ 
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pregnancy. This is to say that IVF/ET can be part of or add 
to the problem it attempts to solve. 
But history shows that IVF/ET (excluding artificial 
insemination) 6 as we have it, today did not come into being 
until July of 1978 when its first product was born. The rate 
of occurrence of extrauterine pregnancy had tripled for many 
years prior to the first IVF/ET baby, and just two years 
after the baby's birth. Pernoll and Garmel attest to this 
fact when they say that ectopic pregnancy "rate increased 
from 4. 8 in 1000 term births in 1970 to .14. 5 in 1000 in 
1980 ... " (Pernoll and Garmell 1994:314). This means that the 
rapid increase in the occurrence of ectopic pregnancy is not 
necessarily due to IVF/ET, even though it is contributive to 
the increase in recent times. 
An opponent might still contend that two years( from 
1978-1980) aggressive IVF/ET practice can significantly 
influence the rate of increase in the number of extrauterine 
pregnancies over the years antecedent to this technical 
reproductive procedure. This view would be mistaken if one 
considers that IVF/ET is not mentioned (though its sister 
method, artificial insemination is) among the kind of 
. Artificial insemination (AI) as a method of human conception has been in use for more than two 
centuries. Two physicians, John Hunter (1728-1793) of England, and Thouret of France are said to be the 
first in the successful application of this method on human beings. Cf. John C. Wakefield, Artiful 
ChikbMking: Articial Insemination Jn Catholic Teaching, Pope John XXIIl Medical-Moral Research and 
Education Center. St. Louis, Missouri, 1978, pp. 18-19. This method "has been widely used as a.method to 
fight infertility in humans since about 1950" (Richard Westley Guidlines For Contempomry Catholics: Life, 
Death and Science, The Thomas More Press Chicago, Illinois, 1989, p. 84). 
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factors that have augmented the rate of the occurrence of 
this lethal condition when one of the most recent surveys 
were conducted. Pernell and Garmel report: 
In the past 5 years, the incidence of tubal ectopic 
pregnancy has increased more than 50% owing to the 
following factors: epidemic salpingitis; microscopic 
tubal surgery of all kinds; conservative management of 
the tube with preservation of an organ that still 
retains the causative factor; the timing of artificial 
insemination and natural methods of contraception, 
which lead to fertilization of a late ovum; an 
increased number of tubal ligations with increased 
failures; and DES syndrome (1994:320). 
Thus artificial insemination as a disvalue in the sense 
that it can cause ectopic pregnancy, is inconsequential in 
that it can be more readily controlled by a more accurate 
timing of ovulation, a claim that cannot be made for 
classical causes of ectopic pregnancy. Classical causes of 
ectopic pregnancy include "tubal factors" which are 
responsible for about "50% of excised tubal pregnancies" 
(Pernell and Garmel 1994:315); "zygote abnormalities ... 
including chromosomal abnormalities, gross malformation, and 
neutral tube defects ... abnormal sperm counts or a high 
incidence of abnormal spermatozoa .... Ovarian factor, 
Exogenous Hormones" factors (Pernell and Garmel 1994:315). 
Granted then that the assisted methods of human 
reproduction can sometimes cause the problem it seeks to 
alleviate still the nature of the technology or insemination 
is such that it can sometimes redress its own errors, as 
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well as those of other factors of infertility by producing 
the value that was originally sought after. Aquinas urges us 
to focus on the human agents (married couple) who seek a 
child on one hand and the human agents (the medical team) 
who are assisting the couple are all involved the procedural 
acts of IVF/ET or artificial insemination on the other. 
Understandably, the possibility of the antic evil of 
ectopic pregnancy can arise here. But when these agents 
consider the value of their end and the overall good, and 
what that value means to them, especially the infertile 
couple, they must weigh these values (particular and common 
or general good) against the disvalues of the couples's not 
having a child at all, it is not surprizing that they judge 
the risks involved in the procedure are worth taking. The 
value of the ectopic embryo's short life, its possibility to 
become a child is more valuable than if it had no life at 
all. 
Moreover, their valuing and planning to achieve their 
good end/s (particular and whole good end), through this 
means of IVF/ET, involves at the same time plans to 
eliminate or at the very least to lessen whatever 
harm/disvalue might frustrate their end/s. In this way all 
things considered, IVF/ET and artificial insemination 
remains a valuable means chosen by human agents to achieve 
the desired good end even though some disvalue (antic evil) 
might be encountered. In other words, the total picture 
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about all relevant factors in the entire project makes good 
sense. The number of successful IVF/ET procedures, cited 
earlier in this work are in support of their judgments. 
{ii) The loss of the lives of many embryos are blamed 
on the ectopic pregnancies and miscarriages. Many arguments 
against IVF/ET have narrowly focused on various harms the 
procedure holds for the embryo, to a seeming neglect of the 
harms the embryo's parents suffer, ·especially its mother. 
The seriousness of the risks of harm involved in ectopic 
pregnancies may be suggested by the fact that "maternal 
mortality rate due to ectopic pregnancy in the USA is 1-2%; 
the prenatal mortality rate is virtually 100% {Pernell and 
Garmel 1994:320). The virtual 100% death rate of the embryos 
raises an understandable alarm about the enormity of ectopic 
pregnancy; at the same time, it can easily mask the 
prolonged suffering of the parents, especially the mother 
who undergoes the physical pains and injuries that are 
involved. 
Still in view of the fact that virtually 100% of the 
fetuses die in an ectopic pregnancy, it is arguable whether 
the suffering of the fetus is sufficiently harmful to it 
that is a more serious disvalue than the suffering of its 
infertile parents and the positive value of a possible 
child. If it is true {as human experience shows), that an 
injury or harm that befalls a child/person especially one 
involving death, can have a negative emotional or 
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psychological affect on his/her parents and vice versa, then 
an important question also arises with regard to the 
suffering of the human embryos that are lost in ectopic 
pregnancies in relation to their parents. So we must ask 
whether death is really a harm as such to the embryos, since 
they do not have real awareness of their own death (not 
meaning that they do not feel pain), and we must look at the 
suffering of their parents who learn of their death and 
suffer accordingly. 
For most people, death is a harm because of the fear of 
various kinds of pains and sufferings associated with some 
illnesses that cause death; fear and anxiety about the 
uncertainties of the outcome of the injuries or sickness 
they are exposed to; fear of the unknown or anxiety about 
the uncertainty of one's spiritual status hereafter; sorrow 
or guilt felt for not accomplishing some important sets of 
personal, cultural, social, or religious values they are 
cormnitted to; but not necessarily because of death itself; 
so that death can actually be harmful if such fears of it 
causes tremendous psychological harm to the person. 
This is not to deny that there are people who are 
afraid of death itself. It must be acknowledged though, that 
this fear issue, does not remove the pain and suffering 
which embryos/fetuses of certain age feel. However, it seems 
true to say that even. at this, the infertile couple remain 
more wounded emotionally on long term basis, especially the 
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woman who bears the entire brunt of the physical pains 
involved with resolving an incidence of ectopic pregnancy 
and the tremendous harmful anxieties of her spouse, families 
members and others experience within the period. For most 
infertile couples, this kind of harm lingers until death. 
It is also true that in real life situation, that 
although the death of an expectant child brings sorrow to 
its immediate family members, and the larger community, the 
birth of another child by that couple minimizes the pain and 
sorrow caused by the dying of the former child. This is not 
to claim that the birth of this child eliminates the entire 
experience relevant to the loss of the dead child; nor is 
this to claim that the dead child was less human than the 
living child. If the above is true of in vivo births, there 
seems no reason why it should not be true of in vitro 
children. 
For in a pronatalistic society such as Nigeria where to 
bear one's own genetic child, is the human-rock-foundation 
for the pride, and happiness of married couple, the bearing 
of a child is still cherished more than the many more 
children that never saw the light of day; though their 
deaths are very much grieved by all in the community. 
Nonetheless, the joy which this one child brings to the 
infertile couple and the members of ~he society is 
sufficient to compensate the loss ?~_many embryos and the 
social stigma of infertility. The following may give a 
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foreigner an inkling into the kind of joy and rejoicing that 
accompanies the birth of a child to a couple that have long 
experienced the sadness and stigma of sterility: "As a rule, 
the whole occasion of birth is marked with feasting and 
great rejoicing among the relatives and neighbors of the 
parents concerned" {Mbiti 1969:114). 
Can one still claim, in view of the above that embryos 
suffer more serious disvalue in the loss of their lives than 
their parents who are infertile or who become aware of their 
loss of the fetuses and aware of their own emotional or 
psychological trauma? It seems to this author that the 
·immediate suffering of the infertile couples which the loss 
of a cherished value (child) and the long term emotional or 
psychological hurt that infertility brings to bear on them 
may justly tip the scale in favor of giving an embryo a 
chance at life, even at the risk of ectopic (or other 
circumstance) of early death. 
But even when the kind of disvalue examined above is 
ameliorated, one of the most serious.ethical objections to 
IVF/ET reproductive technique may not necessarily be 
resolved. That objection is that either defective or "spare 
or unimplanted embryos" may be used for scientific 
experimental purposes and f inaly destroyed as one author 
clearly points out: "Many ova are fertilized, the 'spare' 
ones are either immediately destroyed, used for scient.ific 
research, or frozen for future implantation or 
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experimentation and ultimately destruction" (Westley 
1989:88). The experimentation the unimplanted embryos will 
be subjected to, is to achieve other purposes which these 
medical scientists claim might, be beneficial to humanity. 
On this issue, the opponent's attention is called, not 
to confuse the creation of embryos for laboratory goals, 
with, creating embryos solely for implantation into its own 
mother's womb for further development. This means that, in 
this specific instance, the intention or primary goal of 
those involved in IVF/ET is specifically to assist infertile 
couples to conceive a child. Admittedly, sometimes, the 
physiological, hormonal, or chromosomal condition of a 
couple may necessarily result in the creation of abnormal 
embryos that would not be viable enough to implant in a 
woman's womb. In this case the embryo should be permitted to 
die without being implanted since its fate will be the same 
in either case, but the implanting of a known severely 
defective embryo would involve an almost certain loss and 
some risk of physical harm to the mother. 
But the issue of what to do with spare embryos which 
are alive and not implanted lingers on. Two major avenues to 
remedy the situation have been suggested: the first is that 
the number of embryos created should not exceed the number 
that can actually be implanted in a woman (Smith 1990:33); 
the second is that if more embryos than are needed ar~ 
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fertilized, then as some authors7 have suggested, they ought 
to be frozen for future implantations. It is more probable 
and than not that an infertile couple who desires a child 
would prefer to have their excess embryos, safely preserved, 
than that they w~uld prefer to have them destroyed. Others 
have even suggested they "should be treated as a person" on 
the basis of a prima facie obligation only" (Richard A. 
McCormick 1991:13) . 8 
IVP/ET and harm of deformity to embryo 
Another consideration of possible harm is that embryos 
even if IVF/ET is successful, and the implanted embryo is 
born alive but deformed what moral reasons could justify the 
IVF/ET that brought it to life? 
The real issue about this question, is not necessarily 
that the child is deformed, as it is that the child will 
suffer because he/she is deformed. The worst scenario one 
can envision would be a situation where a child is severely 
deformed. How does one balance the severity of sufferings 
arising from such a deformity possibly as a consequence of 
. "The Case Against Thawing Unused Fror.en Embryos" by David T. Ozar, in: Hastings Center Repon, 
August 1985, pp. 7-12. ; What We May Do with Preembryos: A Response to Richard A. McCormick" by 
John A. Robertson, in: Kennedy Institute cf Ethics Joumal, Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 1991,- Also •Resolving 
Disputes Over Fror.en Embryos", by John A. Robertson, in: Hastings Center Repon, Nov./Dec. 1989, pp. 
7-12 . 
. "Who or What is the Embryo? by Richard A. McCormick, in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol. 
1, No. 1, March 1991. 
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IVF/ET procedures themselves with the fact that such 
children are the products of IVF/ET which is undertaken to 
alleviate sufferings due to infertility? 
In one kind of case of possible deformity the infertile 
couple together with the medical team know that they have a 
significant risk of fertilizing a deformed baby. This risk 
is nevertheless still less than a 100% chance of having no 
children without IVF/ET. This means that the chance of risk 
they are taking is worth taking because, the value being 
pursued (having a child/the life of a child) is worth a lot 
more than the risk. Although there may be some exceptions in 
the case of severely painful deformities that would prevent 
a child from experiencing parents' loving care in general -
by an argument analogous to the one offered above in 
discussing psychological harm - it seems reasonable to hold 
that to be born deformed is better not to be born at all. 
This is to say that in the vast majority of cases, the risk 
and procedure, are commensurate or in due proportion to the 
value at stake (child), especially as there is no better 
option available. 
What is important is, how suffering is looked at in the 
face of one's value systems. The following story may be apt 
to help analyze the moral issue involved. A father narrated 
his.experience about a genetically inherited, and 
progressive disease, called "Fibrodysplasia Ossificans· 
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Progressiva (FOP)", which his daughter, named Sarah, suffers 
from. The rest of the story reads: 
In Sarah's case it appears to be progressing faster 
than expected. She is now seven and half years old. Her 
jaws open only a centimeter and she has a crossbite. 
Her neck, shoulders and spine are rigid. She can read 
and write and feed herself but cannot dress or bathe 
herself. She has trouble sitting in most chairs and 
increasingly is confined to a wheelchair, one custom-
made for her rigid, contorted body. Her cognitive, 
social and fine motor skills range from average to 
superior, but her gross motor and daily living skills 
are drastically sub-normal. She wears hearing aids 
because the bones of the inner ear have fused (Steele 
1994:2). 
Sometime our imaginations about another person's pain, 
or happiness are not accurate. Our first hearing of Sarah's 
physical condition might chill our feelings because, being 
in good physical health, we project how we might feel if we 
were in Sarah's condition, to how Sarah actually feels. So 
we draw the conclusion that she is suffering terribly. But 
the fact may well be that Sarah, is not actually feeling as 
we imagine and feel about her. In that case what we rightly 
call a disvalue (Sarah' suffering) can be blown out of 
proportion because our senses or imaginations deceive us or 
because we are unable to put the disvalue (Sarah's 
suffering) into proper perspective. But when we put it into 
correct perspective, taking account of the human subject who 
is directly involved in the suffering, then our value · 
judgment or perspective may also change. 
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Sarah's father, makes the point clear when he states 
that Sarah views her condition as narrated above differently 
from the observer. "It may well be that this absurdity is 
felt less by the disabled themselves than by their families" 
{Steele 1994:2). Sarah's father illustrates his point: 
Recently one of Sarah's friends tried to hold her arms 
locked like Sarah's arms. She did this with the evident 
intention to understand, not to mock. After a few 
moments she gave up in frustration. Sarah, wise beyond 
her years, said, "I'm used to it and she's not because 
I've never known anything else" {Steele 1994:2). 
The point therefore, is that, it is not necessarily 
true that babies who may be born severely deformed through 
IVF/ET process will actually suffer to the degree that we 
imagine the suffering ourselves especially if they are 
deeply loved and related to. And it remains true of course 
that their state of life is not anything less than that of a 
human being who must be valued and loved. This is not to 
deny that they will experience sufferings, nor to deny that 
their physical conditions may cause them limitations. 
So to argue as has been done here is not to hold the 
view that IVF/ET is trouble free. But then, like the 
assisted reproductive technology of IVF/ET the ordinary 
method of human reproduction carries with it a range of the 
dangers and harms. The proper question is to weigh these 
against the values to be gained. 
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Other kinds of deformity not associated directly with 
hereditary or genetic diseases, which may be attributable to 
IVF/ET, can now be examined. It is possible that IVF/ET can 
produces some children who will suffer serious deformity 
because of problems with IVF/ET procedure itself. According 
to Cynthia B. Cohen, data from Australia provide evidence of 
some severe abnormalities attributed to IVF/ET. According to 
the data, children born of IVF/ET 
"are two or three times more likely to suffer such 
serious diseases as spina bifida and transposition of 
the great vessels (a heart abnormality) . The Australian 
data also suggest that some drugs used to stimulate 
women's ovaries to produce multiple oocytes in 
preparation for IVF increase the risk of serious birth 
impairments in the resulting children (1996:20}. 
However, even critics of IVF/ET such as Kass claim that up 
to 1985 no report of any severe abnormalities arising from 
IVF/ET was made. Other studies seem to support Kass' claim. 
For example, Cohen, in citing a conflicting evidence with 
the Australian study, notes that: 
"other reports, however, suggest that there is no 
increase in disorders at birth among children resulting 
from the use of the new reproductive technologies. One 
small American follow-up study of the health status of 
children born of IVF and gamete intraf allopian transfer 
(GIFT) could find no significant differences in the 
rate of physical or neurological abnormalities in 
children born of techniques of assisted conception 
(1996:20). 
231 
But one cannot write off the Australian claim without 
due consideration, because of the ever present possibility 
of error in any human action. When that possibility is taken 
seriously, it becomes credible that serious mental 9 or 
physical deformity, by IVF/ET is possible. However, the 
probability of deformed children being produced by IVF/ET, 
is even less today than it was in the early days of the 
technology, because the procedure has undergone so much 
improvement. This means that infertile couples who are 
sterile have lesser chances of bearing deformed babies by 
IVF/ET (barring hereditary or genetic diseases which might 
cause deformity), than they had twenty years ago when the 
technology came into practical effect. In other words this 
form of disvalue of the procedure is in decline and from the 
available evidence has never been very great. 
As was mentioned earlier, some authors are of the view 
that IVF/ET would not.necessarily be immoral even if it 
produces children with serious physical deformity, because 
to be alive and deformed is better than not being alive at 
all. For example, a certain author says that: 
. Mental or psychological and emotional harm will be examined separately below. 
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[A] higher incidence'of birth defects in such [IVF/ET] 
offspring would not justify banning the technique in 
order to protect the offspring, because without these 
techniques these children would not have been born at 
all. Unless their lives are so full of suffering as to 
be worse than no life at all, a very unlikely 
supposition, the defective children of such a union 
have not been harmed if they would not have been born 
health¥c (John A. Robertson 1988:434; square bracket 
mine) . 0 
But the arguments above are not all. The rate at which 
embryos' lives are lost in IVF/ET raises legitimate moral 
concern. Yes, it is true that the rate at which embryonic 
lives are lost through IVF/ET, is important to merit serious 
consideration when pursuing a view point that, is 
representative of the new form of human reproduction. But, 
it ought also to be said, without being polemical, that 
similar loss of lives are not only not absent in the 
ordinary method of human reproduction, but indeed are more 
frequent in their occurrences as the statistics (2/3 of all 
pregnancies) given earlier makes no effort to conceal. These 
are antic evils that must be evaluated in comparison with 
the values to be achieved. 
It is the responsibility of humanity, especially those 
who have the skill and knowledge, to lessen or prevent as 
much as possible such antic evils especially as they 
frustrate some of the primary goals (bearing children) of 
the·procedure. Not tx:yin9 to prevent or lessen this antic 
. Quotation cited by Cynthia Cohen in Hastings Center Report Vol. 26, No. 2, March-April 1996, p. 21. 
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evil, would itself be a moral evil in so far as a person has 
the know-how to lessen or prevent some of it. If someone 
willfully fails to do so, knowing this evil to be a serious 
evil that frustrates the well-being of some members of 
society and therefore the development of humanity that would 
be a serious moral wrong. 
This responsibility to act is even more demanded of us 
because knowledge as a resource, is itself a good, to 
promote other good or even higher good (in our case human 
life) . It seems compelling that we should prevent or lessen 
these antic evils since the promotion of the good we seek 
will not cause more antic evil than already occurs in 
ord~nary method of human reproduction. Such consideration 
with those presented earlier, point to the conclusion that 
all things considered, IVF/ET is not a disproportionate 
means of achieving the rational person's goal of human 
conception, given the gravity of suffering of infertile 
couples, the value of, and need for children. 
IVP/ET and possible harm to the embryo's mother 
It is possible that the life of the mother could be at 
risk because of an ectopic pregnancy as a result of IVF/ET. 
The issue is one of a vexing moral conflict between two 
human lives, that is, risk to the mother's life for the sake 
of the possible life of a child who might be born. As JoAnn 
V. Pinkerton, and James J. Finnerty, note, the fact is "This 
is not a choice between absolute good and evil but an 
attempt to balance two competing interests, both of which 
pose nearly equal moral worth" (1996:292}. 
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But nearly egual is not the same as egual. For example, 
in cases of ethical dilemmas involving embryonic-maternal 
life conflicts in Nigeria, society grieves the death of the 
woman more than it does over the death of the conceptus. 
This is to say that the life of a mother, all things 
considered, is relatively more valuable than that of the 
conceptus. Several reasons can account for the more 
sorrowing for the mother whose death is considered more 
grievous than that of the fetus. 
(1) The mother is a fully developed, actual person, 
while the embryo is not considered a person yet though it 
has the possibility to reach the status of a person. (2) The 
mother occupies and excises actual and functional, 
political, religious, economic position in the society; this 
means that she does something meaningful and visible for 
society. The fetus does not yet have such a place or 
responsibility in society, though it has the potential. (3) 
There is a special bond, for instance, the bond of 
friendship, between the mother and the members of the 
society which establishes a personal affect in the members 
of this society on account of the mother's death. There is 
no such relationship and interaction yet between the embryo 
and any members of the human society except the limited 
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interaction between the mother (and possibly father) and the 
fetus. 
These arguments do not suggest that the dead fetus is 
not recognized as valuable or as an actual human being; As a 
matter of fact Nigerians recognize pregnancy as "the first 
indication that a new member of society is on the way" 
(Mbiti 1969:110). But this recognition of the fetus as a 
prospective full member of the human society, does not of 
itself bring it to the status of a social person, a status 
which only members of society can confer on it. Mbiti 
explains: 
In African societies, the birth of a child is a process 
which begins long before the child's arrival in this 
world and continues long thereafter. It is not just a 
single event which can be recorded on a particular 
date. Nature brings the child into the world, bl.lt. 
society creates the child into a social being. a 
cor::porate person. For it is the conununity which must 
protect the child, feed it, bring it up, educate it and 
in many other ways incorporate it into the wider 
conununity. Children are the buds of society, and every 
birth is the arrival of 'spring' when life shoots out 
and the conununity thrives. The birth of a child is, 
therefore, the concern not only of the parents but of 
many relatives including the living and the departed. 
Kinship plays an important role here, so that a child 
cannot be exclusively 'my child' but only •our child' 
( 19 69: 110) . 
As Mbiti helps to clarify, what is grieved in the death 
of a mother, that is different from that of the death of a 
fetus, is the co:r::porate personality of the woman which 
society has helped to create her into right from the moment 
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of her birth; that is, all that it has helped her to become 
culturally. Every child is created into the cor.:porate 
culture of his or her sex. (The corporate personhood that 
society will create a woman into in Nigeria, is different 
from that of a man, without discriminating of their equality 
as human beings/persons) . 
The gravity of the loss of the mother of the fetus is 
known by such verbal expressions as: "Who is going to take 
care of the younger ones? (where the woman is known to have 
children needing motherly care and protection}; or "she 
could have had another chance to bear a child" (where the 
woman has no child yet}. The later of these utterances, it 
could be argued by those who believe that a fetus is a 
person, carries little or no weight at all because the 
mother is no more valuable than the fetus, for two of them 
are equally human beings, with their individual 
possibilities. Thus they could then contend that, the fetus 
could have as much chances as the mother if it had survived, 
to bear its own children and then keep open the line of 
progeny. 
These objections do not seem to counteract the view 
that both mother and fetus are human beings equally valuable 
as such. What it seems to fail to consider is the social 
factor in creating who we are as social persons, a social 
personality that a fetus so far lacks. As a consequence, if 
the risk of ectopic pregnancy meant serious risk of death to 
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the mother, that would be a serious argument against IVF/ET. 
But there is very little evidence of such risk. It is a 
legitimate question to pose, but there is so little risk 
that it is not a reason to reject IVF/ET. 
Conclusion 
The consequentialist arguments against IVF/ET have been 
examined and found wanting because the general risk of harm 
to embryo, child, and mother are outweighed, often greatly 
outweighed by the direct and indirect values achievable by 
IVF/ET. 
This chapter has noted that from the start, the 
destruction, or wastage of human embryos has been one of the 
vexing criteria for the opponents of IVF/ET to judge it as 
immoral. The outcome of the analysis of available evidence 
about psychological harm which children of IVF/ET would 
suffer, does not support the claims·· of the opponents. 
Children conceived by IVF/ET are happy that they were born 
to their parents. 
The analysis of available facts about the number of 
embryos lost through ordinary method of human conception, 
when compared with those lost through IVF/ET are far more 
than the amount of embryos lost during IVF/ET; given the 
fact that there are by far more fertile women in the world 
who loose embryos through ectopic pregnancy than there are 
of the number of infertile women who lose embryos through 
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IVF/ET. Also given the overall value of children and the 
disvalue which childlessness cause couples and society, the 
risk of the action - bearing children and causing some harm 
outweigh the risk of inaction - not causing harm and 
therefore not having any children at all. In addition, the 
birth of even one child successfully by IVF/ET means a lot 
more than the dead ones because the live birth removes the 
otherwise horrible stigma of sterility, and minimizes the 
pain and suffering which the mother undergoes on account of 
the dead embryos. 
The back bone of the arguments of the opponents lose 
their strength when measured against more evil consequences 
of not having this technology as has been demonstrated in 
this section. It therefore seems to this author that the 
various above benefits far outweighs their opposing harms, 
all things considered, to justify morally the technology of 
IVF/ET for the benefit of infertile couples and society at 
large. The introduction of this technology is urgently 
needed in Nigeria, where infertility as against other 
factors is the main cause for the separation of husband and 
wife, and is the source of enormous emotional pain to 
couples and society at large. 
CllAPTER FIVE 
A CONSEQUENTIALIST EXAMINATION OP PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO 
IVP/ET. 
Consequentialist, or proportionalist, arguments are 
always comparative between alternative courses of action. 
The previous chapter examined the benefits and possible 
harms of IVF/ET. The main proposed alternatives to IVF/ET 
will be examined here. The analysis will show that IVF/ET is 
generally a better course of action than the alternatives 
proposed by CDF and others. The chapter shall give a careful 
and detailed analysis of the pros and cons of each 
alternative to IVF/ET. In this connection, (a) "adoption", 
(b) "surgical reconstruction of the oviduct", (c) 
"acceptance of childlessness together with the development 
of other avenues towards leading a worthwhile fulfilling 
life", and (d), "polygamy" are the alternatives to be 
examined. Obviously, the last alternative is not one 
proposed by CDF; but it is a recourse traditionally taken in 
Nigeria and therefore needs to be examined as well. 
The thesis of this chapter is that a strong 
consequentialist justification for policies supporting 
IVF/ET instead of its rival policies can be made. The 
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chapter will try to show that in general IVF/ET will produce 
greater amount of values and lesser amount of disvalues than 
any of its competing alternatives. This implies that its 
thesis demands a careful analysis of the benefits and harms 
of each rival alternatives. Such an analysis ~ neither 
ignore how much the means (IVF/ET and its competing 
alternatives) and end (genetic child) which IVF/ET and the 
rival alternatives seek, are valued by those who seek them. 
Since the advantages and disadvantages of IVF/ET have 
already been addressed in the previous chapter, it is now 
left to examine its competing alternatives. 
Alternatives to IVF/ET 
(a) Adoption 
Adoption has been proposed as a way of meeting the 
desires of infertile couples to have children and therefore 
as a way to avoid the possible harms posed by IVF/ET. In 
addition to that, some infertile couples may satisfy their 
desires to have children by adopting other people's babies. 
For instance, Uniacke says: "Legal adoption of a normal 
infant, which in most cases would not be the biological 
child of either partner, is an alternative which many 
couples on the IVF program say they would welcome" 
(19.88: 143). 
The basic negative of this proposal is that the desire 
of infertile couples to have children is ordinarily not 
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simply a desire to have child/ren, but a desire to have 
their~ genetic children. So adoption of another person's 
child does not respond to the desire for a child of one's 
own blood and the deep, sense of lack and incompleteness 
attending this desire especially in cultures like Nigeria. 
Besides, adoption has its own problems. Therefore a conflict 
of values arises in choosing between the use of adoption and 
IVF/ET to alleviate the problem of infertility suffered by 
married couples. 
Given this conflict, what justification is offered for 
adoption as a more preferable policy than IVF/ET, with 
regard to the needs and desires of infertile couples? How 
can we morally assess the comparative values of the adoptive 
system and IVF/ET? These questions can be answered by 
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of adoption to 
the people affected by infertility with those of IVF/ET done 
in the previous chapter. 
The advantages of adoption 
One of the advantages of adoption is that it can 
provide permanent home to abandoned children, who otherwise 
would have no family they could call their own. Orphans 
would benefit immensely from adoption for it would certainly 
be .better to be adopted than to remain in a foster home 
without parents. There are also some children who, were it 
not for support of a policy of adoption, would have been 
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aborted by their mothers for one reason or another. Those 
children have life because adoption has been supported in 
general. The biological parents of these children are also 
spared of the moral guilt which the aborting of the children 
would have caused them {for those who find abortion morally 
objectionable). There are still some other children who 
would have suffered inunensely in various ways because of 
economic adversities of their genetic parents; or would have 
been victims of some sort of social problems; but who now 
find adoption as the best thing that could ever have 
happened to them. The following could be illuminating: "an 
eighteen-year-old located her birth-mother and learned that 
all those she is genetically related to - mother, father, 
and siblings - are alcoholics and drug addicts." (Jean A. S. 
Strauss 1994:114). 
In all these cases the children benefit from adoption, 
as it is more valuable for them to have parents rather than 
not. But to say that adoptees are better off having parents 
is not to say that adoptees would prefer to have adoptive 
parents than to have their genetic parents; nor is it to say 
that adoptive parents would prefer adoption to having their 
own genetic children. An analysis of some of the ills and 
benefits of adoption wou~d give us a clue as to whether it 
is more preferable and so more valuable to be adopted or to 
have genetic parents, given a hypo~hetical condition that 
the adoptive and genetic parents have similarly equivalent 
status. But these issues will shortly be discussed more 
carefully in discussing the disadvantages of adoption. 
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Tbe joy of Parenthood, is therefore one of the most 
important benefits and values in married life, which IVF/ET 
sometimes brings to those, who, without this procedure, 
would have been without the joy highlighted above. But does 
not adoption bring parents the same· joy? As has already been 
suggested above, to the Nigerian, life is most meaningful 
when it is able to generate another·life for the 
continuation of the human species. The most valuable 
portrait one can paint of oneself is to have a child of 
one's own genes to behold. It is from this horizon that a 
non-Nigerian needs to be educated to listen to the heart 
beat of childless couples who desire to have children of 
their own genes rather than resorting to the adoption of 
children who are other persons' portraits. Therefore, there 
is a sharp difference for Nigerians and the many cultures 
and individuals who are like them in.this regard, between 
adoption and efforts to have one's own genetic child. 
It should be borne in mind, moreover, that Nigeria is 
not an individualistic culture. The community and extended 
family structure of this society, implies that many more 
people share the joy which IVF/ET makes possible by its 
provision of a child to a childless couple. This contrasts 
with the state of unhappiness which the condition of 
barrenness brings with it to the community. Shared joy 
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implies shared sadness. That is, it is not the subjective or 
selfish or idiosyncratic preferences of individuals for 
genetic children that is at stake here. Very deep culturally 
held values and a view of life's meaning are at stake. In 
the view of this, it is not only more valuable to experience 
the condition of joy in relation to bearing one's own 
children through IVF/ET, in comparison to sadness in 
relation to the state of infertility, it is also a far 
greater value to strive for one's own genetic children 
through IVF/ET than to resort to adoption. 
It has been claimed that IVF/ET is a painful, and an 
expensive process of childbearing. But it is a process worth 
more than the price, pains and sufferings it involves and 
worth more than the agonizing condition of childlessness in 
marriage due to infertility. In its most literal meaning, 
the local Nigerian saying: "the individual that has a human 
being is wealthier than the individual that has money" is a 
witness to the foregoing claim. 
IVF/ET would in some measure be a valuable technique of 
checking the threat of infertility as a menace to the 
continuation of the human species. For from a Nigerian view 
point, every line of human life that is threatened to die 
out due to infertility, can be considered as an endangered 
spe~ies. Earlier in this work, we merely sketched out some 
of the causes of infertility. Those causes and a bunc~ of 
others, if unchecked by some kind of medical intervention 
could proliferate and endanger some of the most talented 
members of our human society. 
The disadvantages of adoption 
Adoption is fraught with its o'Wn inherent problems. 
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The most noteworthy of the problems·are psychological and 
social in category. Some adoptee, their adoptive, and 
genetic families can suffer significant psychological and 
social damages. Sometimes adoption can be divisive of our 
basic social institution - the family. The adoption case of 
Jessica DeBoer is a classic example. Carole A. McKelvey and 
Dr. JoEllen Stevens (1994) give a descriptive account of the 
anguish of the genetic and adoptive parents of Jessica in 
their legal battle to secure legal custody right of Jessica. 
What follows is but a partial view of some of the negative 
reactions of society, to the case referred to: "Thousands of 
couples hoping to adopt also felt a catch in their throats. 
With such dramatic evidence that birth parents can regain 
their children, many grew reluctant to open themselves up to 
such sorrow" {McKelvey and Stevens 1994:7, emphasis mine). 
Imagine then, the sorrows and anguish which the adoptee's 
biological and adoptive parents were going through, because 
of fear of the possibility of losing Jessica. The sorrows 
and. anguish of Jessica's adoptive parents must be imagined 
with the true background that this couple is infertile. 
Worse still, is the fact that a two,year old baby is in the 
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middle of the turmoil and sufferings which have arisen from 
her adoption. 
Admittedly some of these difficulties with adoption for 
adopted children and their parents could be lessened by 
changing adoption policies. But there are many important 
moral and public policy issues involved in such policies and 
such changes may and perhaps should not happen. So adoption 
must presently be compared with IVF/ET as it is, with all 
the problems it has. 
The search by an adoptee for his/her genetic parents or 
mother or father, which follow long after adoption is 
instructive for the present study. There is, for many 
adoptees, a longing to find what is missing in one's life; 
that what is missing is valuable in one's life to be sought 
for. Or as one adoptee put it: 
"Some adoptees, who never felt a part of their adopted 
homes, perhaps are looking for a mother or father when 
they choose to search. But I wasn't. I searched, not to 
find parents, but to find pieces of myself that were 
missing. I don't intend to make it sound like all I 
wanted was to locate a data bank. I wanted to meet a 
special person. She had given me life (Jean A.S.Strauss 
1994:315). 
This longing is closely tied to the longing for genetic 
children by infertile couples. There is a deep need in 
humans for genetic bonds to one another. 
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In some instances, there is also a damaging 
psychological effect which living in an adopted environment 
can create in a child. Strauss {1994) describes the feelings 
of some of the adoptees "interviewed for Jill Dremntz's 
book, How It feels to Be Adopted "· 
One adoptee narrates her state of discomfort in her 
first reunion with her birth family: 
"They had a big family gathering, which included 
{several members of my birhtfamily) .... I was too 
overwhelmed by it and felt uncomfortable. Everyone 
treated me like a relative, which bothered me because I 
didn't feel that way. At one point, someone who was 
talking to me ref erred to (my birthmother) as "your 
mom" and I didn't like that at all and said so. If I 
hadn't said anything I would have felt guilty and that 
wouldn't have helped in the long run" (Strauss 
1994:312-313). 
It was not just the adoptee•s well-being and feelings 
that are at stake but also, those of other people who are 
related to the adoptee either by blood or adoption. Such a 
reunion one would imagine, should evoke joyful feelings. But 
it is not always the case. Adoption often is spoken of in 
hurtful words or language especially following a reunion of 
an adoptee with his/her birth family. For the words or 
language we use play essential role~'in our connectedness. 
Terms such as "'Mother,' 'father,' 'daughter,' •son,' are 
powerful words, words that automatically conjure up specific 
images and expectations" (Strauss 1994:313). They are 
capable of evoking feelings of discomfort and sadness. 
Consider this description: 
Lee, my own birthmother, wrote of the time 
following our reunion: "Jean is so hung up on labels 
and names. I'm definitely not her mother, but I· 
struggle with 'What am I?' Her two little boys are 
related to me, but how? 
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Language or at least my preoccupation with it, 
also drove my sister Sue crazy. She wrote, 'When people 
call my sister Jean my half-sister I just cringe and 
say, Which half is my sister? I know adoptees have 
their mothers and sisters and brothers and nobody wants 
to confuse anyone, but do we have to label everything? 
What is my mother supposed to refer to Jean as? A 
daughter? A birthdaughter? A fetus?!' 
Lee is accurate in what she wrote about the months 
following our reunion. I was hung up on labels and 
names. I struggled to define who she was in relation to 
me in my adult life. She had carried me for nine 
months, given birth to me, then courageously let me go 
(Jean A.S. Strauss 1994:313). 
Jean is not alone in her concern about how to define 
her ties with her birthfamily and therefore the confusion 
and psychological imbalance she experiences. Another adoptee 
wrote about her discomfort: 
I wish you [her birthmother] would stop 
identifying members of your family as ~ sisters, ~ 
aunts, etc. That makes me feel like I'm being pulled 
into your family before I'm ready. 
I just don't think of~ family as~ family. I don't 
know if I ever will .... It's~ that I wanted to find, 
not a family (Strauss 1994:316). 
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In yet another interview, a young adoptee recalled: 
It upset me when [my birthmother's] friends would say 
stuff like, "So you're Alison's daughter." I didn't 
know what to say. I sort of went along with it because 
I didn't know what else they would call me, but by not 
saying anything, I felt like I was taking away 
something from my mom. It's confusing because I don't 
know how to categorize my relationship with Alison. I 
don't want to think of it as purely biological, but I 
don't know how else to define it. I feel ridiculous 
introducing her as "my friend," and yet I certainly 
don't think of her as my mother (Strausss 1994:316-
317) . 
One adoptee illustrate the unhealthy psychological 
state of mind and confusion which can exist among adoptees, 
their adoptive parents and their genetic parents, with an 
analogy: 
"As humans, we tend to describe the unknown by 
comparing it to things that we already know. What do 
frogs taste like? Kind of like chicken. Are they 
chicken? No. And neither is your birthmother 100 
percent your mother nor your adoptive mother 100 
percent your mother (Strauss i994:317). 
For many adoptees, then, it is very painful to be in 
such a divided state of being and loyalty to two different 
families' influences in one's existence. As Straus says, one 
should not be surprised that many adoptive parents feel 
extremely threatened by adoptees's search for their 
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biological mothers or parents. One of the reasons for such a 
threat is as Strauss correctly supposes that the need of 
their adopted children to know their birthparents could 
easily be interpreted as a failure on the part of the 
adoptive parents. "If they had done a better job, their 
child would not need this connection" (Strauss 1994:102). 
The need for an adoptee to search his/her genetic 
parents demonstrates an important fact about adoption in 
relation to infertile couples; namely that an adopted child 
is not completely the child of the adoptive parents. Another 
fact is that the adopted child has two competing roots or 
heritages. As Strauss explains: "The heritage through the 
adoptive family is experiential and social, not physical" 
(1994:103). In connection with this kind of realization, 
Florence Fisher, has written that: "one •cannot sign away 
chromosomes and genes ... '" (Lamport 1988:113). Consequently, 
for infertile couples who might choose adoption, it remains 
true that: 
while the adoptee and the birth parents can begin to 
resolve their loss and pain through being reunited, the 
adoptive parents have no real ability to resolve their 
own loss and pain. There exists no •search' tor them. 
They can confront their pain and learn to accept their 
losses ... But they cannot change that there is no one 
for them to 'search' for .... The unborn children they 
may grieve do not exist (Strauss 1994:103-104). 
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The above citation among other things, makes clear the fact 
that the desire of some infertile couples are not truly met 
by adoption. As has been said already, when the adoptees 
leave to reunite with their genetic parents, the pains and 
reality of childlessness revisit and haunt their infertile 
adoptive parents. Here, too, some of the points of the 
adoptive situation might be lessened by children not seeking 
birth-parents, etc. But the point is that there is a deep 
human need for having genetic family relations that adoption 
cannot satisfy and that IVF/ET, if successful, can. So a 
policy that would favor adoption over IVF/ET would not 
generally be the better option; IVF/ET should be supported. 
Of course adoption does not only concern infertile 
couples. It can be argued that adoptions serve the needs of 
children much more, and the needs of a society seeking to 
provide abandoned children or orphans with homes; that is, 
much more than it satisfies the desires of childless couples 
for children. For instance, it can be contended that the 
adoption of children by numerous married couples who already 
have many children of their own, is not an effort to satisfy 
their own desire for a child but an attempt to provide the 
parental and other needs of a motherless and fatherless 
child. By doing so, society will address some of the 
negative experiences which are direct results of children 
being parentless. Opponents of IVF/ET, and advocates of 
adoption, may also claim that a policy supporting IVF/ET 
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exaggerates the desire of infertile couples to have their 
own biological children. These opponents would argue, as 
some have done, ·that although some childless couple may 
desire to have their own genetic children, "Not all 
infertile couples will want children ... " (Uniacke 1988:243). 
Granted! 
Admittedly, for those who desire and need children, and 
are absolutely satisfied with adoption, then having 
biological children would be viewed as unnecessary. For such 
couples, therefore, infertility would not be so serious 
matter to warrant IVF/ET especially because some risk of 
hann and many psychological and financial costs are 
associated with the procedure. The~~_adoptive parents would 
not view having their own genetic children as a great value, 
but only having a child. So for these couples, having a 
genetic child is not of a greater value than having an 
adopted child. However, there are also many couples who 
desire very strongly to have only their own genetic 
children. 
Moreover, it should be clearly borne in mind that, the 
above advantages of adoption are only available in a society 
where there are many children to adopt. In a society where 
the circumstances for adoption are a rarity, as is the case 
in Nigeria, the weight of the value.attached to adoption as 
analyzed, therefore significantly diminishes. Given this 
additional difficulty, as well as the risk of significant 
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pains resulting from adoption, adoption seems to have 
serious drawbacks as an alternative to IVF/ET, especially 
for Nigeria's childless couples and cultures and countries 
like it. 
Some hidden dangers of adoption revisited: 
As already mentioned, one might minimize pains of 
adoption by keeping adoptive parents' identities secret. On 
this topic there is plentiful evidence about the effects of 
secrecy surrounding adoption. In the United States of 
America where democracy is at its best: "Over the years the 
child's best interest concept has evolved to enshroud the 
adoption process in secrecy to the extent that forty-five 
states and the District of Columbia have sealed records 
statutes" (Lamport 1988:110). Lamport says that "The often 
touted justification for secrecy is 'the best interest of 
the child.'" This implies that vital information about the 
pedigree of the child is inaccessible both to the adopted 
child and to his/her adoptive parents. This issue of secrecy 
underscores some of the inherent dangers in adoption. 
"Children grow up and ask questions, questions their 
adopted parents are unwilling or unable to answer." When 
they are not told because of this unwillingness, "they are 
left to wonder and fantasize, and later to search for the 
information about their natural parents on their own" 
(Lamport 1988:111). 
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One can only imagine the mental agony that the adoptee 
suffers upon learning that his/her ancestry is anonymous 
(where at best the adoptive parents tell the child the truth 
that he/she was adopted. Imagine further the psychological 
anguish an adoptee and his/her adoptive parents go through 
when a medical record that contains vital information of 
utmost concern to the adoptee's health, is available but 
he/she has no right to access it.simply because .of 
maintaining the secrecy or anonymity of the adoptee•s 
ancestry or parentage. "In a world where scientific progress 
is as prolific as it is today, and where "adult adoptees are 
becoming more aware of the importance of hereditary aspects 
of illness, physical features and life span" (Lamport 
1988:113); there will be increasing number of adoptees who 
will like to have information about their medical history. 
The current secrecy and anonymity in adoption certainly do 
not augur well for the well-being of adoptees and their 
future generations. The possibility of detecting a 
deleterious hereditary disease or other defects which 
sometimes are contributive to infertile conditions, are 
rendered ever more remote within the prevalent secrecy in an 
adoption. 
An infertile couple who are aware of such secrecy but 
who nevertheless adopts a child of an anonymous heritage 
will always be filled with anxiety about the feature health 
of the child. This is not to say that similar anxiety does 
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not exist among fertile couples who are carriers of such 
diseases, as has just been described. But, one's attention 
is called to the difference in the anxieties alleged above. 
The later is based on fact, the former is not. 
Lamport reports yet another set of problems which are 
particular to children of incestuous relationship; to the 
medical doctor, and to the potential adoptive parents. 
According to Lamport (1988), although the number of children 
resulting from incestuous mating is difficult to ascertain, 
because some of the women fail to report the father of the 
child, incestuous children are seen frequently. These 
children of incest "have increased risks of recessive 
disorders such as homocystinuria, mental retardation, cystic 
fibrosis, and various congenital malformations" (Lamport 
1988:115). The following might make. the point clearer: 
a child seen in the clinic was the product of a half-
sibling mating. The common ancestor was the child's 
grandmother. Both the grandmother and the father had 
mental disorders. The grandmother was a diagnosed 
paranoid schizophrenic and her son was also reported to 
have severe mental difficulties. The child's risk for 
schizophrenia was significantly increased because of 
the increased number of common genes (Lamport 
1988:115). 
Given the value of children in Nigeria, and given the social 
stigma of not having one, an infertile couple desperately 
seeking a child of any kind, (and there are many such 
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instances in Nigeria), might adopt such a high risk child as 
in the citation above. However, this couple would also have 
to bear the daily burden of anxiety of what the child's 
mental state might be in the future, and all the more so 
given the proposal being considered here of total secrecy 
about a child's birthparents. Such a policy is not an 
obvious corrective to the problem of adoption already 
discussed. 
Numerous parents of IVF/ET children today are happy to 
have their own genetic children through IVF/ET. They are 
living evidence that IVF/ET can be the answer to the desire 
of many couples vis-a-vis infertility. This is not to deny 
the view that there are also many infertile couples whose 
desire for children have been happily filled by adoption. 
Nor should the fact be ignored that not all IVF/ET are 
successful. Nevertheless, this point in conjunction with the 
fact that not all IVF/ET are successful does not constitute 
sufficient evidence to override a p9licy advocating IVF/ET. 
Given the disadvantages of adoption, particularly on 
the issue of adoptees searching for and reuniting with their 
genetic parents, some infertile couples could never feel 
that an adopted child could fill the void which a genetic 
child of IVF/ET fills for them. In this sense then, a 
genetic child is more valuable to some adoptive parents than 
an adopted child would be to them. This is not to imply that 
one child is more important or valuable than any other 
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another per se. What it implies is that a genetic child of 
IVF/ET, would be more valuable to some infertile couples 
than an adopted child, since a genetic child is the only 
child that can fill the emptiness which these childless 
couples feel, that is, a child they can truly call their 
mm. 
(b) Surgical reconstruction of the oviduct and other 
surgical procedures 
Another alternative to IVF/ET is "surgical 
reconstruction." Leon R. Kass is one of the proponents of 
this alternative. The benefits of this procedure have been 
summarized by Kass who concludes: "This therapeutic surgery 
for women is without possible moral objection or adverse 
social consequences" (1985:51). But not having moral 
objection or social consequences does not by itself make it 
more beneficial and more effective than other competing 
alternatives nor preferable to those whose lives they seek 
to affect, other things considered. 
The values and disvalues must be weighed. Kass bases 
his position on the risks to the embryo from IVF/ET. "The 
use of IVF/ET to initiate a new human life - unlike oviduct 
repair, ... and, of course, sexual union - involves the 
necessary and deliberate manipulation of human embryo 
itself" (1985:52}. According to Kass, the effect which 
manipulation will have on the child, attracts serious· moral 
questions about the safety of the embryo: "Does the parents' 
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desire for a child {or the obstetrician's desire to help 
them get one) entitle them to have it by methods which carry 
for that child an unknown and untested risk of deformity or 
malformation" (1985:52)? For that reason Kass concludes: 
"Therefore, should both options be feasible and 
available, oviduct repair is to be preferred over 
artificial fertilization both in principle (namely, one 
should use the least objectionable means to achieve the 
same unobjectionable end) and in practice (1985: 51-2). 
On this specific point of risk to the embryo, however, 
it has already been argued above in Chapter Four that the 
benefits of IVF/ET to all affected outweigh these risks. 
Therefore, for Kass to make his case about surgical 
repair being superior he would have to show that it yields 
an even greater net value for those affected than IVF/ET 
does. This he failed to do even in those cases where such 
surgery addresses the actual cases of infertility because 
oviduct repair is not a sure remedy and in fact has been 
replaced by IVF/ET as the treatment of choice. Kass himself 
writes: 
There is an alternative treatment for infertility due 
to tubal obstruction, namely surgical reconstruction of 
the oviduct, which, if successful, permanently removes 
the cause of infertility (i.e., it treats the 
underlying disease, not merely the desire to have a 
child). At present, the success rate for oviduct 
reconstruction is only fair, but with effort and 
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practice, this is bound to improve {1985:51; emphasis 
mine) . 
That is, it should be pointed out that "surgical 
reconstruction" is not a certain alternative because, in the 
citation above, the phrase "if successful", suggests that it 
is still a conditional, an uncertainty, a mere hypothesis in 
deed experimental. Kass fails to give any statistical 
records of his suggested procedure's success rate, so the 
most that can be said from Kass's advocacy at this point is 
that infertile couples are no better off with this 
alternative than they are without it either in particular or 
in general. Further data on success rates will be offered 
below. 
But in addition, IVF/ET has long passed the 
experimental stage. McShane's words in 1988 indicate that 
IVF/ET was already an established practice and had been for 
some time. "The accomplishment in 1978 of a normal birth 
following fertilization of the egg outside the body was the 
culmination of decades of reproductive research II 
{1988:34). aspirations of those bu~~ened by the disvalue of 
infertility. 
In addition, it should be recognized that, Kass's 
alternative is seriously limited in its range of application 
to infertile couples because, causes of infertility in women 
are more than tubal obstruction. The prevalence of the major 
causes of female infertility and the deficiencies of 
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developed methods of treating them were among the reasons 
for the development of IVF/ET in the first place. To this 
fact, Mcshane says: 
There have been major advances in the use of medication 
(such as danazol) to treat endometriosis and some 
progress in the surgical approach to adhesions and 
tubal obstruction due to both infection and 
endometriosis. But these are still the most difficult 
category of fertility problems and were the original 
reasons for the development of in vitro fertilization 
(1988:33-34; emphasis mine). 
It is quite obvious in the above citation that infertility 
remained intransigent despite the major advances in the 
areas emphasized. Therefore Kass's willingness to suggest 
that IVF/ET should be set aside altogether in favor of 
surgical oviduct repair is without foundation. In fact, 
oviduct repair is of no value for a variety of infertility 
conditions in men; these can be addressed presently only by 
IVF/ET. For example, Patricia M. Mcshane explains this and 
reinforces the previous point. "Tubal factor infertility is 
the most common reason for using IVF, followed by male 
infertility, unexplained infertility, and cervical or 
immunological factors" (1988:34). 
From Chapter One the reader may recall that "bilateral 
absence of the vas deferens" is one of the major causes of 
male infertility. Some statistics show that in these area of 
common causes of infertility to which surgery is impotent, 
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IVF/ET has been found useful. For example referring to 
IVF/ET success rate, Mcshane documents that: 
"one fertility unit reports that over a 2 year period, 
infertile couples with ovulation disorders achieved 
approximately 60% pregnancy rates; over 35% pregnancies 
for those with male infertility, but only 25% success 
for women with tubal damage or endometriosis" 
(1988:34}. 
The category of "unexplained infertility" is also 
significant and cannot be assisted by oviduct repair. As 
Foad Azem et al explain: "In a considerable proportion of 
infertile couples, there seems to be no explanation for 
their condition when standard methods of investigation are 
used" (1994:1088}. The theory is that "Such unexplained 
infertility may be the result of both male and female 
factors" (Azem et al 1994:1088}. The following is 
noteworthy: 
The designation •unexplained infertility' is applied to 
couples who have failed to achieve pregnancy despite 
evaluations that uncover no obvious reasons for their 
infertility or to those who remain infertile despite 
correction of all detectable causes of infertility .... 
Approximately 10% to 15% of infertile couples will be 
diagnosed eventually as suffering from this entity 
(Azem et al 1994:1090}. 
This is why IVF/ET has become one of the standard 
options today for fulfilling the desire of some infertile 
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couples to have their one's own genetic children. As Azem et 
al have said, "In recent years, the therapeutic options for 
alleviating infertility have increased dramatically and now 
include ovarian superovulation ... IVF, ... GIFT, and zygote 
intrafallopian transfer" (1994:1090) . 1 In such cases neither 
surgical reconstruction of the oviduct nor any form of 
surgery for some conditions2 which affect 40% of infertile 
male can be of any avail. 
This argument does not however, detract from the 
sometimes positives results to be obtained from surgical 
procedures. One such procedure is "subinguinal 
varicocelectomy" 3 where varicoceles is the cause of some 
male infertility. For example, the following positive result 
was noted in a comparative study made of infertile male 
"patients undergoing laparoscopic varicocele repairs" and 
those of infertile male "patients undergoing "subinguinal 
varicocelectomies": 
Pregnancies occurred in both treatment groups. Four 
pregnancies occurred in the subinguinal treatment group 
and two pregnancies occurred in the laparoscopic 
treatment group. However, of these pregnancies, one 
The reader is reminded that GIFT, and zygote intrafallopian transfer are not different from our 
definition of ivf/et. · 
Varicoceles is one such conditions. "Varicoceles is an abnormal dilation of the veins of the spematic 
cord ..... its prevalence among infertile males is 400/o" (Erik Enquist et al 1994: 1092). Fortunately "Several 
surgical treatments now are available for the ligation of varicoceles" (Erik Equist et al 1994: 1092). 
Subinguinal varicoceletomy is a surgical procdure used to repair varicoceles. See footnote 2 in this 
section. 
miscarriage occurred in the subinguinal treatment 
group. (Enquist et al 1994:1095). 
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The above cited pregnancies occurred"among fourteen patients 
who underwent laparoscopic surgery and 33 patients who 
underwent subinguinal varicocelectomy, from January 1991 to 
December 1992 (Enquist et al 1994:1094). 
The value of a surgical procedure that can alleviate 
infertility is that it avoids the risks to the embryo that 
have been discussed above, and especially if its rate of 
success for pregnancy has been found to be high. In the case 
of varicocelectomy, the success rate stands much higher than 
that of IVF/ET "37 to 42%" (Robert M. L. Winston and Alan H. 
Handyside 1993:932). 
However, it is clear that such;~. surgical procedures 
cannot help childless couples whose childlessness is due to 
other causes. To take one example, consider azoospermia. 
"Azoospermia is conunon in the infertile male population" 
(Herman Tournaye et al 1994:1045). According to Tournaye et 
al, azoospermia is "caused either by spermatogenic arrest or 
by obstruction of the genital tract" (1994:1045). It is 
noteworthy that "Although there is no treatment for the 
former cause, the latter can often be treated successfully 
by f?Urgery" (Tournaye et al 1994:1045). 
Kass's option for the surgical reconstruction of the 
oviduct as the preferred solution to infertility rather than 
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IVF/ET seems to have ignored the couples whose childlessness 
may be as a result of spermatogenic arrests. There surely is 
no reason to think that simply because a procedure is 
surgical, its benefits are therefore significant; too many 
surgical procedures have success rates that are appallingly 
low. Tournaye et al give an example: 
However, if azoospermia is the result of congenita.;I. 
bilateral absence of the vas deferens, the classic 
surgical approach, i.e., the creation of an alloplastic 
spermatocele, has been reported to be successful in a 
maximum of 4% of cases. Therefore this condition has 
been viewed as almost irreversible sterility 
(1994:1045). 
By comparison IVF/ET at worst averages 3 to 4 times 
greater success rate than the above. For example, Robert M. 
L. Winston and Alan H. Handyside have said that: 
Human in vitro fertilization (IVF) is surprisingly 
unsuccessful. In the United States, overall birth rate 
per IVF treatment cycle is 14%, from 16,405 oocyt 
retrievals .... In Britain, the.live birth rate from 
each IVF treatment cycle started is 12.5% ... 
(1993:932). 
But even at this low success rate of IVF/ET, it cannot be 
argued that it is still much more beneficial both in terms 
of ±ts percentage outcome and in terms of its comprehensive 
application to all kinds of infertility problems and iessens 
more of this antic evil than its competing alternative does. 
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With specific regard to surgical reconstruction of the 
oviduct to repair tubal blockage Kass says that "the success 
rate for oviduct reconstruction is only fair" (1985:51). But 
Uniacke writing 3 years later describes it as 
"disappointing; and sometimes a woman's fallopian tubes are 
not there to be repaired" (1988:243). 
But the above contention is not all there is with 
IVF/ET success rate. More recent developments in 
Superovulation which makes possible more than one 
fertilization at a time gives rise to even greater 
opportunity for pregnancy, and so increases the rate of 
IVF/ET success rate. For example, Winston and Handyside 
attest to this when they say that IVF/ET: 
Success is greater when more than one embryo is 
transferred simultaneously. Superovulation hopefully 
leads to fertilization of several oocytes, and it is 
corrunon to transfer several embros to the uterus, 
anticipating that at least one will implant (1993:932). 
The direct outcome of this newer procedure is that higher 
per centage of "Pregnancy resulted from 13% (184 out of 
1436) of transfers when three or fewer embryos were 
transferred, 25% (238 out of 944) with four, and 26% (229 
out of 871) with five or six embryos" (Winston and Handyside 
1993:932). 
This development is not without some negative outcome. 
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Superovulation and multiple embryo transfer. While 
increasing the chance of success of pregnancy, also 
increases the likelihood of deaths of embryos. Some of its 
negative consequences have been reported: 
Simultaneous transfer of multiple embryos increases the 
incidence of multiple pregnancy and the possibility of 
miscarriage and prematurity. Of triplets and 
quadruplets born after IVF, 64.1% and 75%, 
respectively, required admission to intensive care, 
often for weeks. Multiple pregnancy also has 
considerable social, social economic, and psychological 
impact on parents. Prematurity after assisted 
conception was associated with a perinatal mortality 
rate of 27.2 1000 ... , three times the United Kingdom 
average for births after natural conception. The 
increased mortality was almost entirely due to multiple 
pregnancy (1993:932). 
Such negative results may seem to make the practice of 
superovulation and multiply transfer of embryos on balance a 
less desirable alternative than other methods of infertility 
treatment. But the argument offered in Chapter Four led to 
the conclusion that every single instance of risk to embryos 
for the sake of having a genetic child is justifiable for 
clear consequentialist or proportionalist reasons. If this 
risk were sharply multiplied without a significant increase 
of live births, this argument would have some weight. But 
the increase in the number of embryos at risk occurs 
together with a sharp increase in live births. Once again, 
the realities of supperovulation and multiple embryo 
transfer reminds us of the realities of antic evil in human 
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action, and of the necessity of comparing all alternatives 
in terms of the total values and disvalues brought about for 
all affected. In this case, the argument offered in Chapter 
Four still applies. Risk to embryos is more than balanced by 
the value of possible life to the embryo and the value of 
genetic children to the parents, especially in a culture 
like Nigeria's. 
In fact, more experience with perinatal mortality 
associated with multiple transfer of embryos during IVF/ET 
procedure, has produced valuable lessens to minimize the 
antic evil of embryo death or. loss and to maximize success 
rate of human conception and live birth through this means. 
This is to say that the level of responsibility taken by 
those involved with IVF/ET has been stepped up to minimize 
embryo loss. 
Added benefits that accrue from the knowledge gained 
from these unintended mishaps is scientific understanding of 
some pregnancy problems associated with of infertility, such 
as miscarriages and the formation of abnormal ooytes. 
"Superovulation preceded by desensitization of the 
pituitary by gonadotrophin-releasing hormone (GnRH) 
agonists, and reduction of luteinizing hormone 
concentration, before egg collection may improve egg 
maturation, which may in turn result in fewer 
miscarriages. GnRH antagonists and recombinant 
follicle-stimulating hormone (rFSH) may possibly help 
reduce the incidence of defective oocytes" (Winston and 
Handyside 1993:932). 
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Or as Patricia M. Mcshane put it, "Meanwhile, IVF has had 
tremendous impact on our understanding of fertility and 
should help physicians in their approach to infertility in 
the future" (1987:31). Among other points one might grasp 
from here is that, all that is to be gained from IVF/ET, is 
not only the reproduction of a child, though, this is its 
chief goal; but also knowledge gained from both successful 
and unsuccessful IVF/ET can help future patients and 
medicine in general. 
In fact, the knowledge gained has helped to 
dramatically improve the success rate of IVF/ET some 
programs. The following result is an example: "For the last 
3 years, we have seldom transferred more than two embryos 
simultaneously ... , and have been able to maintain pregnancy 
rates of 37 to 42% per transfer with only the occasional 
(1%) triplet pregnancy" (Winston and Handyside 1993:932) . 4 
To return to the surgical procedure, there is also 
evidence of similar efforts to improve surgical technique in 
infertile conditions that permit surgery as means of 
. Other studies or experiences drawn from ivf/et has shown that implanting numerous embryos at a time 
increases chances of herterotopic pregnancies (the formation of pregnancy in an abnormal site) but reduction 
of the number yields better result. For example, "In 1991, the maximum number of embryos transferred at 
University Hospital [London, England) was reduced from five to three to lessen risk of multifetal IUP 
[Intrauterine Pregnancy). It appears happily, that this reduction has an unforeseen tendency to reduce 
heterotopic pregnancy also. . .. Risk of heterotopic gestation is augmented by transferring four or more 
embryos." (Ian S. Tummon et al 1994:1067). This study goes ahead to share this piece of valuable 
knowJedge with other clinics of ivf/et in these words: "Programs that do not limit uniformly embryo 
numbers to three may wish to give consideration to such a limitation for women with distorted tubal 
anatomy• (Ibid 1994:1067). Cf. also William Schoolcraft et al, •Jmproved controlled ovarian 
hyperstimulation in poor responder in vitro fertilization patients with a microdose follicle-stimukiting 
hormone flare, growth hormone protocar in, Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 1, Jan. 1997. 
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alleviating infertility. The low rate of the success of the 
surgical approach of alloplastic spermatocele, as indicated 
above, has been improved upon by microsurgical method of 
aspirating sperm in cases of "congenital bilateral absence 
of the vas deferens". For example, Tournaye et al say that: 
since the report by Temple Smith et al ... on the 
successful use of microsurgically aspirated epididymal 
sperm in IVF-ET, an effective fertility treatment for 
these patients with congenital bilateral absence of the 
vas deferens has become possible. The combination of 
microsurgical epididymal ·sperm aspiration and IVF-ET 
has been shown to off er couples who are suffering from 
infertility because of congenital bilateral absence of 
the vas def erens a chance to have their own genetic 
children (1994:1045-1046). 
But as one can see from this citation, this particular 
microsurgical method still depends on IVF/ET before it can 
produce children. So, this alternative neither equates with, 
nor does it give evidence of being better than IVF/ET in the 
attempts to lessen the problem of childlessness among 
married couples. Nor, as has been indicated, are surgical 
procedure comprehensive enough to tackle the broad range of 
forms of infertility enumerated in our survey of issues with 
some reasonable chances of success. The magnitude of types 
of infertility simply overwhelms means of surgical 
rec~nstruction. Therefore IVF/ET when compared with 
"surgical reconstruction of the oviduct" and other such 
related surgical means, in their pros and cons, is more 
270 
beneficial than this alternative and Kass•s effort to turn 
attention away from IVF/ET and towards surgery is not 
justified. 
As a matter of fact, Kass himself seems to accept the 
unavoidability of ontic evil in the form of risk to embryos, 
and the consequent need to carefully weigh values and 
disvalues when he writes: 
To insist on more rigorous standards, especially when 
we permit known carriers of genetic disease to 
reproduce, would seem a denial of equal treatment to 
infertile couples contemplating in vitro assistance. It 
also gives undue weight to the importance of bodily 
harm over risks of poor nurture and rearing after 
birth, or, to repeat, against the goodness of bodily 
life itself. Wouldn't the couple's great eagerness for 
the child count, in the promise of increased parental 
affection, toward offsetting even a slightly higher but 
unknown risk of mental retardation? It should suffice 
that the risks be comparable to those for ordinary 
procreation, not much greater but no less (1985:55). 
But Kass does not off er any argument to support his 
final standard of no risk of harm greater than in ordinary 
procreation. Infertility is itself an ontic evil; and the 
means available to address and remove this evil may require 
risks of harm to be faced that are greater than where this 
evil does not exist. Kass's rigid standard is unjustified.· 
What is needed is a conscientious weighing of all 
alternatives in terms of all the values and disvalues they 
produce. 
(c) Adjustment to infertility and acceptance of 
childlessness as an alternative. 
It was argued above, that some infertile couples may 
not want children. With that understanding, some sterile 
271 
couples can adjust to infertility and accept childlessness. 
This would mean that among other things, bearing children is 
not at the top of the list of their value and needs. This 
may be because the risks and burdens of IVF/ET and other 
remedies are greater than the value of children or because 
the suffering and unhappiness associated with childlessness 
are not a great a negative for them. In this light Uniacke 
is correct to note that the "type of infertility for which 
IVF is a possible remedy results from a physical problem 
which itself is not a barrier to a very healthy life" 
(1988:244). 
This perspective represents one end of a spectrum of 
points of view of infertile couples. But as Uniacke 
observes, at "the other extreme, some clearly become 
distressed to the extent that the unfulfilled desire for a 
child overshadows all other aspects of their lives" 
(1988:244). But sufferings of infertile couples need not be 
extreme before they deserve our concern and attention. CDF 
recognizes this when it says that the "suffering of spouses 
who cannot have children or who are afraid of bringing a 
handicapped child into the world is a suffering that 
everyone must understand and properly evaluate" (1987:33), 
as in deed it must now be. 
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Some people may argue that after "an initial period of 
even quite intense disappointment many people accept 
infertility and lead qualitatively very good lives despite 
it" (Uniacke 1988:244). It cannot be gain-said that whether 
infertility is acceptable or not, depends heavily on whether 
bearing one's own genetic children is a value that gives 
principal meaning to and sustains couples in unity in 
marriage. Much will depend on the amount of weight one 
places on the value of children, and how much the overall 
life style and well-being of couple would be negatively 
affected or not if bearing genetic children is foregone. But 
again, some couples who desire children but cannot bear them 
suffer enormously. Even CDF, in its opposition to IVF/ET, 
admits this fact when it says "The suffering of spouses who 
cannot have children ... is a suffering that everyone must 
understand ... " (CDF 1987:33). In fact, CDF considers the 
desire to bear children to be a characteristic of the human 
condition. For example, CDF says "On the part of spouses, 
the desire for a child is natural" (1987:33); and CDF 
acknowledges that: "This desire can be even stronger if the 
couple is affected by sterility which appears incurable" 
(1987:33-34). 
The following statistical results of surveys among 
var~ous groups of people about their opinions on the use of 
IVF/ET in the case of infertility reveal on one hand how 
much infertility is disvalued, and on the other hand how 
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much bearing a child is valued. The surveys also support the 
view that infertile couple are more likely to be unable to 
adjust to their infertile condition and accept 
childlessness, than they are likely to adjust to these 
conditions because widely accepted views in most societies 
point in the same direction. 
"A Japanese survey of married women aged 20-50 years in 
May 1984 ... gave approval ratings for the use of IVF by a 
married couple if it was their only means of having children 
of 62%, with disapproval by 33% of respondents" (Macer 
1994:29). Even priests gave positive approval. "Buddhist 
priests ... were surveyed at the end of 1986, and 43% 
approved of IVF for married couples with 22% disapproving 
and 35% undecided" (Macer 1994:29). Still "Japanese 
psychologists in a survey conducted in May 1983 ... 55% 
approved, 16% disapproved and 27% were undecided" (Macer 
1994:29). Yet in another survey conducted in New Zealand in 
1984, 11 88% of respondents were in favor of IVF for use by 
married couples, and only 8% were against" (Macer 1994:30). 
In Switzerland, "74% of Swiss people overall supported 
assisted procreation ... subject to restriction on embryo 
storage" (Macer 1994:30) .· 
These examples are only drawn from three societies, 5 of 
course; but there is arguably a pattern of public opinion in 
. African societies' views in this direction is discussed in some detail in the next alternative, "polygamy." 
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favor of this method of human reproduction, IVF/ET, for 
married couples, rather than holding that they should accept 
infertility as an alternative. 
If these are the views of people who are not affected 
by infertility, it is surely likely, for a greater reason, 
those who are directly affected would more approvingly 
welcome this technology rather than merely accept their 
situation. The proposal being examined here is that 
acceptance of childlessness is a generally better 
alternative than IVF/ET for infertile couples. While some 
couples may accept it without great anguish, many do not and 
many people in the general public who are not affected judge 
their pains reasonable and the use of IVF/ET to try to 
address them justifiable. No general rejection of IVF/ET can 
be supported by such an argument. Instead each infertile 
couple must conscientiously weigh .all the values and 
disvalues involved in their own case; and public policy, it 
has been argued should support IVF/ET as one of their 
options. 
It is important to say that an infertile woman who 
desires to have her own child ordinarily is not simply 
ref erring to the pleasure of being pregnant and actually 
bearing the child. Infertile women suffer greatly by reason 
of t?e absence of genetic offspring, of parenting and 
sharing their life with their child, and other values-of 
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having genetic children discussed above. Consider this 
statement from an infertile woman: 
Please tell your readers it is never OK to ask, 'when 
are you going to start a family?' What may seem like an 
innocent question can be as painful as a stab in the 
heart. 
Childless couples ache when they see a beautiful 
baby. They go completely to pieces when they read about 
newborns found in plastic bags in dumpsters. They are 
angry that life has treated them so unfairly and wonder 
what they did wrong. They bargain with God, thinking 
perhaps if they give up this or that, they might get 
pregnant and have a child. 
Going through test after test and from doctor to 
doctor is pure agony. They live with the hope that the 
next test will reveal some good news. After a while, 
they are emotionally exhausted. They feel cheated and 
"different." It seems that no one understands. But life 
goes on, and friends and relatives get married and have 
children. When they hear that the Smiths or the Joneses 
are having their third or fourth and aren't very happy 
about it, they become furious - then depressed. Why is 
life so unfair (Anonymous author, Ann Landers 1996: c-4 
1996:c-4)? 
Such powerful suffering from infertility will be 
especially conunon in cultures that view childlessness, as an 
individual's break from the continuity between this and the 
other world or between the human and the spiritual world. 
This continuity issue is one of the major reasons for the 
irreplaceable value which Africans generally place on 
bearing their own genetic children. Thus Caldwell and 
Caldwell write that, 
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"the essence of the traditional belief system is the 
importance attributed to the succession of the 
generations, with the old tending to acquire even 
greater and more awe-inspiring powers after death than 
in this world and with the most frequent use of those 
powers being to ensure the survival of the family of 
descent (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:409). 
One would expect that acceptance of a life of 
infertility would have some special means of ameliorating 
the sufferings of childless couples to offer; for example, 
by providing them with some value or point of view 
sufficient to take the place of child-bearing in order to 
make infertility tolerably acceptable. But, especially in 
cultures like Nigeria, none is available. To an African or 
Nigerian, it sounds too harsh, too inhuman, and very 
surprisingly unsympathetic for anyone or group of people to 
suggest that childless couples could use involuntary 
infertility as an opportunity for services that promote the 
well being of other peoples' children or families. Consider 
the following lines: 
Sterile couples must not forget that "even when 
procreation is not possible, conjugal life does not for 
this reason lose its value. Physical sterility in fact 
can be for spouses the occasion for other important 
services to the life of the human person, for example, 
adoption, various forms of educational work, and 
assistance to other families and to poor or handicapped 
children" (CDF 1987:34; emphasis mine). 
. ' 
, . 
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In the eyes of the Nigerian society, the requirement 
for an adult to contribute to the well-being of society is 
the requirement to continue the line of progeny. It cannot 
be simply replaced with some other form of service. This 
requirement is not fulfilled until a child is born to a 
couple. As Mbiti writes: "To be productive, in terms of 
having children, is one of the essential attributes of being 
a mature human being. The more productive a person is, the 
more he contributes to the existence of society at large" 
(1969:142). IVF/ET is therefore a far more valuable 
alternative for an infertile couple who desires to fulfill 
this essential human responsibility for the continuation of 
human species than is adjustment to infertility and 
acceptance of childlessness. 
The heart of Mbiti•s statement is that in particular, 
every married couple is happy when it fulfills this 
essential attribute of being mature. In general, society is 
also happy because new members are being added to its 
number. To the contrary, infertility by its essence and 
function blocks and frustrates both the essential attribute 
and contribution to society by way of reproduction. As the 
Igbos of Nigeria proverbially say: "He/She who has a person 
is worth more than he/she who has money". Or as Onwuejeogwu 
says, "the number of children a woman bears and their sex 
enhances her •status'" (1975:25). This is not meant to imply 
that, selfish enhancing of one's status is the goal of 
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having children. If t.his was true, it would mean that 
children are merely used as means and as property. Instead, 
these words primarily mean that a person/couple who has 
multiple children of both sexes has great satisfaction in 
life because of their contribution for the continuation of 
the human society and its well-being. 
Polygamy' 
Polygamy is a widespread phenomenon throughout Africa. 
Mbiti affirms this fact by saying that getting "married to 
two or more wives is a custom found.all over Africa, though 
in some societies it is less common than in others" 
(1969:142). This implies that although polygamy is an 
African custom, it is not practiced by everyone; Mbiti 
confirms this when he says that "The proportion of 
polygamous families would not exceed more than twenty-five 
per cent of the population even in societies where polygamy 
is most practiced" (1969:144). Peter B. Hammond writes 
. There are two kinds of Polygamy: "(a) polyandry - which exists when one woman has several 
husbands; (b) polygeny - which exists when one man has several wives" A Commentary on the Code of 
Canon Law:Marriage Today, by Bernard A. Siegle, 3rd. Revised ed. Alba House, New York, 1979, p. 25. 
Throughout this section, this work refers to polygeny when the term "polygamy" is used. It will be assumed 
that polygamy in the two senses above, is immoral. in the eyes pf many civil and religiosus societies, though 
not necessarily in all cultures. It must be borne in mind that before Christian and Islamic religions came to 
have foothold in Nigeria, there was nothing except Local Traditional religion; that is, a way of worshipping 
God, which each individual person's or community's ancestors handed down to their children. But, 
Traditional religion is not meant to connote a National organized religion comparable to Christianity or 
Islam. So, polygamy is meant as a cultural practice, not a religious way of life. 
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similarly that: "In most societies, however, regardless of 
the preference for polygamy, most domestic groups are 
monogamous ... " ( 1978: 186) . 7 
However, among other important reasons for plural 
marriage in Nigeria, infertility remains one of the major 
reasons for this practice. Some men are polygamous ~ for 
the purpose of the good it sometimes serves - a means to 
bypass infertility in marriage in order to have children. 
Therefore it will be useful to examine polygamy as another 
alternative to IVF/ET, even though, of course, this is no.t. 
an alternative proposed by CDF. 
Surely, the most significant benefit of polygamy is 
that it sometimes enables a married man whose wife is 
infertile to have a child/ren if the man himself is fertile, 
and that the second wife is also fertile. Some African 
writers on the issue of marriage h~ye. noted that in African 
marriages, 
. The societies referred to in this quotation, are African societies, of which Nigeria is one, and by far the 
most populated, and the most diverse. "In Nigeria there are at least two hundred and fifty languages -
languages, not dialects; while in each language area there are several dialects some of which are almost 
distinct, different languages." African Traditional Religion A Definition, by E. Bolaji ldowu, SCM Press 
Ltd, 58 Boomsbury Street, London WCI .. A fuller account of why polygamy came to be condemned as 
immoral and by who, can be found in, Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891, by J.F. A. Ajayi, Longman 
Group LTD, London, England, 1965:103-108. See also '/he Missionary Impact on Modem Nigeria 1842-
1914, --1 Political and Social Analysis, by Ayandele, Longman Group LTD, Longman House, Bur:nt Mill, 
Harlow, Essex, U. K. 1966: 334-338. What follows is significant: "The high sexual morality that prevailed 
in the traditional society was upset by W estem civilization and its conception of monogamy, missionary 
enterprise beginning the process in the greater part of Southern Nigeria" (Ayandele 1966:336). It will be 
assumed here that polygamy is immoral. 
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"If the first wife has no children, ... , it follows 
almost without exception that her husband will add 
another wife, partly to remedy the immediate concern of 
childlessness, and partly to remove the shame and 
anxiety of apparent unproductivity (Mbiti 1969:142). 
Obvious in this citation, are two goods which a 
fruitful polygamy accomplishes, namely "to remedy the 
immediate concern of childlessness"; that is to bear 
children, and secondarily "to remove the shame and anxiety 
of apparent unproductivity." Two additional benefits of a 
fruitful polygamy in the circumstance under consideration 
are noteworthy. One is that another woman is made happy, 
both by the fact that she is married and by the fact that 
she has born a child to keep open her line of human 
succession. The other is that it preserves both the first 
marriage and the second one. This is to say that polygamy as 
a means of bypassing infertility, when fruitful also helps 
to unite the man and his two wives. 
But polygamy can have a down-side too. Experience drawn 
from polygamous marriages shows that this double union is 
not always possible. When this unity_between first wife and 
her polygamous husband is not possible, the evil 
consequences can be enormous. But proponents of polygamous 
marriages in the circumstances in view will argue that 
whatever the disadvantages are, as will be shown shortly, 
polygamy that fulfills the two ends of bearing children and 
removing shame of unproductively is still morally justified, 
because when these two good ends are achieved, especially 
the bearing of a child, then the goods outweigh all the 
evils of polygamy. 
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The claim that a polygamous marriage unites the first 
wife and her husband is intended to indicate also that 
polygamy prevents divorce. In order words, instead of a man 
divorcing his first wife for the reason of her infertility, 
he still lives and relates with her as his wife. But this 
does not mean that some husbands do not divorce their 
childless wives in order to marry another woman to bear a 
child, nor does it imply that some childless husbands do not 
neglect their wives, and bear children extramaritally 
{through adultery) while still living with their infertile 
wives. 
The second aspect of the good of polygamy in the 
citation from Mbiti is to "remove the shame and anxiety of 
apparent unproductivity." This is a very secondary issue, in 
fact, and is contingent on the possibility of the primary 
goal of polygamy, namely to bear children. But the 
achievement of both of this principal goal and the secondary 
one must be seen in proper context: .o.n.C! with reference to 
the husband. The child to be born or that is born by a man's 
second wife whose first wife is infertile satisfies .o.n.C! 
desire for a child by the man or by the new marriage. It 
does not satisfies desire for a child in the first marriage 
except with reference to the husband. 
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So, a husband who resorts to polygamy to resolve the 
problem posed by infertility of his wife, does not actually 
solve the problem, but simply identifies the personal source 
of the problem. The husband has only succeeded in 
vindicating himself from blame in public eyes when his 
second wife is able to conceive and bear a child; his first 
wife remains infertile. This vindication has also a negative 
implication, putting the blame for childlessness of his 
first marriage on his first wife. Bearing this blame would 
understandably have a damaging and lasting negative 
psychological sense of worthlessness, guilt, and shame for 
his first wife. In other words, the good value that resulted 
from the man marrying a second wife and bearing a child/ren 
is also accompanied by a lasting evil impact on the first 
wife. 
In many cases the childless woman develops ill feelings 
against her husband and jealousy towards his new wife. In . 
many instances too, feelings of enmity develops in the 
household. This kind of enmity happens most often when the 
childless woman is in opposition with her husband's marrying 
another woman out of unflinching loyalty to the demands of 
Christian church authority. As Isichei records: "Some women 
were empowered by church support to refuse an unacceptable 
marriage, or leave one, especially where polygamy was 
involved" (1995:240). Usually such tensions and disagreement 
in the new polygamous household has a ripple effect 
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spiraling from the family to their extended families, 
creating alienation of one extended family from the other. 
This in turn affects social life and leads to boycotting of 
social events or community developmental programs. 
However, such a step on the part of a husband to 
marry another woman, instead of bearing the suffering of 
childlessness with his infertile wife, only reinforces the 
claim made earlier in this work about the irreplaceable 
value attached to child-bearing in Nigeria. Also such a step 
on the part of the husband is unfair to his first wife in 
other ways, but more especially in the particular sense that 
the husband preserves only his own lineage at the expense of 
his first wife. 
Some authors have pointed out some other 
disadvantages which critics of polygamy see in the use of 
plural marriage as a means to bypass infertility. For 
example, Mbiti notes that "Quarrels and fights among the 
wives ... are not infrequent" (1969:143}. But is the 
possibility, or even probability of frequent quarrels, a 
strong enough disvalue to override the value in the resort 
to a second wife as a means to the desired child and the 
general human good of continuity brought about by this 
means? It does not seem so. People know before entering into 
marr~age that quarrel is a strong probability, even between 
husband and wife, with or without children. Or as Mbit.i 
says, "the problems of polygamous families are human 
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problems and are not necessarily created by polygamy as 
such; nor have they been solved or avoided in monogamous 
families either in Africa or Europe and America (1969:144). 
So, the objection -that the wives of a polygamous marriage 
will quarrel is not a strong objection to override the good 
sought after by polygamous means. On this score, polygamy 
may appear to be a positively valuable practice on balance. 
But other criticisms against polygamy as a way of 
bypassing childlessness seem quite strong, on the basis that 
it is disrespectful to the dignity of a woman. Experience 
drawn from the common occurrence among polygamous households 
seem to bear out the fact that the husband in the special 
condition under consideration gives preferential treatment 
to the wife who bears a child over the barren wife. Such 
practices will often compromise the dignity of his first but 
infertile wife. For example, Mbiti says it "is cruel for the 
husband to neglect some wives because he favors others 
especially the latest additions" (1969:143). 
If it is true, as Mbiti says above, that some 
people (though unjustly) can favor their latest addition of 
wives, certainly then, it will be true that a man is even 
more likely to favor his new wife with a child/ren than the 
one without child/ren, given the pre-eminent value attached 
to children. This cruelty of neglect frequently leads the 
childless wife to even greater evils - divorce of her 
husband - an action which some Nigerian writers perceive and 
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interpret as a personal catastrophe, and one which must be 
avoided at any cost (cf. Nicholas N. Obi 1987:91). Again, 
divorce itself, by definition, severs the love and unity of 
relationship between the woman and her husband. In many 
cases, the woman is so aware of her helplessness that she 
embraces prostitution, partly as a reaction to the neglect 
of her husband and partly as reaction to her woeful failure 
in life to bear children. So Nicholas N. Obi writing about 
the variety of reasons for prostitution in Nigeria, notes 
that "For a married girl or woman, childlessness may well 
push her into it" (1987:109). 
Obi goes ahead to point out both the potential and 
the and actual hazards prostitution is fraught with in what 
follows: 
How odd, this world of ours! If it wasn't as odd, 
we would since have known that prostitution is non-
reproductive and incompatible with the family system 
and therefore downright dysfunctional, and , if 
sufficiently widespread, would bring about a society's 
collapse. We would have known that since this ill is 
visible in our streets, it is most unhealthy to our 
youths. We would, undoubtedly, have seen prostitution 
as a social problem because, among other things, it 
institutionalizes the use of sex for pleasure alone, to 
say nothing of bastards that are brought into the world 
as a result. We sure would have all been aware of other 
social problems associated with prostitution - the 
spread of venereal disease, for example; ... 
(1987:110). 
Moreover, the awareness on the part of the· 
infertile woman that she is involved in prostitution, which 
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is a social evil which no descent family wants to be 
associated with, may lead her then to flee even her own 
parental family and community. In so doing, polygamy 
together with the woman's infertility becomes the beginning 
of a chain of events involving dissociation of spouses and 
then even families - a great evil. 8 
Because of the intricate nature of the Nigerian 
culture, other ways are available to avoid or minimize 
dissociation of husband and wife and their families, and the 
personal and social harms following divorce, and thereby 
maintaining unity. For example, in the Igbo sub-culture of 
Nigeria, by agreement with her husband, a barren woman 
sometimes freely arranges a second wife to bear children for 
her husband when she (the first wife) is the source of 
childlessness in the first marriage. This means that the 
woman realizes the indispensable value of a child in a 
marriage; but it also implies that the first wife and her 
husband are not willing to be separated from each other on 
account of the love they have for each other. In this 
instance, polygamy acts as a mediating factor, a socially 
acceptable therapeutic remedy for childlessness and other 
.A fuller account of why polygamy came to be condemned as immoral and by who, can be found in, 
Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891, by J.F. A. Ajayi, Longman Group LTD, London, England, 
1965:1~3-108. See also The Missionary Impact on Modem Nigeria 1842-1914, A Political and Social 
Analysis, by Ayandele, Longman Group LTD, Longman House, Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex, U. K. 1966: 
334-338. What follows is significant: "The high sexual morality that prevailed in the traditional society was 
upset by Western civilization and its conception of monogamy, missionary enterprise beginning the process 
in the greater part of Southern Nigeria" (Ayandele 1966:336) .. 
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evii consequences of infertility as well as a preyentiye to 
diyorce and prostitution to which childlessness and polygamy 
so often lead. 
But even this more positive practice has its own 
evils. In the culture that practices it (or used to practice 
it), the second wife is seen as the wife of the first wife 
so to say, because she arranged for her, even most probably 
arranged for all the financial costs in the name of her 
husband; but above all she chose the second wife because 
after all due personal inquiries and observation of the in-
coming new wife, the first wife believes she can live in 
harmony with her. Unfortunately, in many cases of this sort, 
the second wife plays more of the role of a servant to her 
husband's first wife. But the servile harmonious good 
relationship between the second wife and the first wife does 
not always last, and even where it lasts, such a servile-
rnarital relationship seems among other things in discord to 
the unity and equality of relationship that marriage calls 
for. 
In addition, a man who is considering polygamy or 
IVF/ET in terms of their costs, should not only consider the 
cost of marrying another wife, but also the uncertainty of 
marrying another infertile woman together with all the 
suff~rings involved for himself and the new wife. For the 
practice of polygamy is not a guarantee of fertility and 
offspring. 
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Since infertility in marriage can also be caused by 
some reproductive deficiency on the part of a man, including 
chromosomal aberrations, or defective sperms which may be 
responsible to series of spontaneous abortions which leave a 
woman childless, then a husband who is the direct source of 
childlessness in marriage is not always immune from the 
negative consequences of his reproductive incapability. The 
negative psychological (guilt, shame, depression, feeling of 
worthlessness) impact which a woman awareness of her 
infertility has on her, especially when it has become public 
knowledge, are replicated on the husband when he is the 
direct source of childlessness in their marriage. But the 
result is even worse on a man if his wife decides to pursue 
the good of bearing a genetic child and so also to escape 
the stigma of infertility. In most cases of this sort the 
consequence is divorce. 
For while a husband may not divorce his first wife if 
she is infertile, a woman can divorce her husband if he is 
the sole source of their childlessness. The reason behind 
such non-reciprocal behavior is that Nigeria is a 
patrilineal society. This means that a woman cannot marry 
another man without divorcing or separating from her first 
husband because for reasons of lineage within society, 
polyandry is not practiced in Nigeria. The only way such a 
wife can bear her own child/ren is ._if she divorces her 
infertile husband and marries another man, or if she begets 
289 
a child/ren extra-maritally. Thus, in Nigeria the wife of an 
infertile husband may go out and have a sexual relationship 
with a man outside of or even within the local community in 
order to have a child. Or as Mbiti says: "Where the husband 
is impotent or sterile, his 'brother' can perform the sexual 
duties and fertilize the wife tor him, and thus save the 
marriage from breaking down" (1969: 145). 9 In this 
situation, as in the case described above where the husband 
preserves his own lineage by marrying and bearing a 
child/ren by another woman, so does the wife (so to say) 
preserve her own lineage by bearing a child with another 
man, though not from her legal husband. 
Obviously, when childlessness causes a divorce or 
separation, the unity between husband and wife is 
automatically broken. Here again, the theme of the 
indispensable role played by procre~tion in Nigerian 
marriages, and the irreplaceable yalue of children in the 
Nigerian culture, is demonstrated by the woman's behavior 
(divorce or separation) in pursuit of this good/end (child) . 
But there are evil in the practices just discussed as well. 
When a wife leaves her husband for the known reason that he 
is infertile, the husband and his family members are 
bumiliated and exposed to shame. But this is not all. The 
humiliation and shame to which the husband and his family 
. The moral implication of this quotation will be addressed shortly. 
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are exposed has a long term negative effect on them because 
the husband will never be able to marry again. For in 
Nigeria, marriage involves the whole community. Mutual 
inquiries are instituted regarding the character and values 
of a man and a woman, along with their families, who seek to 
be in marital relationship with each another. This means 
that the man's inability to fertilize a woman or other 
problem of infertility will be exposed to another woman and 
her family members whose hand may be sought in marriage. 
Therefore, the psychological pain will therefore also 
fall on members of the husband's larger or extended family 
when the wife divorces or separates from her husband. Given 
what was learned in the section of psychological harm in 
Chapter Four, it seems clear that, in general, this has a 
much more long damaging effect than knowledge by a child 
that he/she is a product of IVF/ET would have on him/her. 
In Nigeria, a child who is a product of adultery, has 
at least two major issues which may be sources of 
psychological problems to him/her. The first is that he/she 
is faced with the problem of resemblance. The second is that 
he/she will face the problem of genealogy/lineage. "From 
where comes this child who neither resembles his father or 
his mother?" is typical of the kind of questions members of 
the community ask, especially if the child is a male in 
which case there is evidence through lack of resemblance 
that the infertile husband is not the father of the boy. 
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This kind of a situation can create a lot of stress and 
psychological problem of identity for the child, who may 
latter learn the conditions surrounding his conception and 
birth. Also, the husband may not be happy with the knowledge 
that he is not the father of the child. The situation can 
present a crushing feeling of emptiness or incompleteness, 
shame and worthlessness with reference to his incapacity to 
have his own child through conjugal act. 
The atmosphere in the household, is one of uneasiness, 
especially where the husband and wife are not in agreement 
with each other about the method of the conception of the 
child. The conception of a child due to adultery of the kind 
being described, sometimes ends up with the woman simply 
leaving or divorcing her husband; in order to marry the man 
responsible for her pregnancy. As Mbiti writes: "In the 
African situation what constitutes a divorce must be viewed 
against the fact that marriage is a 'process'. In many 
societies that 'process' is complete only when the first 
child is born, ... (1969:145). This simply means that a 
marriage is insecure, and is most likely to break up if no 
child is born within a certain period of years. 
An additional evil of the practice of polygamy in 
the specific instance where the wife/woman is the reason for 
chil~lessness is that, it is heavily prejudiced against 
married infertile women in favor of men. For, while the 
practice permits men to marry other women in order for them 
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to satisfy their desires for children, it does not permit 
women to satisfy similar desires on their part. In this way 
it leaves the genealogy issue incompletely attended to 
because it is helpful only to the men. Ancestry may be 
maintained for a man and his second, or third wife, it is 
broken for his first wife. The question that arises in all 
of the above benefits and harms of polygamy as a means of 
bypassing infertility, is whether polygamy is a better 
alternative to address the problem of childlessness than 
IVF/ET? 
A clarification of Mbiti's citation above is important 
now. Mbiti's presentation of the need for one's brother to 
impregnate his wife in order to preserve the marriage from 
breaking down, may lead a non-African the wrong impression 
that incest is a welcome practice in Nigeria. It is not. But 
the value and need for a child could compel a woman to 
engage in otherwise morally prohibited sexual behavior such 
as Mbiti described, even though that kind of behavior is 
severely punished as well. For, just as infertility is a 
sufficient reason for divorce, adultery within or outside of 
the community is also sufficient ground for divorce. In this 
connection M. Angulu Onwuegeogwu writes: "The most common 
grounds for the divorce of a woman are: real or assumed 
barrenness; acts which bring her into public disrepute; 
adultery with a kinsman" (1975:91). 
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However, when the issue is infertility where the man is 
the reason for childlessness, most men allow their wives to 
bear children for them through adulterous practices. The 
reason for such a permission is that .llQ man in Nigeria would 
willingly submit to public knowledge of impotence or 
infertility on his part. The notion of a man's inability to 
bear a child is without exaggeration, one of the most 
humiliating of all humiliating issues for a Nigerian man. It 
would be preferable to a man to divorce his wife or instead 
to permit his wife to bear children through adultery than to 
acknowledge that he is incapable of bearing a child. 
Nigerian culture, as indicated, sees a marriage as empty if 
it does not produce children and this cultural judgment does 
not exclude the Catholic segment of its population who are 
infertile. 
When one compares the very limited benefits and all the 
evils following from polygamy as described here with the 
risks and great benefits of successful IVF/ET one finds a 
marked difference. The major issues involved are firstly, to 
bear a genetic child and secondly to safeguard unity in 
marriage. It is obvious that polygamy is incapable of 
actually assisting the childless couple to bear a child of 
their own genes without another woman when either the wife 
or the husband is the source of childlessness. Polygamy 
extends the family, but leaves key parts of the value of 
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lineage and continuity unaddressed, and brings many evils as 
well. 
But when successful, IVF/ET is able to help the couple 
to bear their own genetic child/ren when either or both of 
them are contributors to childlessness. In this way, the 
issue of dissociation arising from divorce, and the further 
social evil of prostitution which arises from it are guarded 
against, and unity of spouses as well as social health are 
preserved. In addition and more importantly, the child that 
is born preserves both the lineage of his/her parents and 
his/her own proper parental identity. In other words, the 
child will not suffer from any psychological problem arising 
from lack of real knowledge of his/her biological identity 
as the child born of adulterous relationship would. 
Firstly then, it was already ~iscussed that the overall 
good to the parties involved - parents, the larger society, 
the child born, and posterity, in the means of IVF/ET 
outweigh all the negatives of this technology. But the 
practice of polygamy involves more evils than benefits. In 
allowing a husband to marry another wife to bear a child 
polygamy does not fully consider the good of his first wife 
nor the good of society, nor that of posterity, but only the 
husband's own point of view. Such a means also encourages 
the variety of serious evil consequences embedded in 
polygamy. Those evils - divorce and prostitution, cause 
social ill-health that are harmful to individuals and 
society. 
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Their negative impact on society as a whole outweigh 
the good brought about by polygamy, because this particular 
good - the child, will eventually suffer the harm produced 
by this particular means. This argument holds also for a 
woman who is considering to divorce her husband on account 
of infertility and marry another man in order to have a 
child. 
In view of the various facts shown by the analysis of 
the competing alternatives to IVF/ET, some conclusions 
become obvi6us. IVF/ET has an overwhelming advantages over 
the other competing alternatives. (1), it is able to help 
some infertile couples to reproduce their own genetic 
children while some cannot, as was seen in the examination 
of IVF/ET versus "adoption" and "acceptance of infertility 
... " (2), IVF/ET is a better alternative to surgical 
reconstruction of the oviduct and other surgical procedures 
because it is much more comprehensive of the variety of 
infertility conditions it can sometime bypass to produce 
children than this alternative which is limited in its 
scope. (3) It is a superior alternative to polygamy because 
it is able to preserve the genealogies of both spouses and 
prevents unnecessary social evils that are damaging to 
social life as a whole. 
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In all of the above, what is suggested is not that 
IVF/ET should replace any or all of the alternatives because 
IVF/ET is not perfect, just as the traditional means of 
human conception is not perfect. There may be situations 
that may allow the use of any of the other alternatives 
instead of IVF/ET although the evils of polygamy are 
considerable and the most difficult to justify (with 
reference to IVF/ET) . For example if a couple decides that 
they are better off adopting rather than using IVF/ET to 
bear and raise children, then in that specific instance it 
would be more beneficial to them all things considered to 
use that method than to employ the services of IVF/ET. This 
is to say that the availability of more than one option to 
an infertile couple to have a child, in order to lessen the 
amount of suffering or harm involuntary childlessness 
imposes on them, makes each of the available means of human 
conception and methods of bypassing infertility 
complementary to one another. 
Therefore opponents to IVF/ET are not justified in 
condemning IVF/ET as inunoral on the basis that it is fraught 
with more harm than the other suggested alternatives. For 
the investigations of this chapter have shown that this 
technological procedure is in fact superior to the other 
alternatives in terms of yielding more benefits and 
incurring less harm when the whole human good is considered. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has made a carefully focused 
consequentialist/proportionalist philosophical examination 
and critique of CDF's deontological philosophical arguments 
on the morality of IVF/ET; and applied the findings of this 
critique to the Nigerian cultural framework. Both CDF's 
position and this dissertation's are two different 
interpretations of Thomas Aquinas' on natural law morality. 
Chapter One set the scene of the arguments of this 
dissertation by reviewing the biological presuppositions of, 
and then the general arguments about IVF/ET focusing on 
homologous IVF/ET. Chapter Two provided a philosophical 
background for a proper understanding of the meaning of 
natural law. Chapter Three provided a more precise ethical 
philosophical foundation for CDF's document againt IVF/ET; 
gave a textual exposition of CDF's arguments, and showed 
that CDF's main deontological argument is fundamentally 
flawed. Chapters Four and Five take a consequentialist or 
proportionalist approach to the morality of IVF/ET, basing 
their reasoning on value assumptions about children that CDF 
itself accepts. More precisely Chapter Four examined the 
risks and harm and benefits of IVF/ET, and showed that, in 
general, the practice of IVF/ET yields more goods than harms 
for.those involved, especially in a culture like Nigeria. A 
comparison of IVF/ET with other alternatives was the subject 
matter of Chapter Five. In each case, it was shown that 
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IVF/ET in general yields a better balance of good over evil 
than the other alternatives {adoption, surgical 
reconstruction of the oviduct and other surgical procedures, 
acceptance of childlessness together with the development of 
other avenues towards leading a worthwile fulfilling life, 
and polygamy) . For example, {1) , it is able to help some 
infertile couples to reproduce their own genetic children 
while some cannot, as was seen in the examination of IVF/ET 
versus "adoption" and "acceptance of infertility ... " (2), 
IVF/ET is a better alternative to surgical reconstruction of 
the oviduct and other surgical procedures because it is much 
more comprehensive of the variety of infertility conditions 
it can sometime bypass to produce children than this 
alternative which is limited in its scope. {3) It is a 
superior alternative to polygamy because it is able to 
preserve the genealogies of both spouses and prevents 
unnecessary social evils that are damaging to social life as 
a whole. 
In all of the above, what is suggested is not that 
IVF/ET should replace any or all of the alternatives because 
IVF/ET is not perfect, just as the traditional means of 
human conception is not perfect. There may be situations 
that may allow the use of any of the other alternatives 
instead of IVF/ET although the evils of polygamy are 
considerable and the most difficult to justify {with 
reference to IVF/ET) . If a couple decides that they are 
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better off adopting rather than using IVF/ET to bear and 
raise children, then in that specific instance it would be 
more beneficial to them all things considered to use that 
method than to employ the services of IVF/ET. This is to say 
that the availability of more than one option to an 
infertile couple to have a child, in order to lessen the 
amount of suffering or harm involuntary childlessness 
imposes on them, makes each of the available means of human 
conception and methods of bypassing infertility 
complementary to one another. Therefore opponents to IVF/ET 
are not justified in condemning IVF/ET as inunoral on the 
basis that it is fraught with more harm than the other 
suggested alternatives. 
By properly articulating the natural law philosophical 
argument on which CDF bases its deontological arguments, 
giving them careful critical philosophical examination, I 
hope that it will be a genuine contribution to scholarhip as 
well as an open door invitation to more carefull scholarly 
discussion of CDF's position without its ecclesiastical 
aura. 
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